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Abstract of a thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
Abstract 
Local government authority and autonomy in Canterbury’s freshwater politics 
between 1989 and 2010.  
 
by 
Nicholas Allan Kirk 
 
This thesis proposes a hybrid theory, informed by multiple clientelism and New Public Management, 
to examine local government authority and autonomy under interest group influence in a modern 
New Zealand context. Multiple clientelism theory suggests that a local government agency can 
establish authority and autonomy over natural resource use through selective and sequential 
patronage with competing interest groups. Multiple clientelism was devised during an examination 
of American federal lands politics in the 1970s, an era of big government. By contrast, this thesis 
examines multiple clientelism in the context of New Zealand’s New Public Management reforms 
during which central government retreated somewhat from natural resource management. During 
New Zealand’s New Public Management reform era, natural resource management responsibilities 
were tranfered from a collection of central and local government agencies to regional councils. Also 
during this period, the Resource Management Act was introduced which required regional councils 
to manage and regulate the environmental effects of resource use. 
The predictions of the hybrid theory are examined through analysis of the Canterbury Regional 
Council’s freshwater management between 1989 and 2010. The Council was created in 1989 as an 
amalgamation of various government agencies. The Canterbury Regional Council navigated between 
pro-development and pro-conservation interest groups who desired contrasting policy over 
freshwater use. Three case studies were investigated using qualitative methods to examine how the 
Council pursued authority and autonomy over Canterbury’s freshwater management.  
In the three case studies, the Canterbury Regional Council struggled in its pursuit of authority and 
autonomy despite attempting selective and sequential patronage as multiple clientelism predicted. 
In response, the Council initiated collaborative governance arrangements to regain some authority 
over freshwater management. I propose that collaborative governance arrangements risk becoming 
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captured by powerful interest groups. New Public Management reforms for freshwater policy were 
initiated, in part, to limit the potential capture of policy by interest groups. As a result, I propose the 
counterintuitive conclusion of a cycle between policy capture and policy stagnation in Canterbury’s 
freshwater politics.  
Keywords: multiple clientelism; New Public Management; collaborative governance; freshwater 
management; Canterbury Regional Council; Environment Canterbury; Resource Management Act; 
interest groups; environmental policy; natural resource management.  
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1. Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The Canterbury region of New Zealand’s South Island contains 23 per cent of the nation’s agricultural 
land (Creech, Jenkins, Hill & Low, 2010, p.5). Following the European colonisation of New Zealand, 
this land has been integral to New Zealand’s export-based economy. Early colonists noted that access 
to freshwater would be necessary to farm Canterbury’s land (Cameron, 2009). In response, colonists 
in the 19th century built water races to quench the thirst of imported stock animals (Scotter, 1965b; 
Pawson, 2001). In the 20th century New Zealand’s government used public money to build irrigation 
schemes in Canterbury (Roche, 1994). However, by 1984 New Zealand’s Treasury argued that the 
benefits of public investment in irrigation infrastructure had been “captured entirely by private 
landowners within the schemes” (Treasury, 1984, p.46). New Zealand’s government responded by 
selling irrigation schemes to users in the hope that freshwater policy would not be captured in the 
future (Farley, 1994). During the 1990s and 2000s, farmers in Canterbury requested access to more 
irrigable freshwater to farm their land profitably, while environmental interest groups lobbied for the 
conservation of Canterbury’s freshwater resources. A new local government agency – the Canterbury 
Regional Council (abbreviated throughout to Environment Canterbury or ECan) - became responsible 
for managing and regulating the competing demands for freshwater use and conservation from 
1989. This thesis investigates ECan’s vexed management of freshwater from its amalgamation in 
1989 until its restructuring in 2010. This investigation produced some unexpected results. The 
research findings suggest that Canterbury’s freshwater policy could become captured by interest 
groups in the future despite the efforts of reformers in the 1980s to eliminate capture of freshwater 
policy. As a result of this counterintuitive conclusion, I propose a cycle between policy capture and 
policy stagnation in Canterbury’s freshwater politics.  
The Canterbury region in New Zealand’s South Island is the setting for this research. 58 per cent of 
freshwater allocated for consumptive purposes in New Zealand is abstracted from Canterbury’s 
streams, rivers, lakes, and underground aquifers (Mayoral Forum 2009: 23). As seen in Figure 1, 
Canterbury’s rivers either originate from the Southern Alps – such as the braided Rangitata, Rakaia, 
and Waimakariri Rivers – or from the eastern foothills – such as the Orari, Hinds, Selwyn, and Ashley 
Rivers (Hayward & Ackley, 1983, p.43; Winterbourn, 2008). Rivers are fed by groundwater, rain, and 
snow. Rainfall on the eastern foothills infiltrates through the soil to recharge underground aquifers 
(Hayward & Ackley, 1983, p.46). Canterbury’s groundwater is of high enough quality that 
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Canterbury’s urban centre Christchurch pumps all of its drinking water from untreated underground 
aquifers (Hoben, 1914; Chilton, 1924; Hercus, 1948; Dicker, 1993). Canterbury receives less rainfall 
than most areas of New Zealand, however, the Southern Alps on Canterbury’s western boundary 
ensures rivers and aquifers carry ample freshwater downhill towards the Pacific Ocean.  
 
Figure 1 Canterbury’s rivers –MfE (2015).  
These diverse sources of freshwater are managed and regulated by the Canterbury Regional Council. 
New Zealand is a constitutional monarchy with a unicameral Parliamentary system (Jackson, 2003), 
and local government agencies – such as ECan – are given legal rights and responsibilities by 
Parliament. For example, local governments in New Zealand can own property, employ staff, and 
enter into contracts (Bush, 2003, p.161). Nonetheless, local governments in New Zealand do not have 
legislative sovereignty. Only New Zealand’s Parliament has the sovereignty to enact law, and 
Parliament cannot be bound by the laws enacted by previous Parliaments (Jackson, 2003, p.78). The 
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structures, authorities, and responsibilities of New Zealand’s local governments are established by 
laws enacted by Parliament.  
New Zealand’s local government agencies struggled to exercise autonomy during the 1960s and 
1970s (Bush, 1980). These agencies were confronted by new demands as well as financial and 
functional inadequacies (Bush 1980, pp. 44-5). Regional united council responsibilities were poorly 
defined and overlapped with older road boards, country towns, and county boroughs. Graham Bush 
(1980, p.45) argued that “it was not a stable, placid era where each component had its station and 
was guaranteed immunity from interference”. Because New Zealand does not have a federal system 
of government, New Zealand’s local governments will never gain full autonomy from Parliament.  
Given this context, authority is defined in this research as a local government agency having “the 
right or capacity, or both, to have proposals or prescriptions or instructions accepted without 
recourse to persuasion…or force“(Reeve, 2009) 1. This follows contemporary political philosophers 
who argue that for a state to have authority its rules and commands must be followed by its citizens 
(Christiano, 2013). A citizen obeys state rules and commands because state officials exercise 
normative (morally justified) authority rather than non-normative (de facto) authority (ibid).  
 
There are several concepts of legitimate state authority. There is legitimate political authority as 
justified coercion, or legitimate political authority as the ability to impose duties on citizens 
(Christiano, 2013). However, I have chosen to use legitimate political authority as the right to rule. 
This means that citizens do not have a duty to comply with rules, however, an authority might offer a 
justification for its right to rule (Ladenson 1980). Therefore, the state has permission to issue 
commands as well as to coerce citizens into following them, but citizens can argue against these rules 
or choose to not comply and face the consequences.  
 
Autonomy is defined in this thesis as a local government agency having independence from non-
governmental groups (interest groups, business groups, etc.) to set proposals, prescriptions, and/or 
instructions. Michael Mann (1984) has argued that states have autonomous power. Mann’s 
argument is that the state is autonomous of civil society actors such as interest groups and business 
associations. Because civil society actors’ desire that some activities – for example, water use and 
allocation – are regulated by a central agency, they willingly cede resources to the state. A state is 
unique because, unlike the civil society actors, it’s centralized and territorially bound. Thus, the state 
                                                          
1 In Andrew Reeve’s original definition of state authority, he argues that authority is the capacity to “have 
proposals or prescriptions or instructions accepted without recourse to persuasion, bargaining, or force”. 
Bargaining was removed from the definition for its use in this research. This is because multiple clientelism 
theory, which will be introduced later in this chapter, argues that bargaining with interest groups enhances the 
authority of local government agencies. Thus, bargaining helps local governments to attain, rather than lose, 
authority.  
 4 
can be influenced by civil society actors – and frequently is – but it occupies a space, and obtains a 
power which is unique from civil society. Mann (1984) concludes that the power and autonomy of 
states has varied greatly throughout history.  
 
The context in which New Zealand’s local governments exercise authority and autonomy changed in 
the 1980s. New Zealand’s Labour Party campaigned during the 1987 national election to reform local 
government functions and boundaries (Bush, 1990, p. 326). Labour was successfully elected and 
passed the Local Government Amendment Act (no. 2) in 1989. This Amendment merged an 
estimated 850 single and multi-purpose local government agencies into 86 multi-purpose agencies 
(Cheyne, 2002, p. 127). The Local Government Amendment Act established directly elected regional 
councils. The Statement on Reform of Local Government argued that “regional councils will have a 
primary role in resource management” and that the boundaries of regional councils should conform 
to one or more freshwater catchments (Bassett, 1988, p. 5). The Statement also proposed a 
“separation of regulatory and service delivery responsibilities” (Bassett, 1988, p. 8). Central 
government2 envisioned that new regional councils would exercise regulatory responsibilities 
whereas territorial authorities3 would exercise service delivery responsibilities.  
Two united councils – Canterbury and Aorangi – amalgamated to create the Canterbury Regional 
Council on 9th June 1989 (Douglass, 2004a, p. 3). United councils exercised limited responsibilities 
and often had no independent source of income (Bush, 1980, pp. 69-70). United councillors were 
appointed by the territorial authorities within its boundaries (ibid). The election of regional 
councillors, and the expansion of the council’s mandate to include regulation of natural resource use, 
was a significant restructuring of New Zealand’s local government.  
The Resource Management Act (RMA) was enacted by Parliament during the first term of the 
Canterbury Regional Council on the 22nd July 1991. The RMA revolutionised environmental 
management in New Zealand by integrating the management of land, air, coastal, and freshwater 
resources in one piece of legislation for the first time. The purpose of the RMA was to “promote the 
sustainable management” of natural and physical resources (RMA, 1991, p. 68 [sec.5 (1)]). Regional 
councils were now responsible for regulating the use of natural and physical resources to ensure its 
sustainable management.  
                                                          
2 Central government refers to the executive branch of New Zealand’s unicameral Parliament. Central 
government propose the majority of laws that are passed by Parliament. New Zealand introduced a Mixed 
Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system in 1996 which means that it is unlikely that the executive will be 
made up of members of one political party. However, prior to MMP this occurred frequently.  
3 Territorial authorities are the second tier of local government in New Zealand. Territorial authorities are 
responsible for local roads, sewerage, building consents, and land use. The term local government agency is 
used throughout this research as a broad term encapsulating New Zealand’s regional councils, territorial 
authorities, and unitary authorities.  
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Prior to the RMA, planning legislation sanctioned activities in particular permitted areas (Peart, 2007, 
p. 15). By contrast, the RMA promoted sustainable management through regulating the effects of 
activities (ibid). Under the RMA, entrepreneurs determine the location of resource use while regional 
councils regulate and manage the effects of resource use (Berke, Crawford, Dixon, & Ericksen, 1999, 
p. 450).  
Local government and resource management reform were part of a broader project of state sector 
reform (Boston & Dalziel, 1992; Boston, Martin, Pallot, & Walsh, 1996). New Zealand faced a fiscal 
debt crisis following the election of the fourth Labour government in 1984 (James, 1986, p. 171). This 
crisis provided the impetus for reform. Labour’s reforms substituted Keynesian economic policies, 
which had prevailed in New Zealand since 1935, with a more market-based laissez faire approach 
(James, 1986; Roper, 1993; Kelsey, 1997). These reforms reduced central government control over 
New Zealand’s economy.  
By 1991 the new Canterbury Regional Council was in a state of flux. The elected regional councillors 
were now responsible for the regulation of natural resources in New Zealand’s largest regional 
council. I examine how the new regional council - created through an amalgamation of local 
government agencies that struggled to make autonomous decisions - pursued authority and 
autonomy given state sector reforms. I use the lens of multiple clientelism to examine how ECan 
pursued authority and autonomy over freshwater management in Canterbury between 1989 and 
2010.  
1.2 Multiple clientelism 
Multiple clientelism is a theory of natural resource management which analyses governmental 
authority and autonomy under interest group influence (Culhane, 1981). Multiple clientelism argues 
that governmental agencies establish relationships of patronage with interest groups to gain 
authority and autonomy over contentious natural resource management issues (Culhane, 1981, p. 
334). Multiple clientelism predicts that a governmental agency will be influenced by multiple 
customers. In Paul Culhane’s research, these customers included pro-development and pro-
conservation interest groups (Culhane, 1981, pp. 294-5). Culhane concluded that an agency will be 
influenced by multiple customers, and in response, chooses to establish relationships of patronage 
with both pro-development and pro-conservation interest groups at different times (Culhane, 1981; 
Mohai, 1987). Policy capture4 will be avoided because the agency is “variably captured” by different 
                                                          
4 Policy capture is also referred to as “agency capture” or “regulatory capture”. I have chosen to use the term 
policy capture in this research. Policy capture occurs if a “government agency…vests its operators with much 
discretion”, and as a result, “the tasks of these operators [become] define[d] by the pressures of external 
organized interests” (Wilson, 1989, p. 73).  
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interest groups (Culhane, 1981, p. 334). The agency will reach decisions that reflect the diversity of 
its interest group clientele.  
In sum, multiple clientelism offers an explanation of how ECan can establish authority and autonomy 
when influenced by multiple competing interest groups. ECan, by establishing relationships of 
selective and sequential patronage with interest groups, can reach diverse decisions over freshwater 
policy. ECan’s authority and autonomy will be strengthened through gaining the support of multiple 
interest groups. Multiple clientelism is an influential theory of natural resource management, 
however, it was devised in 1981 during the era of big government (Walker & Vatter, 1997, pp. 109-
110). By contrast, ECan was amalgamated during an era typified by the retreat of the regulatory state 
(Gunningham, 2009, p. 158). The New Public Management reforms, introduced to New Zealand 
between 1984 and 1999, affected the relationship between the government, bureaucracy, and 
interest groups. This research examines multiple clientelism in this context.  
1.3 New Public Management 
New Public Management (NPM) refers to the managerial reforms undertaken by consecutive New 
Zealand governments between 1984 and 1999. Christopher Hood (2001, p. 12553) defined NPM as 
“a new (or renewed) stress on the importance of management … in public service delivery, often 
linked to doctrines of economic rationalism”. New Zealand’s NPM reforms received international 
acclaim because of their speed, depth, and the extent to which they created an “innovative, 
sophisticated and coherent” framework (Halligan, 2007, p. 48). It is claimed that NPM reforms 
shifted “the emphasis from process accountability towards accountability for results” (Bach & 
Bordogna, 2011, p. 2284). Under this regime, a government ensures accountability for results by 
establishing goals and specifying outputs to meet these goals. The government then decides which 
type of organisation – public, non-profit, or private – can best deliver the outputs (Klijn, 2012, p.205). 
This process is concluded by testing “with well-defined output performance indicators” to determine 
whether the strategy taken was successful or not (ibid).  
New Public Management reforms will be described in greater detail during the third chapter. Three 
points should be noted here. First, ECan was amalgamated during the NPM reform era. Second, the 
RMA – which regulated the use of freshwater in New Zealand after 1991 – was enacted during the 
NPM reform era. Third, ECan’s freshwater regulation was guided by the RMA, and the methods the 
RMA promoted to achieve sustainable management – such as focusing on the effects of activities on 
the environment – were influenced by NPM.  
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1.4 The Resource Management Act and sustainable development 
The Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) regulates freshwater use, allocation, and management in 
New Zealand. Section 5 of the RMA states the intention of the legislation: 
(1) The purpose of this Act is to promote the sustainable management of 
natural and physical resources; 
(2) In this Act, ‘sustainable management’ means managing the use, 
development, and protection of natural and physical resources in a way, or 
at a rate, which enables people and communities to provide for their social, 
economic, and cultural wellbeing and for their health and safety while- 
a) Sustaining the potential natural and physical resources (excluding 
minerals) to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations; 
and 
b) Safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil and 
ecosystems; and 
c) Avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of activities on the 
environment (RMA, 1991, p. 68 [sec.5 (1)(2)]). 
The RMA’s definition of sustainable management and what is meant by the word “promote” has 
been interpreted in a variety of ways since the RMA’s enactment (Grundy, 2000). For example, New 
Zealand’s Environment Court observed in the 1990s that the RMA’s goal of sustainable management 
was so broad it had led to “an accumulation of words verging in places on turgidity” (as cited in 
Grundy, 2000, p. 67). Some argued that the authors of the RMA had created a deliberately 
ambiguous definition of sustainable management (Harris, 1993, pp. 67-8). This ambiguity allowed the 
Courts to interpret sustainable management through evolving case law. Peter Skelton and Ali Memon 
(2002, p. 2) agreed. They argued that defining sustainable management was difficult due to “the 
spectrum of values different groups accord to the environment in a plural social setting” (ibid). In 
response, the Courts adopted an “overall broad judgment” approach whereby no primacy was given 
to biophysical effects (Skelton & Memon, 2002, p. 7). The Courts assessed ecological, economic, 
social, and cultural effects equally when using an overall broad judgment approach to reach 
decisions. Upton, Atkins, & Willis (2002), reflecting on the RMA eleven years after its enactment, 
agreed with Skelton and Memon’s review of the case law. Simon Upton, who was the Minister for 
the Environment during the RMA’s enactment in 1991 and his co-authors, argued the sustainable 
management clause was designed to give the Courts reasonable latitude when making decisions 
(Upton et al., 2002).  
Freshwater ought to be regulated and allocated under the RMA in a way that promotes sustainable 
management. Regional policy statements, regional plans, and individual resource consents are the 
tools available to regional councils under the RMA to regulate and allocate freshwater. Regional 
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policy statements set the objectives for resource management in a region. Regional plans establish 
rules and limits to resource use (Gunningham, 2011, p.43). Policy statements and regional plans 
reconcile the demands of pro-development and pro-conservation interest groups while 
simultaneously promoting the sustainable management of natural resources. Consents are permits 
for resource use that require an effects-based assessment (ibid).  
In sum, ECan’s statutory mandate to promote sustainable management is ambiguous. As a result, 
pro-development and pro-conservation interest groups can lobby ECan through public submissions 
on regional plans, resource consent hearings, and other mechanisms like personal contacts or media 
presence. Walker, Brower, Clarkson, Lee, Myers, Shaw, & Stephens (2008) noted pro-development 
and pro-conservation lobbying in their examination of indigenous biodiversity protection under the 
RMA. As in Walker et al., both pro-development and pro-conservation interest groups can argue that 
their preferred policy outcome will help achieve sustainable management due to the RMA’s 
ambiguous mandate. Due to this ambiguity, ECan should be able to establish patronage with 
competing pro-development and pro-conservation interest groups as multiple clientelism predicts.  
1.5 Research Question 
ECan was created in 1989 through an amalgamation of local government agencies that had 
previously struggled to exercise autonomy. ECan was given responsibility for promoting the 
sustainable management of freshwater use in the region after the enactment of the Resource 
Management Act in 1991. Given this context, the research question I pose is:  
How did Environment Canterbury pursue authority and autonomy over freshwater 
management between 1989 and 2010?  
To answer this question, I will examine three case studies in-depth using qualitative methods 
(described in chapter four). The cases were chosen because competing interest groups attempted to 
influence ECan’s freshwater policy decisions. This thesis will examine multiple clientelism in a 
different context to Paul Culhane’s research in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Culhane, 1981). In 
response, a hybrid theory of multiple clientelism and New Public Management theory (MC-NPM) will 
be created to help guide the case study analysis (see end of chapter three).  
1.6 Organisation of the thesis 
Chapter 2 examines the theory of multiple clientelism. A description of the growth of environmental 
interest groups in New Zealand from the 1960s onwards follows. Multiple clientelism only becomes 
possible after the emergence of environmental interest groups in New Zealand’s freshwater 
management. Chapter 3 examines the state sector reform period in New Zealand with a focus on 
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New Public Management reform. It is argued that NPM reforms affected freshwater management as 
well as New Zealand’s interest group politics. The hybrid MC-NPM theory is introduced at the end of 
this chapter. Chapter 4 describes the research methods used to answer the research question.  
The next three chapters present the case studies. The first case study, Chapter 5, investigates ECan’s 
management of the Rangitata River in South-Canterbury and an attempt to halt damming of the river 
through application of a Water Conservation Order. The second case study, Chapter 6, examines 
ECan’s groundwater zoning policy. The third case study, Chapter 7, evaluates the Canterbury Water 
Management Strategy, a collaborative non-statutory plan that establishes targets, principles, and 
priorities for Canterbury’s future freshwater management. Chapter 8 discusses the case study 
findings in reference to the thesis’ research question. Chapter 9 concludes the thesis.  
The research findings suggest that an unintended consequence of new collaborative governance 
arrangements is a return to capture of freshwater policy. The counterintuitive conclusion is that a 
cycle exists between policy capture and policy stagnation Canterbury’s freshwater politics. The 
interest group cycle I propose contributes to research on collaborative freshwater governance 
internationally (Leach, Pelkey, & Sabatier, 2002; Singleton, 2002; Sabatier, Focht, Lubell, 
Ratchenberg, Veditz, & Matlock 2005; Benson, Jordan, Cook, & Smith, 2013; Anada & Procter, 2013) 
and in New Zealand (Lomax, Memon, & Painter, 2010; Holley & Gunningham, 2011; Land and Water 
Forum, 2012; Duncan, 2013; MfE, 2013). The interest group cycle also provides an alternative 
explanation for ECan’s freshwater management between 1989 and 2010 that goes beyond 
accusations of a farming conspiracy (Mahon, 2006; 2011) or ECan’s inability to fund regional planning 
(Douglass, 2004b; Williams, 2010a; G. McFadden, personal communication, April 17, 2013; K. Burke, 
personal communication, March 16, 2012.).  
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2. Chapter Two 
Multiple clientelism and the corporatist era of interest group 
politics in New Zealand 
2.1.  Introduction 
An observer in 1938 noted that New Zealand’s politics had a rural bias (Graham, 1963). Rural farmers 
were considered “the backbone of the country”, whereas urban New Zealanders were “parasitical in 
that they depend for their very existence on the lifeblood of the farmer” (as cited in Graham, 1963, 
pp. 197-8). Given this rural bias, it is not surprising that New Zealand’s early freshwater policy was 
shaped to favour rural industry, and later on, government managed hydro-electricity projects. It was 
not until the 1960s, with the emergence of environmentalism, that the prevailing logic of using New 
Zealand’s freshwater for economic development was challenged.  
This research focuses on freshwater management while highlighting the connection between 
freshwater management and land use. As Jonet Ward and Frank Scarf (1993, p. 60) argued 
“management of water resources cannot take place in isolation from the land”. Land uses for primary 
industries – such as wool, meat, and dairying – have been integral to New Zealand’s export-based 
economy (Smallfield, 1970; Easton, 1987; Greasley & Oxley, 2008; Pawson & Brooking, 2011; 
Lattimore & Eaqub, 2011). In 1921 93 per cent of New Zealand’s export produce was sourced from 
grassland products (Pawson & Brooking, 2011, p. 2). Since the 1920s, the use of New Zealand’s 
grasslands has changed in response to fluctuating international demand for commodities and 
adjustments in central government policy. For example, Table 1 highlights the growth of dairying in 
Canterbury during the 1990s and 2000s. The growth of dairying in Canterbury was a response to 
rising prices for dairy produce internationally as well as the removal of farming subsidies in the 1980s 
(see third chapter).  
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Table 1 Dairy Cattle in Canterbury – 1995 to 2009 –Statistics New Zealand Agricultural Census 
(1995; 1999; 2002; 2003; 2007; 2009) 
 Total Dairy cattle in 
Canterbury 
Total Dairy cattle in 
New Zealand 
Canterbury’s 
percentage of total 
New Zealand herd 
1995 228,114 4,089,817 5.5 per cent 
1999 275,305 4,316,409 6 per cent 
2002 533, 673 5,161,589 10 per cent 
2003 556,339 5,101,603 11 per cent 
2007 754,937 5,260,850 14 per cent 
2009 918,000 5,861,000 15 per cent 
 
This chapter examines the establishment of multiple interest group influence over freshwater 
management in New Zealand. It also examines in greater detail Paul Culhane’s theory of multiple 
clientelism. Multiple clientelism is an influential theory of natural resource management which 
argues that government agencies can establish authority and autonomy under multiple interest 
group influence. Farmers were the predominant interest group with influence over New Zealand’s 
freshwater management prior to the 1960s. Countervailing environmental interest groups emerged 
following the Lake Manapouri Dam protests. The chapter begins by discussing the theoretical roots 
of multiple clientelism before examining the quantitative model Paul Culhane devised to investigate 
interest group influence over US public lands policy. The chapter then examines the context of New 
Zealand’s freshwater management in the 1960s. The chapter concludes by describing the corporatist 
era of interest group politics in New Zealand.  
2.2. Roots of multiple clientelism 
Paul Culhane examined the two dominant explanations of US public lands politics – policy capture 
and conformity to professional norms – to see which one best fit the US Forest Service and the 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM). Political science, when investigating the influence of interest 
groups on policy, had traditionally focused on national politics. Culhane argued this was because rule 
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making authority and policy decisions often result from national politics (Culhane, 1981, p. 135). 
Regardless, Culhane argued that “local administrators play a critical role in agency decision making” 
(ibid). Thus, Culhane’s research focused on the “consequences of group influence on local 
administrators” representing the US Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management (Culhane, 1981, 
p. 30). Following Culhane, this research examines group influence over local government agencies 
and administrators.  
Culhane (1981, p. 335) argued that policy capture “is a degenerate form of clientelism”. Clientelism is 
a theory of politics which framed the relationship between a government agency and interest groups 
as one of patron and client. Susan Stokes (2007, p. 605) defined clientelism as “the proffering of 
material goods in return for electoral support, where the criterion of distribution that the patron 
uses is simply: did you (will you) support me”? A patron (e.g. a politician, political party, bureaucracy, 
or elected government) distributes goods and service to a client (e.g. interest groups, stakeholders, 
or citizens) in return for their support. Stokes (2007, p. 604) argued that clientelism will slow 
economic growth, weaken democratic institutions, and allow politicians to hold onto power for 
longer than they should. For these reasons, clientelism is often associated with policy capture.  
Policy capture occurs when an individual or interest group seeks “to control the distribution of 
discrete benefits by government”, for example, farmers influencing state funded irrigation policy 
(McFarland, 2004, p. 33). A captured governmental agency will only respond to a narrow clientele, 
such as irrigators, rather than the variety of different groups and individuals affected. Policy capture 
undermines the democratic process because private interests gain influence over public policy. In 
sum, clientelism assumes that a governmental agency will use patronage to gain the support of 
individuals and interest groups. Clientelism will result in policy capture if the agency establishes 
patronage with only a few select individuals and interest groups.  
Culhane also investigated the conformity thesis which argued that US Forest Service officers followed 
apolitical professional norms despite attempts to capture the service by interest groups (Culhane, 
1981, p. 65). The conformity thesis proclaimed that administrative decisions were an exertion of 
technical expertise (Culhane, 1981, p. 28). The conformity thesis explained how formal and informal 
practices were used by managers to gain a high level of compliance from subordinate field officers 
(Culhane, 1981, p. 29). The conformity thesis presented a challenge to those who argued that the US 
Forest Service and BLM had been captured by interest groups.  
2.3. Multiple clientelism 
Culhane created a quantitative model to examine interest group influence over the US Forest Service 
and BLM. Culhane hoped this model would help answer if US public lands policy was captured by 
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interest groups or if employees conformed to professional judgment and statutory law (Culhane, 
1981, p. 1). The quantitative model first defined the properties that give interest groups the ability to 
influence policy: (1) a group’s interest or preference; (2) a group’s organisational power; (3) a group’s 
size, relation to members who share its interest, financial resources, and/or the skills of their leaders; 
and (4) a group’s access to decision makers (Culhane, 1981, pp. 290-1). Culhane argued “a model of 
group influence would thus be a mathematical representation of the group theorists’ contention that 
any policy is a function of the power, value preferences, and access of the groups involved in the 
policy process” (Culhane, 1981, p. 291). Culhane’s model is presented in Figure 2 below.  
O = i1APV1 + i2APV2 + i3APV3 + i4APV4 + … +iNAPVN 
O = a policy output 
i = the particular group’s relative influence index 
A = the group’s access to decision makers5 
P = the group’s power, 
V = the group’s value preferences6, and; 
N = the total number of groups in the policy process 
Figure 2 A general group influence model (Culhane, 1981, p.291).  
Culhane argued that five interest groups could influence the BLM and Forest Service: including (1) 
the livestock industry, (2) the forest products industry, (3) conservationists and recreationists, (4) 
economic interests other than livestock or forest product industries (e.g. the mining industry), and 
(5) other local contacts or entities (Culhane, 1981, pp. 294-5). Culhane also included state 
administrators in his model. Culhane argued that a “persistent criticism of group theory has been 
that it assigns government decision makers too neutral and passive a role” (Culhane, 1981, pp. 295-
6). To address this criticism, local administrators and their superiors (e.g. district managers) are the 
sixth and seventh groups with potential influence over BLM and Forest Service policy.  
Culhane then measured the influence of these groups over four quantifiable policy decisions: 
including (1) the total amount of timber sold in a year; (2) the amount of permits given to graze 
                                                          
5 A group’s access to decision makers was calculated by tallying the number of interactions between an interest 
group and a local ranger or administrator.  
6 Culhane determined values by asking the groups a series of questions on public lands policy issues. He then 
put their answers into a scale from most-environmental to most-utilitarian. In this scale, conservationists were 
considered to be the most environmental, the Forest Service and BLM in the middle, with stockmen and the 
forest products industry the most utilitarian (Culhane, 1981, pp. 177-9).  
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animals in a year; (3) the number of permits granted in relation to mining, oil, and gas exploration; 
and (4) the amount of area designated for preservation (Culhane, 1981, pp. 291-2). Figure 3 presents 
these policy decisions as the output with interest groups included together to calculate their relative 
influence over policy. 
AUMs7% = a81 + i911Stock10RNVP + i12ForPr11RNVP + i13CnRc12RNPV + i14Eco13RNPV + i15Oth14RNVP 
+ i16SAdm15RPV + i17DAdm16PV17 + e1 
MBF18% = a2 + i21StockRNVP + i22ForPrRNVP + i23CnRcRNPV + i24EcoRNPV + i25OthRNVP + 
i26SAdmRPV + i27DAdmPV + e2 
Wild-Prim19% = a3 + i31StockRNVP + i32ForPrRNVP + i33CnRcRNPV + 34EcoRNPV + i35OthRNVP + 
i36SAdmRPV + i37DAdmPV + e3 
Min/O&G20% = a4 + 41StockRNVP + i42ForPrRNVP + i43CnRcRNPV + 44EcoRNPV + i45OthRNVP + 
i46SAdmRPV + i47DAdmPV + e4 
Figure 3 The public lands group influence model (Culhane, 1981, p.297).  
Culhane’s model confirmed that public participation access, interaction with decision makers, and 
organisational resources were not equally important for the different groups (Culhane, 1981, p. 305). 
For example, public participation access was important for conservationists and recreationists 
seeking to influence policy but less so for economic groups (Culhane, 1981, p. 306). The forest 
products industry had the highest influence over the four policy areas (Culhane, 1981, p. 307). The 
forest products industry achieved influence by having a high number of contacts within the Forest 
Service and BLM, however, frequency of contact was low. The four remaining non-governmental 
groups had relatively even influence. By contrast, administrators had the least influence (ibid). 
Culhane (1981, p. 309) noted that “the absence of individual administrators’ effects in the model 
does not mean that administrators as a whole – as part of the complicated structure of agency 
                                                          
7 AUMs% is grazing use, in animal-unit months, as proportion of carrying capacity. 
8 a is intercepts. 
9 i is influence indices. 
10 Stock is livestock industry. 
11 ForPr is forest products industry. 
12 CnRc is conservationists and recreationists. 
13 Eco is economic users other than the livestock and timber industries. 
14 Oth is other interest group contacts. 
15 SAdm is forest supervisors and BLM district managers. 
16 DAdm is forest rangers and BLM area managers. 
17 RNPV, RPV, PV are products of power, values, and access, as defined previously. 
18 MBF% is timber sold, in 1,000 board-feet, as proportion of allowable cut. 
19 Wild-Prim% is wilderness, primitive, and other areas approved, as proportion of areas considered. 
20 Min/O&G% is mining or oil and gas leases/permits approved, as proportion of allocations. 
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policymaking – are unimportant in the policy-making process”. Significantly, administrators did not 
reconcile their own values with conservationist demands, but used conservationist demands to 
legitimate their own policies and professional norms (ibid). Culhane concluded there was “fairly 
strong evidence of group influence at even the lowest levels of public management” (Culhane, 1981, 
p. 311).  
Culhane’s research reinvigorated the debate between capture and conformity. Culhane argued that 
policy capture would occur if an agency only established patronage with one interest group (Culhane, 
1981, p. 325). Culhane found that policy capture was avoided because the Forest Service and BLM 
are required to engage with a variety of interest groups. The Forest Service and BLM’s multiple-use 
mandate encouraged these agencies to provide as many uses of public land for as many users as 
possible (Culhane, 1981, p. 327; BLM, n.d.). Culhane highlighted a flaw in the debate between 
capture and conformity. Culhane’s research discovered that groups influence public land managers:  
…but because local constituencies are not composed solely of commodity users, as the capture thesis 
assumes, the resulting pattern of influence is quite different from that posited by thesis adherents. 
The Service and Bureau are neither uniformly captured nor uncaptured, but variably captured 
(Culhane, 1981, p. 334). 
Variable capture was Culhane’s contribution to interest group theory. Variable capture allowed 
economic interests and conservationists to attain their policy goals at different times. Decisions 
appeal to both groups because the agencies in Culhane’s research represent a number of different 
constituencies. I refer to the process of variable capture throughout this research as the selective and 
sequential patronage of interest groups by a local government agency.  
Culhane argued that policy capture is a matter of perception, and “when environmentalists…look to 
the right…they see the Service and Bureau aligned with consumptive user industries, and when 
industry users look to the left, they see the agency aligned with environmentalists” (Culhane, 1981, 
p. 338). Interest groups typically interact with a local government agency in one-on-one situations. 
Thus, only government officers fully appreciate the tension between competing interest groups 
(ibid). An agency relies “on their own experience” in anticipating tension between interest groups 
and responds in a way that avoids future conflict (Culhane, 1981, p. 281). This is known as the “rule 
of anticipated reactions” (Culhane, 1981, pp. 279-83; Mohai, 1987, pp. 124-5).  
The multiple-use doctrine also helps local government agencies mediate conflict between interest 
groups. According to Culhane, multiple-use was the key technical and political doctrine of the Forest 
Service and BLM (Culhane, 1981, p. 331). Multiple-use was defined by the American Federal Land 
Policy and Management Act of 1967 as the “management of the public lands and their various 
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resource values so that they are utilized in the combination that will best meet the present and 
future needs of the American people (BLM, n.d.) The multiple-use doctrine is broad enough to justify 
the use or conservation of natural resources. Thus, local government agencies used the doctrine to 
resolve the political pressures placed on them by competing interest groups (Culhane, 1981, p.331).   
An agency, using selective and sequential patronage and the rule of anticipated reactions, can “play 
their more extreme constituents off against each other to reinforce the agencies’ preferred middle 
course” (Culhane, 1981, p. 336). Furthermore, “by using both extreme elements in their 
constituencies, the bureau and service generate a multiple clientele for their multiple-use mission” 
(ibid). Culhane concluded that the agencies in his research “have so arranged matters that the 
political necessity of responding to their multiple clienteles reinforces the dictates of their 
professional expertise and statutory mandates” (Culhane, 1981, p. 341).  
In sum, multiple clientelism proclaimed that a local government agency can establish authority and 
autonomy if multiple interest groups lobby for competing policies. Culhane devised this theory in 
response to the contextual changes in America’s public lands policy he observed during his research. 
An important aspect of this contextual change was the emergence of conservationist and 
environmentalist interest groups. The next section will examine the growth of environmental interest 
groups in New Zealand’s freshwater policy following the Lake Manapouri Dam protests.  
2.4. The emergence of environmental interest groups – the Lake 
Manapouri dam protests 
Appendix 1 details the pre-colonial management of freshwater in Canterbury by Māori. This appendix 
demonstrates that freshwater was actively managed by Māori prior to the arrival of European 
settlers. Despite this, European settlers were of the opinion that no legal mechanisms existed for 
management of freshwater prior to their colonisation. This misjudgement permitted transition from 
existing Māori law, which overlay physical and metaphysical realms, with English common law 
(Wheen, 2002, p. 261). English common law established riparian ownership rights for freshwater. 
Riparian rights permitted landowners to use freshwater for domestic and stock watering purposes as 
long as the flow of water through their property was not diminished in quality or quantity (Roche 
1994, p.16).  
Appendix 2 details the drainage of Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere in Canterbury. This appendix 
demonstrates that European freshwater management was used to establish productive farming in 
Canterbury through lake drainage and protection of land from water bodies. This occurred despite 
protests from local Māori that they did not sell Te Waihora to the settlers.  
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Appendix 3 details the establishment of Canterbury’s farming industry between 1850 and 1960. This 
appendix shows that farmers were the prevailing interest group in Canterbury’s freshwater 
management from 1850. During this period, the Farmers Union (Cleveland, 1972) and Federated 
Farmers (Perry, 1992) established themselves as the voice of farmers in New Zealand. New Zealand’s 
politics exhibited a rural bias and farming interest groups and local booster organisations used their 
influence to lobby central government to construct irrigation schemes during this period, for 
example, the Rangitata Diversion Race (RDR) in Mid-Canterbury. Irrigation test farms were also 
established with the help of central government funding (Evans & Cant, 1981, p. 59; Hopkinson, 
1997; Wood & Brooking, 2001, p. 90). 
Federated Farmers were New Zealand’s prevailing farming interest group by the 1960s. In this same 
decade, countervailing environmental interest groups established themselves in response to the 
proposed damming of Lake Manapouri in the Fiordland region of New Zealand’s South Island (Bührs 
& Bartlett, 1993; Memon, 1993). Ecologists, hunters, and urban citizens were concerned about the 
effect of the proposed dam on the local landscape. Two factors led to the Lake Manapouri dam 
protests. First, there was a growing public awareness of the risks of human activity on the natural 
environment. For example, Rachel Carson’s popular book Silent Spring (1962) highlighted the effect 
of pesticides on birdlife. Second, the New Zealand public was increasingly angered by the second 
National government’s secret negotiations with international corporations. The government planned 
to build the Lake Manapouri dam to generate power for an aluminium smelter run by international 
company Comalco (Young, 2004, p. 170). 
Investigation into a hydro-electric dam on Lake Manapouri began in 1959 (ibid). Construction started 
after the election of the second National government in 1960. The Lake Manapouri dam was far 
more controversial than previous hydro-electric dam projects, such as Lake Coleridge in Canterbury 
(Peat, 1995, p. 3; Britten, 2000), because the government proposed to raise the lake’s level to supply 
the hydro-electricity station. The public were repulsed that a lake as aesthetically beautiful as 
Manapouri could be destroyed for economic gain (Peat, 1995, p. 3). Economic development 
conflicted with growing environmental awareness (Wheen, 2002, p. 265).  
The Save Manapouri Campaign began in 1959 but did not flourish until early 1970 (Young, 2004, p. 
174). The campaign was successful due to its ability to assemble different groups – such as the 
aforementioned hunters, ecologists, and urban citizens – into a coalition focused on saving the lake. 
The Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society’s petition to save the lake was signed by 264,907 New 
Zealanders (Young, 2004, p. 170). The third Labour government was elected in 1972 and committed 
during the election campaign to halt raising lake levels. Botanist and conservationist Alan Mark 
argued that the Lake Manapouri protests transitioned New Zealand’s economy from a focus on 
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resource exploitation for economic gain towards a new era that integrated conservation of natural 
resources with economic development (Peat, 1995, p. vii). This transition is highlighted by 
institutional concessions granted to environmentalists during this period, such as the establishment 
of a Nature Conservation Council in 1962 as well as a Commission for the Environment in 1971 
(Wells, 1998, pp. 6-7).  
2.4.1. The corporatist era of interest group politics in New Zealand – 1949 to 1984 
The Manapouri Dam debate coincided with the corporatist era of interest group politics in New 
Zealand. Corporatism is a form of government in which public policy is written in cooperation with 
specific interest groups (Mulgan, 1989, pp. 104-5). In a corporatist government “power lies with 
organised interest groups rather than with elected political leaders or public servants” (ibid). The 
government recognises some interest groups as the legitimate representatives of their sector, for 
example, the Engineering, Printing, and Manufacturing Union for workers or Federated Farmers for 
farmers. The government selects certain interest groups to help write policy.  
Corporatism began in New Zealand after the election of the first National government in 1949 
(Westrate, 1959; Cleveland, 1972). The previous Labour government had insisted on direct control of 
the economy. An example of corporatism was the co-operative Meat and Dairy export boards. Under 
National, these boards received greater autonomy for marketing their produce overseas (Westrate, 
1959, pp. 60-1). Farming policy subsequently became a bargaining exercise between the 
government, Federated Farmers, and the Meat and Dairy boards.  
Richard Mulgan (1989, p. 109) described the various techniques marketing boards or Federated 
Farmers used to influence New Zealand’s government during the corporatist era. These techniques 
included making submissions to the Minister of Finance before the government budget, discussing 
taxation and broader economic policy, as well as the development of farming policy. Mulgan argued 
that “[b]ecause Federated Farmers is so effective both in articulating the differing viewpoints of the 
farming industry and in forming an acceptable consensus between them, ministers of agriculture 
tend to rely on its advice as representative of farming opinion” (ibid). Nick Perry (1987; 1992) 
concurred with Mulgan. Farmers, according to Perry (1987, p. 117), influenced government policy 
during the corporatist era by actively engaging with government bureaucracies and politicians.  
2.4.2. Strengthening corporatism – the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 
During the Manapouri Dam debate, Parliament rewrote and passed a new law governing the use, 
allocation, conservation, and quality of freshwater in New Zealand. The Water and Soil Conservation 
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Act 1967 (WSCA) gave central government ownership21 of freshwater, as well as the authority to use, 
allocate, and manage freshwater in New Zealand (ibid). The WSCA replaced the riparian rights regime 
that had existed for freshwater use since European colonisation (Roche, 1994, p. 107). Under the 
WSCA, businesses and government bureaucracies (such as the Electricity Department) would have to 
apply to Regional Water Boards for the right to use water (Roche, 1994, p. 106). Negotiation 
between the government and business over the use of freshwater was now mandatory. This 
strengthened the New Zealand government’s authority over freshwater management and reflected 
its corporatist style of decision making.  
New Zealand’s previous freshwater legislation, the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act (SCRCA) 
1941, focused primarily on soil erosion (Dick, 1969; McCaskill, 1973). The SCRCA established 
Catchment Boards that under the WSCA became Regional Water Boards. The SCRCA also established 
the national Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Council (SCRCC), which would remain influential 
after the passing of the WSCA (Roche, 1994, p. 106). Freshwater management issues became more 
complex between 1941 and 1967. The Manapouri dam protests highlighted the growing desire for 
conservation of freshwater bodies. Furthermore, a government report released in 1959 noted 
imminent conflict over the allocation of freshwater for irrigation in Canterbury (Roche, 1994, p. 98). 
The report argued that the SCRCA was unable to resolve these conflicts because no governmental 
agency had been designated with the task of allocating freshwater between competing uses (ibid). 
New Zealand’s freshwater legislation subsequently shifted from a focus on soil erosion to a focus on 
“allocation of water amongst competing agricultural, industrial, domestic and subsequently 
recreational and scenic uses” (Roche, 1994, p. 97). 
The Water and Soil Conservation Act (1967, p. 1) stated its goal:  
to promote a national policy in respect of natural water, and to make better 
provision for the conservation, allocation, use, and quality of natural water, 
and for promoting soil conservation and preventing damage by flood and 
erosion, and for promoting and controlling multiple uses of natural water.  
The WSCA focused on the multiple uses of freshwater in New Zealand (Dick, 1969, pp. 9-10). 
Freshwater allocation was now the responsibility of the National Water and Soil Conservation 
Authority (NWASCA). NWASCA was responsible for advising government Ministers about freshwater 
issues of national importance, co-ordinating matters relating to the erosion and pollution of 
freshwater, controlling the damming of water bodies, guiding research efforts, as well as creating 
minimum standards for freshwater quality (Roche, 1994, pp. 106-7). In retrospect, NWASCA and the 
Regional Water Boards struggled to achieve the goals of the WSCA. For example, freshwater 
pollution targets were not met. The Water Pollution Council, established after the enactment of the 
                                                          
21 With the exception of domestic water, stock water, and water for firefighting purposes (Roche, 1994, p. 105).  
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Water Pollution Act 1953 (Ward & Scarf, 1993, p. 65), was limited to an advisory role following 
lobbying from New Zealand’s meat and dairy industries (Roche, 1994, p. 120). This is one explanation 
for the failure to achieve water pollution targets during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.  
In response, the Water Resources Council (WRC) was established to manage water pollution 
following an amendment to WSCA in 1972 (Roche, 1994, p. 119). The WRC’s role was to classify 
water bodies due to their quality, carry out surveys into the deterioration of water quality, and 
spread information as to how water quality could be improved in New Zealand (Roche, 1994, p. 121). 
Regional Water Boards were responsible for granting rights to discharge pollution into waterways, 
and thus, they pressured the WRC to classify water bodies as quickly as possible so that minimum 
water quality standards in New Zealand could be established (Roche, 1994, pp. 121-2). Despite this, a 
report released by the WRC in 1974 noted that only half of the dairy farms and factories they 
monitored had satisfactory effluent disposal systems (Roche, 1994, pp. 122-3).  
The WSCA struggled to achieve freshwater quality targets. The WSCA also struggled when calculating 
the benefits of competing freshwater uses. The WSCA proposed that the potential benefits of water 
use had to be weighed against anticipated ecological losses (Wheen, 2002, p. 265). This balancing 
approach was tested during an Appeal Board hearing over hydro-electricity development on the 
Rangitaiki and Whaeo Rivers in 1978. The potential benefit was electricity development; the 
anticipated ecological loss was an outstanding fishery and the habitats of endangered duck species. 
The Appeal Board argued that they lacked the statutory guidelines to determine the relative 
importance of economic development, scenic values, and wildlife (Roche, 1994, pp. 132). According 
to lawyer Tony Black, the subsequent decision to allow hydro electricity development exhibited a 
clear bias: 
…towards resource development as opposed to environmental 
conservation…For in the process of balancing tangible economic benefits 
and tangible social benefits against intangible and generally misunderstood 
environmental benefits the tangible wins out every time (Black, 1978,p. 
153). 
Use of freshwater for economic development persisted despite the WSCA’s attempt to balance 
economic and environmental goals. This highlights the power of economic users of freshwater during 
New Zealand’s corporatist era of government. For example, rural districts dominated by farmers 
successfully lobbied for an increase in government spending on irrigation development throughout 
the 1970s (Roche, 1994, p. 124). Following an amendment to the WSCA in 1971, the WRC was given 
the authority to approve the construction of irrigation schemes costing less than $50,000. By 1974 
the WRC had subsidised nine new irrigation schemes costing a total of $185,000 (Roche, 1994, p. 
 21 
125). Freshwater management in the corporatist era remained dominated by commercial concerns 
despite attempts to balance economic and environmental goals.  
2.4.3. Environmental concessions – the 1981 Wild and Scenic Rivers Amendment 
The WSCA’s balancing approach, when applied in Appeal Board hearings, favoured the economic use 
of water over preservation of freshwater ecosystems. In response, environmental interest groups 
pressured politicians to protect freshwater bodies in New Zealand. The third National government – 
influenced by the American Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (Tarlock & Tippy, 1970) – succumbed to 
pressure and proposed protection of wild rivers through an amendment to the WSCA. This 
highlighted the increasing influence of environmental interest groups during the corporatist era of 
interest group politics in New Zealand.  
The 1981 Wild and Scenic Rivers Amendment established a framework to protect freshwater bodies 
in New Zealand. The object of the Amendment was “to recognise and sustain the amenity afforded 
by waters in their natural state”, through “the preservation and protection of the wild, scenic and 
other natural characteristics of rivers, streams and lakes” (WSCA, 1981, p.1). Water Conservation 
Orders (WCOs) were the legal mechanism provided by the Amendment to protect freshwater bodies. 
A WCO can protect a water body by four methods: (1) providing for the quantity or rate of flow of 
water in its natural state, (2) preventing the building of dams along water bodies, (3) preventing the 
building of dams outside of the water body which will subsequently effect that water body, and (4) 
setting maximum and minimum levels of water flow (WSCA, 1981, p. 20D [sec. 3 (a) (b) (c) (d)]).   
Some environmentalists opposed the Amendment. Opponents argued the changes were a “farce” 
while others saw it as an “unhappy compromise” (Oldham, 1989, pp. 75-6). Acclimatisation 
societies22 were not entirely satisfied with the Amendment but recognised its importance. 
Conservationists criticised the Amendment because it did not regulate land use. Conservationists 
argued land use was integral in determining the “outstanding qualities” of water bodies (Oldham, 
1989, p.80). Despite criticism, three WCOs were successfully enacted in Canterbury during the 1980s 
on Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere, the Ahuriri River, and the Rakaia River (Hughey, Rennie, & Williams, 
2014). The Rakaia River was protected despite hydro-electricity and irrigation companies lobbying for 
a dam (Young, 2004). The Rakaia River WCO illustrated that WCOs could affect land use through 
restricting the amount of freshwater available for irrigation (Oldham, 1989, pp. 104-5). The Rakaia 
River WCO thus hinted at the challenge WCOs would pose to prevailing farming interest groups 
during future freshwater allocation debates23.  
                                                          
22 Acclimatisation societies became what are now known as the Fish and Game Councils of New Zealand.  
23 This will be investigated in further depth during the fifth chapter. 
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In sum, during the corporatist era between 1950 and 1984 the government offered a variety of 
concessions to farmers and environmental groups. Farmers lobbied successfully for subsidised 
irrigation schemes. Environmental interest groups were able to protect wild freshwater bodies 
through an amendment to the WSCA. The ability of the government to set policy without recourse to 
persuasion or force exhibited its authority over freshwater management during this period24. 
However, the government was not able to set policy without first bargaining with interest groups, 
exhibiting a low level of autonomy over freshwater management. During the NPM era, the 
proliferation of local government agencies with authority over freshwater use in New Zealand – such 
as regional water boards, catchment boards, and the water resources council – were amalgamated, 
and the legislation governing the use of New Zealand’s freshwater was re-written.  
2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter introduced Paul Culhane’s theory of multiple clientelism. Multiple clientelism argued 
that a local government agency can gain authority over natural resource management despite 
pressure from multiple and competing interest groups. An agency can establish patronage with 
different interest groups at different times. Despite bargaining with interest groups, the local 
government agency establishes autonomy by playing each group off against each others in order so 
that the agency can pursue its preferred policy.  
Paul Culhane devised multiple clientelism after investigating interest group influence over the US 
Forest Service and BLM in the 1970s. These agencies were responsible for planning, regulating, and 
allocating natural resources such as forests and grasslands for multiple users. In New Zealand, a 
variety of regional, sub-regional, and local agencies were responsible for planning, regulating, and 
allocating freshwater under the Water and Soil Conservation Act.  
The WSCA also noted the need to address multiple uses of freshwater. Comparable to Culhane’s 
research, more than two groups desired influence over New Zealand’s freshwater management – for 
example, hydro-electricity generators, fishers, and water-sports enthusiasts – however, as this 
chapter illustrates, farmers and environmentalists were the most organised and influential 
groupings. As a result, economic users of freshwater and environmentalists had to negotiate with 
agencies over the use or protection or freshwater bodies in New Zealand. Thus, the corporatist era of 
freshwater management described in this chapter led local government agencies to negotiate policy 
with interest groups in a method that was reminiscent of multiple clientelism.  
                                                          
24 A noted exception is the Clutha Development (Clyde Dam Empowering) Act of 1982. The Act allowed the 
Clyde Dam to be built despite an earlier court decision against the dam’s construction. Nicola Wheen (2002, p. 
268) argued that this broke an important constitutional convention. As such, the Act exhibited central 
government’s use of authority above and beyond the law.  
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The next chapter examines the reforms which were introduced after the election of the fourth 
Labour government in 1984. This government was elected during a fiscal debt crisis that led them to 
introduce economic, managerial, and state sector reforms. The chapter examines these reforms with 
a particular focus on New Public Management reforms. The chapter examines the effect NPM 
reforms had on interest group politics and freshwater management in New Zealand. These reforms 
might have an effect on the way a new local government agency pursues authority and autonomy 
over freshwater management, especially given the shift from the big government corporatist 
approach of the WSCA towards the hands-off effects-based approach of the Resource Management 
Act.  
 24 
3. Chapter Three 
New Public Management in New Zealand 
3.1. Introduction 
New Zealand’s government was radically reformed between 1984 and 1999. During this period the 
public service was reshaped, subsidies for farmers were removed, and the economy was reformed to 
reflect the principles of laissez-faire free market economics. Internationally, the scope of New 
Zealand’s reforms was unique. For example, The Economist magazine noted in November 1990 that 
“New Zealand is the only rich country in the world which does not protect its farmers at all. They are 
paid only a quarter of the price received by EC [European Community] farmers for their butter and 
milk” (as quoted in McGill, 2004, p. 85). The state sector reform period affected farmers, and as a 
result, also affected land use and freshwater management in New Zealand. This chapter examines 
this period of economic, managerial, and state sector reform in New Zealand. I hypothesise that 
these reforms will have an effect on the way ECan pursues authority and autonomy over freshwater 
management.  
Prior to these reforms, New Zealand’s public service was a “unified, lifetime career [public] service” 
with “monolithic sector-based departments” (Gill, Pride, Gilbert, Norman, & Mladenovic, 2011, p.32). 
These monolithic departments were often “preoccupied with due process, rules and equity of 
treatment” (Ryan & Gill, 2011, p. 13). In response to this environment, New Public Management 
reforms promoted new administrative principles for the public service that were influenced by 
private sector management techniques (Hood, 1991; 2001).  
This chapter reviews New Zealand’s New Public Management (NPM) reform era. The chapter begins 
by describing the general features of NPM reform. The chapter then analyses the New Zealand model 
of public management that became a global exemplar of NPM reform (Halligan, 2007, p. 48; 
Whitcombe, 2008, p. 7). Following this, the effect of NPM on freshwater management in New 
Zealand and Canterbury is examined. A discussion of the influence of interest groups over public 
policy during the NPM era is then presented. The chapter is concluded by acknowledging the trend 
towards collaborative governance post-NPM. The hybrid MC-NPM theory is introduced at the end of 
this chapter.  
3.2. New Public Management – a new reform agenda 
Public management is defined in this thesis as “the arrangements for governing a country, including 
the means by which policies are developed and implemented by public sector organisations and the 
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processes for funding managing and monitoring those organisations” (Gill et al., 2011, p.30). NPM 
was a global reform project that encouraged governments to reduce or eliminate “the differences 
between the public and the private sectors” by focusing on results over process (Bach & Bordogna, 
2011, p. 2284). NPM reformed governments achieved this shift by establishing policy goals (such as 
maximizing irrigated land space) and specifying outputs to meet these goals (such as the amount of 
freshwater consents granted).  
NPM scholars have argued that the reform agenda was influenced by economic-based theories of 
politics as well as private sector managerial practices (Aucoin, 1990; Boston et al., 1996). Public 
Choice Theory (PCT) is the most widely cited economic-based theory of politics that influenced NPM 
reform (Boston et al., 1996, p. 17; Whitcombe 2008, p.8). PCT is a theory of politics that uses 
“economic tools to deal with the traditional problems of political science” (Tullock, 2008). PCT 
reframes the relationship between the voter and politician as one of customer and entrepreneur 
(Tullock, 2008). PCT assumes that politicians, bureaucrats, and voters are all self-interested. Through 
this assumption, PCT can use tools of analysis derived from economics and statistics to understand 
(and potentially predict) political behaviour. 
PCT scholars argued that “politicians will pursue their own particular objectives at the expense of 
many of their constituents”, that “interest groups will engage in rent-seeking behaviour to the 
disadvantage of the wider community”, and finally that “government officials, in their attempts to 
expand their budgets, will acquire an ever increasing quantity of resources” (Niskanen 1971, as cited 
Boston et al., 1996, p. 18). These predictions assumed that the state will expand to address the 
unique desires of politicians, interest groups, and bureaucracies. The result is that interest groups or 
bureaucrats will capture policy (ibid). As Boston et al. (1996, p. 27) argued, PCT’s “emphasis on [the] 
budget-maximising behaviour of bureaucrats, its suspicion of politicians’ motives, and its concern 
over provider capture…undoubtedly influenced the climate of opinion” during New Zealand’s NPM 
reform period. Whitcombe (2008) agreed with Boston et al. and added that NPM reformers 
perceived PCT as a solution to the problem of provider capture, in which policy is captured by self-
interested bureaucrats who do not respond to government ministers.  
NPM reforms were also influenced by private sector managerialism. Managerialism is reminiscent of 
scientific management and the work of Frederick Winslow Taylor (cf. Painter, 2011). Reformers 
assumed that the differences between the public and private sectors were insignificant, and thus the 
public service ought to adopt private sector managerial practices (Boston et al., 1996, p. 26). Private 
sector management techniques such as short term contracts with tightly specified details (Put & 
Bouckeart, 2011), performance linked pay, and the development of strategic and corporate plans 
(Hood, 1995, p. 97), were subsequently introduced to the public sector. 
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Christopher Pollitt and Geert Bouckeart (2004, p. 280), in a comparative analysis of NPM reforms in 
thirteen different jurisdictions, concluded that New Zealand’s reforms were “probably the most 
comprehensive and radical set of public management reforms of any OECD country”. New Zealand’s 
NPM reforms are analysed in the next section.  
3.3. New Zealand’s New Public Management reforms  
New Zealand’s Treasury promoted the adoption of NPM in New Zealand. Treasury preached the 
benefits of NPM in two influential documents. The first document, Economic Management, was 
Treasury’s briefing to the incoming Labour government in 1984 (Treasury, 1984). The second 
document, Government Management, was published as a briefing to the returning Labour 
government in 1987 (Treasury, 1987). Treasury argued that public management in New Zealand 
ought to be reformed: Treasury suggested (1) clear objectives for managers that are then monitored 
for performance, (2) transparency in setting performance objectives, (3) a structure that limits the 
capture of policy by people who are providing public services, (4) a structure that ensures 
contestability of policy advice and delivery, (5) the gathering of good information from which to 
gauge public sector performance, and (6) incentives for managers to achieve the goals of 
government rather than their own personal goals (Scott, 2001, p. 4).  
Treasury’s suggestions for public management reform influenced the NPM reforms initiated by 
consecutive governments between 1984 and 1999. Boston et al. (1996) is the authoritative source on 
the New Zealand model of NPM. Boston et al. note that not all of the aspects of global NPM reform 
were adopted in New Zealand. Below are some of New Zealand’s NPM reforms recounted by Boston 
et al. (1996, pp. 27-8).  
1) Attempts to limit the role of interest groups in New Zealand  
Treasury (1987, pp. 44-5) argued that central and local government, when addressing conflicts over 
public policy, will either pursue general social goals or be diverted into addressing certain vested 
interest groups. For this reason, Treasury argued that “the mechanisms of policy capture” – either 
from external sources such as interest groups or internal sources such as a bureaucracy – “need to be 
continually reviewed” (Treasury, 1987, p. 44). Reforms were initiated to limit future policy capture. 
For example, the funding of governmental goods and services (such as irrigation schemes) was 
separated from providers (such as bureaucracies) to avoid interest group capture (Duncan & 
Chapman, 2010, p. 301). Secondly, separate bureaucratic institutions were created to draft and 
implement policy. It was envisioned this would protect against bureaucratic capture of policy 
(McDermott, 2000).  
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2) A shift to output accountability. 
NPM reforms highlighted the difference between public sector outputs and outcomes. Graham Scott 
(2001, p. 169) defined public sector outputs as “the goods and services produced for an external 
party, such as ministers or consumers”. Public sector outcomes are “the impacts of those goods and 
services on the communities” (ibid). Scott argued that a government will be judged on their ability to 
produce high level outcomes, for example, reducing road fatalities. Public sector organisations, such 
as the New Zealand Police, ought to pursue strategically defined quantifiable outputs (such as 
number of road users fined for speeding) to achieve the broader outcome (reducing road fatalities). 
In sum, NPM reform ensured bureaucracies were accountable for quantifiable outputs while 
government ministers were responsible for delivering outcomes (Halligan, 2007, p.53). As Hood 
(1995, p. 97) argued, NPM reform moved “towards more explicit and measurable (at least checkable) 
standards of performance for public sector organisations”. 
3) Devolution of managerial control. 
Christensen and Lægried (2001, p. 79) defined devolution in a NPM context as strengthening “the 
discretionary power of managers” and giving “subordinate levels and agencies more autonomy”. 
James and van Thiel (2011) concurred that devolution to smaller authorities is a feature of NPM 
reform. Boston et al. (1996, pp. 167-8) cited local government reforms in New Zealand, and the 
reduction in regional, territorial, and special purpose agencies following 1988’s Local Government 
Amendment Act (no.2) as an example. Boston et al. also cited the transfer of resource management, 
transport, and crime prevention responsibilities from central to local government during this period.  
4) A separation of policy advice from policy implementation. 
Graham Scott (2001, p. 21) argued that policy advice should be separated from policy 
implementation to “avoid domination of policy advice” by those who have to implement it. Scott 
cited the separation between New Zealand’s Ministry of Justice, which provides court services, and 
the Department of Corrections, which provides prison services, as an example. McDermott (2000, p. 
54) cited the separation of “environmental responsibilities between regional and local councils” in 
New Zealand as another example.  
5) The splitting of large bureaucracies 
New Zealand’s government established 26 new departments between 1984 and 1995; 23 
departments were abolished, corporatisted, or privatised. Many of these new departments were 
smaller sector-based policy ministries. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries was 
split into the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Fisheries.  
6) A preference for private ownership of previously publicly owned infrastructures 
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NPM promoted private ownership of infrastructure. This will be examined later in this chapter with 
the sale of New Zealand’s state-owned irrigation schemes. 
7) The emulation of private sector management practices in the public service 
NPM introduced private sector management techniques to New Zealand’s public service. Boston et 
al. (1996, p. 26) cited “the use of short-term labour contracts, the development of strategic plans, 
corporate plans, performance agreements, and mission statements, the introduction of 
performance-linked remuneration systems, the development of new management information 
systems, and a greater concern for corporate image” as examples.  
Allen Schick was commissioned by New Zealand’s State Services Commission and the Treasury to 
review New Zealand’s NPM reforms in 1996. Schick (1996, p. a) proclaimed that New Zealand’s public 
management had been transformed since 1984 through “new methods of managerial accountability, 
including the shift from input to output appropriation, reliance on contracting, and monitoring of 
results”. Schick was complimentary of the reforms, but the New Zealand experience highlighted 
problems with NPM. First, Schick argued that NPM reforms had emphasised outputs to such an 
extent that medium- to long-term planning had been neglected (Schick, 1996, p. b). Second, Schick 
argued that “something may be lost when responsibility is reduced to a set of contract-like 
documents and auditable statements” (Schick, 1996, p. 85). Schick warned that pursuing 
accountability through contractual duties could potentially result in a reduction of employee 
responsibility, or in other words, a commitment to do one’s best for the public service. Schick 
concluded that “it is urgent to uphold the old-fashioned tenets of managerial responsibility, while 
strengthening the modern instruments of managerial accountability” (ibid). 
The State Services Commission (SSC) reviewed New Zealand’s public management in 2001 (SSC, 
2001). SSC’s Review of the Centre identified similar issues with New Zealand’s public management to 
Allen Schick’s report. The Review of the Centre argued for greater alignment between bureaucratic 
departments, a citizen focused bureaucracy that meets broad outcomes, as well as enhancing the 
core values of the public sector (SSC 2001, p. 6). Jonathan Boston and Chris Eichbaum (2007, p. 136 
as quoted in Gill et al. 2011, p. 13) were more complimentary. These authors argued that NPM had 
improved New Zealand’s public management.  
[The cited benefits included] [g]reater productive efficiency (especially in the 
commercial parts of the public sector), improvements in the quality of 
certain services (e.g. the time taken to process applications for passports 
and welfare benefits has been drastically reduced), better expenditure 
control, better management of departmental budgets, greater managerial 
accountability, and major improvements in the quality of information 
available to policy makers. 
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Grant Duncan and Jeff Chapman (2010, p. 303) argued that NPM reforms were slowly modified after 
the election of the fifth Labour government in 1999. Duncan and Chapman argued that many of the 
reforms now remain only in a “revised form” (Duncan & Chapman, 2010, p. 304). As evidence, the 
authors cited the growth of the public sector under the Labour government as well as a coordinated 
“outcome-oriented approach”, which replaced the focus on quantifiable outputs criticised by Allen 
Schick in 1996 (Duncan & Chapman, 2010, p. 310). Jong Jun (2009) agreed with Duncan and 
Chapman. Jun argued that a “post-New Public Management” reform agenda is being initiated 
globally. Post-NPM reform addressed several problems that stemmed from earlier NPM reforms, for 
example, the fragmentation of roles and responsibilities between bureaucracies, the expansion of 
single purpose organisations, and lack of co-operation between agencies (Jun, 2009, pp. 162-3). By 
contrast, post-NPM reform promoted a whole-of-government approach utilising public-private 
partnerships, re-centralization, and clear role relationships between different agencies and 
bureaucracies (ibid).  
This illustrates that NPM is not a static project in New Zealand. Between 1989 and 2010 NPM 
reforms influenced New Zealand’s public management, however, its adoption was contested and 
questioned. Much like the United Kingdom’s public management system, New Zealand’s has been in 
a constant state of reform. However, the changes initiated between 1984 and 1993 were far more 
significant than the subsequent reforms between 1993 and 2010. I argue that despite NPM being a 
flexible project which has morphed since 1989, there were structural reforms which had a significant 
effect on freshwater management. For example, a preference for private ownership of infrastructure 
encouraged the sale of state-owned irrigation schemes to users. The Resource Management Act 
focused on output accountability and the management of effects rather than planning for long-term 
outcomes. The establishment of regional councils illustrated the devolution of managerial control as 
well as the separation of policy advice from implementation. Furthermore, the removal of farming 
subsidies had an impact on land use and freshwater quality in Canterbury. These developments are 
examined in the following sections.  
3.3.1. Privatization of irrigation schemes 
The Ministry of Works and Development (MWD) constructed and managed state-owned irrigation 
schemes in New Zealand between 1912 to 1987 (Farley, 1994, p. 4). MWD was disbanded in 1987 
and the irrigation schemes were sold to users. The Irrigation Schemes Act 1990 facilitated the sale of 
forty-nine state-owned irrigation schemes (Farley, 1994). The rationale provided was that transfer of 
ownership to users would improve efficiency and eliminate maintenance costs incurred by 
government (Lewthwaite & Martin 1987, as cited in Collins, Kearns, & Le Heron, 1998, p. 10). The 
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sale did not produce a large profit25 (Farley, 1994, p. 8). Despite this, Farley concluded that 
“government involvement in irrigation has not been shown to produce any net national benefit” and 
the “privatization of irrigation schemes in New Zealand has produced very large efficiency gains” 
(Farley, 1994, p. 11).  
3.3.2. The Resource Management Act 
The Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) replaced New Zealand’s town planning and resource 
management legislation. The WSCA had previously allocated use of freshwater by weighing the 
benefits of resource use against the benefits of conservation. By contrast, the RMA allocated 
freshwater through assessment of the potential effects of freshwater use on the environment (Peart, 
2007, p. 15).  
Regional councils are responsible for managing and regulating the effects of resource use under the 
RMA. Central government issues national policy statements that bind all regions in New Zealand to 
meet collective standards (McDermott, 2000; Gunningham, 2008, pp.15-6). Regional councils then 
use outputs such as resource consents, regional policy statements, and regional plans to achieve the 
envisioned national outcomes. In sum, central government offer policy advice to achieve broad 
outcomes (through national policy statements) whereas regional councils are responsible for policy 
delivery through quantifiable outputs (consents, policy statements, plans). The RMA thus reflects the 
NPM principles of output accountability, devolution, and the separation of policy advice from policy 
implementation.  
Use of freshwater is prohibited under the RMA unless there is a rule in a regional plan that permits 
its use or if consent is granted for its use (Gunningham, 2008, p. 17). In other words, it is prohibited 
unless expressly granted. Section 5 c) of the RMA stipulated that resource use can occur if it enables 
people and communities to provide for their social, economic, and cultural wellbeing while avoiding, 
remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of the proposed activity on the environment (RMA. 
1991, p. 68 [sec.5 (1)]). Granting resource consent for freshwater use will be determined on the 
effect it might have on the environment, and whether these effects are prohibited, non-complying, 
discretionary, controlled, or permitted in the planning process. By contrast, regional plans establish 
limits to control the cumulative effect of individual resource uses that pollute the environment. 
However, with a few notable exceptions (e.g. McKenzie, 2004), using plans to regulate cumulative 
                                                          
25 According to Farley (1994, p. 13), 49 state-owned irrigation schemes were sold to users under the Irrigation 
Schemes Act 1990, producing a profit of $3,274.924. 
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effects appeared politically unacceptable and therefore difficult for regional councils to implement 
during the 1990s (Memon, 1997, p. 313)26.  
Neil Gunningham (2008) was critical of the RMA in his review of Canterbury’s water governance 
arrangements in 2008. Gunnigham (2008, p. 5) argued that neither regional plans nor consents were 
“capable of effectively constraining water takings or of ensuring allocation to its highest value”. 
Furthermore, the Court’s “narrow interpretation” of cumulative effects from individual uses (ibid), 
and the RMA’s ethos that intervention in land use should only occur if there are significant 
environmental effects (Upton. 1991. p. 3018), obstructed planning for long-term outcomes. 
Freshwater planning also stalled because central government did not create a national policy 
statement for freshwater between 1989 and 2010 (Gunnigham, 2011, p. 42; Logan, 2013, pp. 139-
164).  
The RMA was also criticised for an over-emphasis on environmental protection. The McShane Report 
(McShane, Tremaine, Nixon, & Salmon, 1998) argued that RMA planning processes led to excessive 
regulation of land use, placed unrealistic costs on private developers, and created lengthy delays in 
the processing of consents by councils. Mairi Jay (1999, p. 470) argued“[p]lanners have 
been…subjected to criticism from all directions in relation to RMA implementation”. Planners were 
either environmentally conservative or not conservative enough depending on one’s perspective. 
This is an example of the RMA’s ambiguity, and the efforts interest groups would go to lobby regional 
councils for recognition of their values in policy.  
3.3.3. The creation of regional councils in New Zealand 
The amount of local government agencies in New Zealand was significantly reduced by the Local 
Government Amendment Act (no.2) in 1989. Arguably, these reforms differ from the principles of 
NPM. For example, freshwater management responsibilities shifted from catchment scaled Regional 
Water Boards to larger regional authorities. Land drainage boards and pest destruction boards were 
amalgamated with Regional Water Boards into regional councils. This re-centralisation of freshwater 
and natural resource management functions defies the NPM trends of decentralisation and the 
disaggregation of bureaucratic functions.  
Prior to NPM reform, environmentalists had perceived state-led resource-developments, such as the 
building of hydro-electric dams, as the newest threat to freshwater ecosystems (Bührs & Bartlett, 
1993, 90). According to Berke et al. (1999, 450), local government reform in conjunction with the 
RMA permitted the private sector to investigate resource-development opportunities that were 
                                                          
26 It should be noted this situation has now changed with the operational National Policy Statement for 
Freshwater in 2011 (MfE 2011) and the subsequent 2014 (MfE 2014b) amendment requiring all regional 
councils to set limits for pollutants, such as nitrates, within freshwater bodies. 
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previously undertaken by the public sector27. Regional councils were now responsible for controlling 
“the effects of use and development of resources” by the private sector through the RMA (ibid). The 
cumulative effect of these private individual resource uses, rather than large state-sponsored 
projects, became the biggest threat to the health of New Zealand’s freshwater ecosystems following 
NPM reform.  
3.3.4. The removal of subsidies  
The Labour government eliminated the majority of financial subsidies for farmers between June 1984 
and December 1985 (Cloke, 1989). These reforms significantly effected Canterbury’s farming 
community. The elimination of subsidies forced farmers to change land use which would 
subsequently have an effect on freshwater quality during the 1990s and 2000s. For example, William 
Smith and Lindsay Saunders (1996, p. 24) argued that the removal of subsidies had a distinctly 
biophysical effect:  
[with] farmers [now] respond[ing] to changes in market signals after 1984, 
by changing their production system and input mix. Unable to control costs 
or income they ran down their non-market capital – the land ... [This in turn] 
…significantly reduced New Zealand’s environmental capital and imposed 
an enormous if unquantifiable cost on all New Zealanders. 
The income of sheep and beef farmers in New Zealand fell by an average of 39 per cent between 
1983 and 1985 (Galt 1989, as cited in Smith & Saunders, 1996, p. 21). Federated Farmers supported 
the removal of subsidies despite the effect on farmers’ income. A handbook published by Federated 
Farmers in 1996 argued that the government should continue to reduce its involvement in 
commercial areas while improving the efficiency of its own expenditure (Federated Farmers 1996, as 
cited in Liepins & Bradshaw, 1999, p.  576). According to the reformers, resource use should be 
determined by farmers and the price for their produce should be determined by the international 
free market.  
Canterbury’s dairy herd grew by 302 per cent between 1995 and 2009 (Statistics New Zealand, 1995; 
2009). Farmers profited from dairying without the need for government subsidies. Concurrently, a 
decline in Canterbury’s freshwater quality – which was predicted by ECan employees in the early 
1990s (Talbot, 1991; Douglass, 1993) – was confirmed by the mid-2000s (Parkyn, Matheson, Cook, & 
Quinn, 2002; Bell & van Voorthuysen, 2008). The growth of dairying and other intensive land uses 
following the removal of subsidies was blamed for this decline in freshwater quality (PCE, 2004: 21). 
Furthermore, demand for irrigable water was driven by the growth of intensive land uses. ECan was 
given responsibility for ensuring the sustainable management of freshwater in this context. The 
                                                          
27 For example, the construction of the Opuha Dam in South-Canterbury during the 1990s and 2000s was a 
private venture (see Worrall, 2007).  
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competing demands of farmers, who were still affected by the removal of subsidies, and 
environmentalists, who perceived the decline in Canterbury’s freshwater quality during this period as 
evidence of ECan wavering on its statutory mandate, exerted influence on ECan’s freshwater policy. 
In sum, the removal of subsidies, the privatization of irrigation schemes, the enactment of the RMA, 
and the creation of regional councils affected the relationship between the regulators (ECan), 
environmentalists, and farmers. The next section will examine in greater detail the relationship 
between interest groups and the government during the NPM reform era.  
3.4. New Public Management – the second interest group era 
NPM and state sector reforms effected the relationship between interest groups, local government, 
and central government. The exchange of policy between chosen interest groups and the 
government seen during the corporatist era receded. For example, Michael Roche, Tim Johnston, and 
Richard Le Heron (Roche, Johnston, & Le Heron, 1992) noted the waning influence of traditional 
farming interest groups in the early 1990s. They argued that farming interest groups’ “political 
mechanisms are often ineffective channels; they usually occupy a structurally subordinate position, 
relative to agribusiness and other interests; and agricultural politics are increasingly being driven by 
consumption and not production issues” (Roche et al., 1992, p. 1762).  
The government disengaged with interest groups during the NPM reform era in an attempt to avoid 
the policy capture that was exposed during the corporatist era (Wood & Rudd 2004, p. 164). For 
example, Treasury argued in 1984 that publicly funded irrigation projects had been entirely captured 
by users:  
Unlike other projects traditionally undertaken as public works, such as 
roads, flood controls, etc., the benefits from community irrigation are 
captured entirely by private landowners within the schemes. There is no 
evidence to indicate that the benefits from irrigation investment are of 
anymore value to the nation than the benefits of other types of investment. 
Put simply, the ‘public good’ aspect of investment in irrigation schemes are 
the same as those of any other private investment. Indeed, it is more 
correctly stated that a social cost is involved in those instances where 
irrigation schemes use scarce water resources for which they are not 
charged (Treasury, 1984, p. 46).  
Tenbensel argued that the NPM era “generated a concerted attempt by governments to reduce and 
constrain the influence of interest groups in politics” (Tenbensel, 2003, p. 352; see also Goldfinch, 
2003, p. 553; Tenbensel, 2010). NPM reformers were of the attitude that “all interest groups, 
regardless of whether they claimed to be representing sectional or non-sectional interests, were 
really in the business of securing benefits for their members at the expense of the rest of society” 
(Tenbensel, 2003, p. 352). In sum, the NPM era saw a “concerted attempt” by local and central 
government to reduce the influence of interest groups over policy.  
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During the NPM era, regional councils were asked not to exercise their full authority to set rules for 
natural resource use (Upton, 1991). Rather, the RMA and its proponents argued that regional 
councils should adopt a hands-off approach to management of natural resources. For example, 
Minister for the Environment Simon Upton argued in Parliament that the RMA “should be seen as 
legitimising intervention only to achieve its purpose”. According to Upton, regional councils should 
only intervene “to achieve sustainability of natural resources” or to “facilitate matters for those who 
seek consents” (Upton, 1991. p. 3018). As a result, regional councils were often indecisive when 
setting rules for the cumulative use of resources such as freshwater.  
In sum, regional councils did not exercise full authority over natural resource use and were 
simultaneously discouraged from interacting with interest groups during the NPM reform era. This 
led regional councils to exercise a low amount of authority over freshwater policy while maintaining 
a high level of autonomy over decisions made. Tenbensel (2003, p. 353) argued that these trends 
softened after the election of the fifth Labour government in 1999. The fifth Labour government 
were more receptive to interest group negotiation than its predecessors. According to Tenbensel 
(ibid), the Labour government recognised the capacity interest groups still had to mobilise political 
power (c.f. Wood & Rudd, 2004, 174). Thus, renewed negotiation with interest groups over policy 
was a pragmatic rather than an ideological move.  
3.5. Collaboration – an emergent third interest group era 
New Zealand’s economic, managerial, and state sector reform period ended following the election of 
the fifth Labour government in 1999. Jun (2009) noted a trend in post-NPM reform globally from the 
early 2000s, concurrently Duncan and Chapman (2010, pp. 303-4) observed a similar trend in New 
Zealand. During this period interest groups were reintegrated into the policy process. This 
reintegration often occurred through participatory or collaborative governance arrangements. The 
shift to collaborative governance in New Zealand reflected Paul Schumaker’s (2013, p. 256) 
observation that “a new pluralism is emerging that de-emphasizes a politics of group power and that 
emphasizes the role of diverse ethical and political principles in community politics”. Bronwyn 
Hayward (1995), Wendy Larner and David Craig (2005), Ali Memon and Gavin Thomas (2006), 
Adrienne Lomax, Ali Memon, and Brett Painter (2010), Claire Charters and Dean Knight (2011), 
Cameron Holley and Neil Gunnigham (2011), James Lennox, Wendy Proctor, and Shona Russel 
(2011), and Elizabeth Eppel (2013) have all witnessed this trend in New Zealand.  
Collaboration between government agencies, industry, and the public has been encouraged by the 
passing of the Local Government Act (2002) (Gunningham 2008; Reid et al. 2006; Thomas and 
Memon 2007). Section 20 of the LGA asked local government agencies to “promote the social, 
economic, cultural and environmental well-being of communities now and for the future” (LGA, 
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2002). Agencies produce long-term plans which outline how they will achieve these goals. Bryan 
Jenkins (2011a; 2011b) argues that because the LGA requires community involvement in the creation 
of long-term plans, it “represents a shift from representative democracy towards participative 
democracy”. By contrast, Larner and Craig (2005) argued that debates on the Treaty of Waitangi28 – 
and the relationship between the New Zealand government and Māori – provided impetus to 
develop partnerships between the government and community groups (Larner and Craig 2005, p. 
408). For example, the Statement of Government Intentions for Improved Community-Government 
Relationships (New Zealand Government, 2001) actively sought to improve the relationship between 
central government, local government, and communities. 
Elizabeth Eppel (2013) examined the New Zealand experience with collaborative governance in a 
recent overview article. Eppel (2013, pp. 40-1) argued that the fragmentation of government 
agencies in the 1990s (a feature of NPM reform) made it more difficult to deal with “wicked” policy 
issues that have neither one cause nor one solution (see Rittell & Webber, 1973). Eppel (2013, p. 46) 
concluded that collaborative governance offers a potential solution to wicked policy problems, and 
that “effective collaborative governance is contingent on the nature of the problem to be solved, the 
processes suitable for working with complex problems, and the governance structures to be created 
which must also be compatible with the complexity of the problems to be solved”.  
Government agencies in New Zealand believe that the complex problems presented by freshwater 
management can be solved through collaborative governance. For example, the Ministry for the 
Environment proposed collaboration as an alternative to RMA processes (MfE, 2013). In MfE’s 
opinion, collaborative governance will help set limits and standards for freshwater quantity and 
quality while actively involving iwi and Māori in freshwater decisions (MfE, 2013, p. 24). The Land and 
Water Forum (2012, p. x) concurred, stating that governance of freshwater under “collaborative plan 
and policy making process[es] will be generally faster…more efficient and more equitable than the 
status quo”.  
In sum, collaboration is an emergent third era in New Zealand’s interest group politics. Collaboration 
emerged in the early 21st century in response to the exclusion of interest groups from the policy 
process during the NPM reform era. The period between 1989 and 2010 analysed during this 
research is a juncture between the remnants of corporatism, the NPM reform era, and the emergent 
trend of collaboration.  
                                                          
28 The Treaty of Waitangi was signed between the British Crown and a selection of Māori chiefs in 1840. The 
Treaty permitted British settlement of New Zealand, established a British Governor, while subsequently giving 
Māori the rights of British subjects while recognizing the ownership of their lands and properties. The Treaty of 
Waitangi has subsequently taken on constitutional importance as the founding document of modern New 
Zealand.  
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3.6. MC-NPM hybrid theory  
The second chapter suggested that multiple clientelism provides a method for local government 
agencies wishing to establish authority and autonomy over natural resource management. This 
chapter noted that New Zealand’s natural resource management regime in the 1990s and 2000s, 
which is typified by the shift towards an effects-based approach through the RMA, might affect the 
way ECan will pursue authority and autonomy. Therefore, I propose a hybrid MC-NPM theory to 
predict ECan’s pursuit of authority and autonomy in the three case studies.  
Given the definitions of authority and autonomy in the first chapter, the table below explains the 
criteria which determine whether a local government agency such as ECan establishes high or low 
authority and autonomy.  
Table 2 Criteria for high and low authority and autonomy.  
High Authority A local government agency has high 
authority if it is able to set rules, 
prescriptions, or instructions which are 
followed without recourse to persuasion29 or 
force30.  
Low Authority A local government agency has low authority 
if it has to resort to the use of persuasion or 
force in order for its rules, prescriptions, or 
instructions to be followed.  
High Autonomy A local government agency has high 
autonomy if it has the ability to set rules, 
prescriptions, or instructions with full 
independence from interest group influence.  
Low Autonomy A local government agency has low 
autonomy if it is unable to set rules, 
prescriptions, or instruction without first 
bargaining with interest groups.  
                                                          
29 An example of persuasion could include when someone does not want to follow a rule or instruction, but is 
encouraged to follow it due to the threat of force.  
30 Examples of force could include fines or criminal prosecutions.  
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If a local government agency successfully engages in selective and sequential patronage with interest 
groups, as multiple clientelism suggests, the agency will establish high authority with low autonomy. 
Authority is high because the agency’s rules, prescriptions, and instructions are respected by interest 
groups. However, the agency will have low autonomy because it has actively bargained with interest 
groups over policy through selective and sequential patronage. If an agency has high authority and 
autonomy it ought to be able to set rules, prescriptions, and instructions for freshwater use 
autonomously. If an agency has low authority and autonomy its freshwater policies will stagnate, and 
the agency will be unable to set rules, prescriptions, and instructions that will be followed. 
MC-NPM hybrid theory suggests a local government agency will exercise a high level of autonomy 
with low authority for the following reasons: 
1) As multiple clientelism suggests, a local government agency will attempt to establish 
relationships of selective and sequential patronage with interest groups. However, NPM 
reforms attempted to constrain the influence of interest groups to avoid policy capture. For 
example, NPM reforms split policy delivery from implementation and separated the funding 
of governmental goods and services from bureaucratic providers. As such, MC-NPM theory 
predicts that a local government agency will seek patronage with interest groups. Despite 
seeking patronage, the local government agency will be unwilling to cede autonomy over 
policy decisions.  
2) NPM reforms argued that local government agencies ought to focus on meeting 
quantifiable outputs rather than planning for long-term outcomes. As such, the MC-NPM 
hybrid theory predicts that a local government agency will choose to exercise authority 
through rules, prescriptions, and/or instructions to meet quantifiable outputs (such as 
consents, policy statements and plans) rather than through planning for long-term 
outcomes. 
3) NPM reforms argued that a local government agency ought to adopt a hands-off approach 
to natural resource management. In particular, the RMA directs regional councils to ensure 
sustainable management of natural resources by managing environmental effects. As such, 
MC-NPM theory predicts that a local government agency will choose to exercise authority 
through rules, prescriptions, and/or instructions only if the environmental effects of resource 
use are clear. 
In sum, the MC-NPM hybrid theory suggests that a local government agency will attempt to establish 
relationships of patronage but not to the detriment of its autonomous decision making. The hybrid 
theory also suggests that a local government agency will take a hands-off approach to resource 
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management, only intervening in resource use to ensure outputs are met and the environmental 
effects of resource use are minimised. Table 3 below represents the different resource management 
outcomes from local government agencies exercising high and low authority and autonomy. 
Table 3 Local government authority and autonomy in natural resource management.  
Local 
Government 
Authority 
High High Low Low 
Local 
Government 
Autonomy 
High Low High Low 
Suggested 
Outcome 
Full Autonomy Multiple 
Clientelism 
MC-NPM Policy 
Stagnation 
3.7. MC-NPM hybrid theory and competing theories of policy 
In this section, I discuss competing theories of policy analysis and why the MC-NPM hybrid theory 
was chosen over these theories. The first competing theory is Institutional Analysis and Development 
(IAD), a framework which analyses public policy and institutions. The framework was developed by 
Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues at Indiana University (Blomquist and deLeon 2011, p.1). The IAD 
framework first aims to define a policy question or problem (Polski and Ostrom 1999). Once the 
policy issue is determined, the framework analyses external variables – such as biophysical 
conditions, attributes of a community, as well as formal and informal rules – against actors in an 
action situation (Ostrom 2011, p.10). Scholars then work to identify the interactions between the 
external variables and actors to determine how the policy issue was resolved or modified.  
 
The IAD framework is a thorough method of analysing public policy and institutions which uses 
specialized analytic techniques borrowed from the physical and social sciences (Polski and Ostrom 
1999). Despite the framework’s strengths, I argue that the predictive NPM-MC hybrid framework is 
more suitable for this thesis. IAD is an analytical framework which works backwards to discover how 
policy was created. The MC-NPM hybrid is a predictive theory which is more suitable for this thesis.  
 
Another alternative method of analysing public policy is the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). 
ACF was devised by Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith to explain policy changes over a long 
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period of time (Sabatier, 1988). An advocacy coalition is a coalition which includes various types of 
political actors in a policy network which has existed for at least ten years (McFarland 2004, p.53). 
ACF argues that policy change ought to be evaluated over a decade of decisions, and that scholars 
ought to focus on the coalitions of political actors who are advocating for policy (Sabatier 1988, 
p.131). Finally, ACF argues that policy ought to be conceptualized in the same way as belief systems, 
because actors in the policy coalition will see policy as a personal value. Policy coalitions then align 
their values with causal assumptions about how to put public policy into practice (ibid).  
 
Although ACF is a well-established method of analysing public policy, it will struggle to answer the 
thesis’ research question. Because ACF focuses on a wide range of actors, local government agencies 
are just one of many important actors. The authority and autonomy of local government agencies 
will be a secondary concern, rather than a primary concern, of scholars using the ACF framework. For 
this reason, I argue that the MC-NPM hybrid is more suited to answering the thesis’ research 
question.  
 
Network governance has recently emerged as a competing method for analysing public policy. Eva 
Sørensen and Jacob Torfing (2005, p.197) argue that network governance is typified by independent 
and autonomous actors who interact when bargaining over public policy. These actors bargain within 
a self-regulating institutionalized framework of rules and norms. Ultimately, the process of 
bargaining between actors results in new ideas and regulations for society. These governance 
networks create flexible public policy where information is shared freely between participants. 
Furthermore, network governance can help to establish a consensus among stakeholders which 
reduces the risk of resistance to public policy (Sørensen and Torfing 2005, p.199).  
 
Network governance was devised in the late-1990s and early-2000s (Rhodes 1997; Sørensen and 
Torfing 2007; Davies 2011). As an approach to policy analysis, network governance erodes the 
boundaries between governmental and non-governmental actors, focusing on how these actors 
influenced policy. As my research question focuses on local government, in particular, I argue that 
the MC-NPM hybrid framework is more suited to answering the research question. Network 
governance is more suitable for analysing who devised policy, and the relative influence of 
governmental and non-governmental actors over policy.  
 
Collaboration as a method of public policy creation emerged in the 1990s. Collaboration is a method 
of policy creation where local government agencies offer non-governmental groups the chance to 
assist in the creation of policy (Ansell and Gash 2008). Elinor Ostrom’s (1990) Governing the 
Commons: the Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action was one of the first scholarly works to 
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promote the adoption of collaborative governance. Since Ostrom’s book, collaborative governance 
has been promoted by scholars and adopted by authorities struggling to cope with wicked policy 
problems. 
 
However, collaboration has only recently been adopted in practice in New Zealand. Examples include 
the Land and Water Forum and the Canterbury Water Management Strategy (see chapter 7). Both of 
these collaborations began in the late 2000s, and were the earliest examples of collaborative 
governance in New Zealand. For this reason, using collaboration as an analytical framework to 
analyse local government authority and autonomy is difficult.  
 
The MC-NPM hybrid framework is therefore more appropriate than competing theories. However, 
there are some weaknesses of the MC-NPM hybrid that ought to be discussed. First, the MC-NPM 
framework simplifies the relationship between local government agencies and non-governmental 
groups. By focusing on governmental authority over policy, as well as governmental autonomy from 
interest group influence, it does not analyse the relationships between government and interest 
groups that often play a large part in policy formation. The IAD and ACF frameworks focus explicitly 
on these connections, and thus they offer better analyses of governmental and non-governmental 
relationships than the MC-NPM hybrid.  
 
Second, multiple clientelism was devised as a theory to examine natural resource management. 
Thus, the MC-NPM hybrid theory is not appropriate for analysing policy outside of natural resource 
management. The MC-NPM theory is also more suited to analysing distributive policy, and how 
government negotiates with groups over distribution, rather than regulatory policy. Therefore, the 
hybrid theory only ought to be used to analyse distributive natural resource policy.  
 
Third, the propositions made by the MC-NPM theory are static over the 21 year analysis period. The 
thesis has recognised that NPM was not a fixed project, and that it was in a constant state of reform 
over the analysis period. Despite this, I argue that the NPM reforms which initiated a split of policy 
delivering from implementation, a focus on quantifiable outputs, and the hands-off approach to 
natural resource management, were so significant that they ought to have had an effect on 
freshwater management between 1989 and 2010.  
3.8. Conclusion 
This chapter argued that New Public Management reform affected freshwater management as well 
as local and central government interaction with interest groups in New Zealand. The previous 
chapter argued that multiple clientelism is a powerful explanation of local government authority and 
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autonomy over natural resource management. This research combines multiple clientelism’s 
predictions with New Public Management reforms through a hybrid MC-NPM theory.   
The composite lens of MC-NPM hybrid theory will be used to examine ECan’s pursuit of authority and 
autonomy over freshwater management in three case studies. These case studies will confirm what 
action ECan pursued, what effect NPM reform had, and to what degree the predictions of multiple 
clientelism are confirmed. The next chapter will describe the research methods used during the three 
case studies.  
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4. Chapter Four 
Methods 
4.1. Introduction 
This research uses a qualitative case study method to investigate ECan’s authority and autonomy. 
Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack highlight the benefits of qualitative case study research: 
[t]he qualitative case study is an approach to research that facilitates 
exploration of a phenomenon within its context using a variety of data 
sources. This ensures that the issue is not explored through one lens, but 
rather a variety of lenses which allows for multiple facets of the 
phenomenon to be revealed and understood (Baxter & Jack, 2008, p. 544).  
Three in-depth case studies examine ECan’s authority and autonomy over Canterbury’s freshwater 
management. These case studies will analyse a variety of data sources with a focus on the decisions 
made by human beings and institutions, as well as the context in which these decisions were made. 
These events require a methodological means to explain why people and institutions take the action 
they do. However, I acknowledge that method is limited by the fact that “[s]ocial science is, of 
necessity, an interpretive act” (Gerring, 2007, p. 70). Given this, the results of the case studies will be 
my own interpretation of events influenced by the hybrid MC-NPM theory and derived from the 
multiple data sources collected. The following sections will describe the methods used to collect and 
analyse this data.  
Case studies are useful in social science research when asking how and why questions (Baxter & Jack, 
2008, pp. 550-1). This research poses a how question, and thus, case studies will be helpful in 
answering the overarching research question. The interpretive approach adopted by this research is 
to use the MC-NPM hybrid theory and the case studies to gauge how ECan pursued authority and 
autonomy over freshwater management. This chapter begins with a discussion of the case study 
method. The methods of primary and secondary data collection and analysis are then described. The 
chapter concludes by introducing the chosen case studies.  
4.2. Case study method 
Case studies are helpful when interpreting the decisions of humans and human institutions. Wilbur 
Schramm (1971, as quoted in Yin, 2009, p. 17) argued that “the essence of a case study, the central 
tendency among all types of case study, is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions, why 
they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result”. To reduce case study bias, 
Robert Yin (2009) promoted the use of a case study protocol. Yin argued a protocol will increase the 
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reliability of case study research. It will also guide the researcher during data collection. A case study 
protocol should contain four features: “(1) an overview of the case study project (project objectives 
and auspices, case study issues, and relevant readings about the topic being investigated), (2) field 
procedures (presentation of credentials, access to the case study ‘sites’, language pertaining to the 
protection of human subjects, sources of data, and procedural reminders), (3) case study questions 
(the specific questions that the case study investigator must keep in mind in collecting data, “table 
shells” for specific arrays of data, and the potential sources of information for answering each 
question…), and (4) a guide for the case study report (outline, format for the data, use and 
presentation of other documentation, and bibliographic information)” (Yin, 2009, p. 81). This 
protocol was followed throughout the data collection.  
A criticism of case studies is that they provide little basis for generalisation. The question, how can 
you generalise from a single case, is a valid query. However, this question can also be asked of a 
single scientific experiment. As Yin (2009, p. 15) explained, “scientific facts are rarely based on single 
experiments; they are usually based on a multiple set of experiments that have replicated the same 
phenomenon under different conditions”. The same can be said of case studies. Furthermore, 
statistical generalisation is impossible when using case studies because the cases were not chosen as 
a random sample. In this research, multiple cases resemble multiple experiments which have been 
chosen to answer my research question.  
4.2.1. Case study data collection 
What types of data should be collected during case studies and how should this data be analysed? 
Yin (2009, p. 101) provides three tips for case study data collection: (1) use multiple rather than 
single sources of evidence to provide triangulation, (2) create a case study database to store 
information, and (3) maintain a clear chain of evidence. Yin then presents the six types of data that 
can be sourced for case study analysis: (1) archival records, (2) direct observations, (3) 
documentation, (4) interviews, (5) participant observations, and (6) physical artefacts (Yin, 2009, pp. 
103-13). Some of these data sources cannot be collected for this research project. Direct 
observations and physical observations, for example, cannot be obtained as this research is a 
historical analysis.  
Physical artefacts were not analysed in this research. However, the remaining forms of data – 
interviews, documentation, and archives – have all been collected. Interviews provided the majority 
of the primary data used in this research. Below, I describe the interview methods I used. 
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4.3. Interview methods 
Eleanor and Nathan Macooby (1954, p. 499) define an interview as a “face-to-face verbal interchange 
in which one person, the interviewer, attempts to elicit information or expressions of opinion or 
belief from another person or persons”. Interviewing is a data gathering method in which the 
researcher comes face-to-face with the information source. Kevin Dunn (2005, p. 80) suggests four 
reasons a researcher would use interviews: (1) to fill a gap in knowledge; (2) to investigate 
behaviours and motivations; (3) to collect a diversity of meanings, opinions, or experiences; and (4) 
to empower the interviewee in a way that does not occur with other data collection methods. Yin 
(2009, p. 106) argues that guided conversations are more useful than rigidly structured interviews 
when using interviews as a method of data collection for case studies. For these reasons, I have 
chosen to undertake in-depth semi-structured interviews for this research (Minichiello, Aroni, 
Timewell, & Alexander, 1990). Semi-structured interviews place “emphasis ... on discovering new 
ideas, thoughts, and social processes that the interviewer is not aware of, in an inductive fashion” 
(Friesen, 2010, p. 82). A semi-structured interview also empowers the interviewee by asking them to 
tell their own story in their own words. Bill Gillham (2005, p. 70) argues that “the semi-structured 
interview is the most important way of conducting a research interview because of its flexibility 
balanced by structure, and the quality of the data so obtained”.  
Interviews must be conducted in an ethical manner due to the intimacy between the researcher and 
the data source. Gillham (2005, p. 13) provides five methods to ensure an ethical interview: (1) 
maintain confidentiality and restrict the information gathered for specific purposes, (2) maintain 
interviewee anonymity if they desire, (3) keep the data gathered securely locked, (4) inform the 
participants that the data gathered could be used for publication, and (5) keep the data for a specific 
period of time before ensuring its routine destruction. This research followed this protocol and 
subsequently obtained human ethics approval for all interviews.  
For this research I interviewed citizens who are politically, economically, and culturally powerful in 
Canterbury. As Gill Valentine (1997, p. 114) notes, the interviewer is normally in a dominant position 
over the interviewee. However, this role is often reversed when interviewing political, economic, and 
cultural elites, as these interviewees often control access to information, knowledge, and informants. 
The interview is a social encounter, and thus, it is important what the interviewer and the 
interviewee think of each other. This could be pronounced during this research as the topic is 
controversial and divisive. Teresa Odendahl and Eileen Shaw (2002, p. 313) argue that 
“confidentiality is especially important in the interviewing of high-profile subjects”. All interviewees 
for this research were asked if they would like to remain anonymous. Two interviewees initially 
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remained anonymous, however, after reading through the transcript notes and selected quotes to be 
used in this research, one of the interviewees removed anonymity.  
Kevin Dunn (2005, p. 54) argues that interviewing powerful members of society is helpful when 
studying social or political issues because the interviewees have gained their position of authority 
from expert knowledge within the particular area being researched. Table 4 lists the thesis research 
interviewees for each case study and notes their specific expertise. Because of the interviewees’ 
authority, quoted statements from the interviews were carefully chosen and selected to not put the 
interviewees at risk of controversy or embarrassment. All interviewees were asked to read through 
selected quotes to ensure they were happy with the statements attributed to them before 
publication.  
Table 4 List of research interviewees.  
General Rangitata River Groundwater CWMS 
David Carter (Minister 
of Agriculture (at time 
of interview), 
Member of 
Parliament) 
John Young (Former 
RDR manager) 
Colin Glass (Chief 
Executive of Dairy 
Holdings Ltd who own 
Lynton and Pine 
Grove farms) 
Alex Familton (Mayor 
of the Waitaki 
District) 
Jim Sutton (Former 
Minister of 
Agriculture) 
John Waugh (Former 
South Canterbury 
Catchment Board 
member) 
Matthew Bubb 
(Aqualinc hydrologist) 
Kelvin Coe (Mayor of 
Selwyn District) 
 Bryce Johnson (Fish 
and Game Chief 
Executive) 
Leo Fietje (ECan 
Principal Planning 
Advisor) 
Eugenie Sage (Former 
ECan councillor, 
current Member of 
Parliament) 
 Frank Scarf (Fish and 
Game WCO applicant) 
John Donkers 
(Irrigator) 
Winston Dalley 
(Mayor of Hurunui 
District) 
 John Wilkie 
(Arowhenua rūnanga 
representative) 
John Keast 
(Journalist) 
Kerry Burke (Former 
ECan Chairman) 
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 Angus McKay (Former 
ECan councillor, 
current Ashburton 
District mayor) 
Ian McIndoe 
(Aqualinc hydrologist) 
Mike Jebson (Ministry 
of Agriculture) 
 Ken Hughey 
(Professor of 
Environmental 
Management, DOC 
representative at 
WCO hearing) 
Christina Robb 
(Former Aqualinc 
consultant, Ministry 
for the Environment 
employee, currently 
Programme Manager 
for Water and Land at 
ECan) 
Glen Innes 
(Mackenzie District 
Chief Executive) 
 (Anonymous)  Howard Williams 
(ECan hydrologist) 
Bryan Jenkins (Former 
ECan Chief Executive) 
 Jay Graybill (Fish and 
Game WCO applicant) 
 Ken Taylor (Director 
of Investigations and 
Monitoring at ECan) 
   John Coles (Mayor of 
Waimate) 
   David O’ Connell 
(Ngai Tahu) 
   Grant McFadden 
(Former Ministry of 
Agriculture policy 
analyst) 
 
Potential interviewees were selected after an early literature review. The literature review identified 
key actors in the chosen case studies. They key actors were then approached for an interview. A 
majority of the people identified through the literature review were willing to be interviewed, 
however some refused. Canterbury’s water management was politically divisive during the 
examination period, and I believe some of the people I contacted were not willing to be interviewed 
due to political sensitivities. Furthermore, some interviewees chose to have quotes amended or 
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deleted due to potential political conflicts. Thus, the interviews I conducted were not 
comprehensive, but were the best possible under the circumstances.  
4.4. Secondary material 
4.4.1. Documentary evidence 
Martyn Denscombe (2007, p. 227) states that “documents can be treated as a source of data in their 
own right – in effect an alternative to questionnaires, interviews or observations”. Documentary 
evidence will be used in this research as a supplementary source to provide data triangulation. A 
variety of documentary sources were available for use in this study. These included government 
publications and official statistics that have been collected into a table in appendix 6. Denscombe 
(2007) argues these data sources provide information that is authoritative and factual. Government 
publications and statistics are more likely to have been robustly researched and peer reviewed than 
competing documentary sources. In reference to Canterbury freshwater politics there is a wealth of 
publications and statistics, for example, ECan publicly release hydrological information and policy 
documents. Central government departments like the Ministry for the Environment also offer policy 
documents as well as information on national and global trends.  
Newspapers and magazines sources were also analysed. Newspapers, such as Christchurch’s Press 
and Timaru’s Herald, provide an account of the political debates leading to certain policy decisions. 
Although the credibility of these sources can be affected by the expertise and perspective of the 
journalists, the specialisation of the publication, and the amount of insider information journalists 
can uncover (or publish), they remain an important data resource.  
4.4.2. Archival evidence 
Archival evidence includes Official Information Act requests, council meeting minutes, Water 
Conservation Order hearings (including expert witness testimonies), and public submissions on 
planning documents. Denscombe (2007) argues that archival records need to have two qualities. 
First, “they need to contain a fairly systematic picture of things that have happened” and second, 
“they should be publicly available” (Denscombe, 2007, p. 228, italics in original). Gaining access to 
archival evidence has been difficult due to the recent sequence of earthquakes in Canterbury. 
Damage to buildings where evidence is located has made some of it inaccessible. Despite this, all 
effort has been made to ensure relevant archival evidence was analysed.  
4.5. Data analysis  
A case study method promotes the use of multiple sources of information to enhance validity. This 
section describes the methods used to analyse primary and secondary data in this research.  
 48 
4.5.1. Interview data 
Auerbach and Silverstein (2003, p. 50) remind researchers that when coding interview material there 
is an inescapable element of interpretation which cannot be solved through any method. The coder 
must ensure their interpretation is as transparent and understandable as possible. The qualitative 
data analysis software NVivo was used to code and analyse the interview transcripts. NVivo was 
favoured in lieu of physical coding. Coding was conducted to align the primary data with the MC-
NPM hybrid theory. These codes were then analysed in reference to the overarching thesis research 
question.  
4.5.2. Secondary data 
David Silverman (2005) argues that secondary data analysis should consist of data reduction, display, 
and conclusion drawing. This is an especially helpful method when using case studies as the amount 
of data collected can be overwhelming. The method used in this research was to once again refer to 
the research question and hybrid theory for guidance in data reduction, display, and conclusion 
drawing. I ask to what extent the secondary data highlights ECan’s pursuit of policy authority and 
autonomy and the factors affecting that pursuit.  
4.6. Selected case studies 
The scope of a case study can often be too large. To avoid this, case study researchers suggest 
selecting cases specific to a time, place, and activity (Baxter & Jack, 2008, p. 546). As such, I have 
chosen the case studies in this research because they were completed between 1989 and 2010 and 
multiple interest groups were present. Furthermore, cases were chosen because they had a 
significant effect on Canterbury’s freshwater management and governance. 
The first case study examines the management of the Rangitata River. Farmers south of the river 
wanted a dam to provide irrigation water. Environmentalists sought to protect the river from 
damming to ensure the quality of the river’s fishery remained intact. ECan pursued a planning 
document to mediate between these two groups. This case had a significant effect on Canterbury’s 
freshwater management because the Fish and Game council challenged ECan’s planning process by 
applying for a Water Conservation Order.  
The second case study examines Canterbury’s groundwater resources. Farmers and 
environmentalists were concerned about the potential over-allocation of permits for groundwater 
abstraction in the early 2000s. By the mid-2000s, ECan attempted to manage groundwater 
abstraction through zoning. Farmers questioned ECan’s calculation of sustainable abstraction limits 
within certain zones. Environmentalists supported ECan’s precautionary approach to groundwater 
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abstraction. This case was significant because it highlighted ECan’s attempt to manage freshwater 
without a notified regional plan. 
The third case study examines the Canterbury Water Management Strategy (CWMS). The CWMS 
began31 after a series of droughts in 1997 and 1998 and the realisation that a plan did not exist to 
manage the long-term effects of drought in Canterbury. Farmers supported the CWMS because it 
promoted the expansion of irrigation as a solution to future droughts. Environmentalists supported 
the CWMS’ ecological and environmental goals. The CWMS was significant in its ability to bring 
farming and environmental interest groups together in the creation of a plan, vision statement, and 
targets for Canterbury’s future freshwater management.  
4.7. Conclusion 
Interview, documentary, and archival data collected during three case studies will be used to answer 
the thesis’ research question. The next chapter presents the first case study. In this case, ECan’s 
pursuit of authority and autonomy over the Rangitata River’s management will be examined.  
 
                                                          
31 The CWMS evolved from the Canterbury Strategic Water Study which was prompted by Canterbury’s 
successive droughts in 1997 and 1998,  
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5. Chapter Five 
Case Study 1 – the Rangitata River Water Conservation Order 
5.1. Introduction 
The Rangitata River is one of Canterbury’s largest braided rivers. The Rangitata is valued by fishers 
for its Chinook salmon fishery, whereas farmers north of the river benefit from the irrigable water 
which is abstracted by the Rangitata Diversion Race (RDR). From 1996 onwards ECan did not have an 
operative plan which set rules for the use of Rangitata River water. Following a severe drought in 
1997 and 1998, a dam was proposed for the Rangitata River to provide farmers south of the river 
with freshwater for irrigation. Fishers argued the proposed dam would have a detrimental effect on 
the river’s ecosystem. ECan devised its own management plan for the Rangitata River in the midst of 
these arguments.  
This case study begins by giving a brief history of the Rangitata River. The chapter then describes the 
attributes of a Water Conservation Order. A discussion of the river’s management prior to the Water 
Conservation Order Tribunal follows. The chapter then examines the Water Conservation Order 
Tribunal hearing and a subsequent Environment Court appeal.  
5.2. Rangitata River – a brief history 
The Rangitata River flows from the Southern Alps into the Pacific Ocean 30 kilometres north of the 
South-Canterbury township of Timaru. The river is 140km in length and has a 1600 km² catchment 
with four distinct sections. The alpine headwaters form into a braided river on the upper Rangitata 
River plain. The river then passes through a narrow gorge cut into greywacke-argillite rock before 
exiting the gorge and becoming fully braided once again (Rangitata River Water Conservation Order 
tribunal, 2002, p.15). In the 1930s, politicians proposed using the Rangitata River to help grow the 
economies of Mid- and South-Canterbury. These economies had been sustained by wool and wheat 
booms during the 19th century, but by the early 20th century the regional economy experienced a 
decline in agricultural production (Evans & Cant, 1981, pp. 58-9). In response, the Canterbury 
Progress League and the Ashburton Country Council lobbied central government for the necessary 
funds to build a local irrigation scheme (Evans & Cant, 1981, p. 59; Hopkinson, 1997; Wood & 
Brooking, 2001, p. 90). The Rangitata Diversion Race was built between 1937 and 1945 (Evans& Cant, 
1981; Hopkinson, 1997). The RDR delivered irrigable water to farmers north of the Rangitata River in 
the Ashburton District.  
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The South Canterbury Catchment Board created a management plan for the river in 1977. The plan’s 
objective was to balance the needs of irrigators, fisheries, recreational users, and environmental 
users during times of low flow (SCCB, 1977). The plan was updated in 1986. This plan operated until 
1996. John Waugh, a former Catchment Board member, helped develop the plan. Feedback was 
sought from the public during community meetings. According to Waugh, the public believed the 
plan was equitable. It established a one-for-one flow sharing arrangement32. Waugh noted that the 
Catchment Board did not seek a cap on allocation33, which he argued in retrospect was a mistake (J. 
Waugh, personal communication, March 9, 2012).  
5.3. What is a Water Conservation Order?  
This case study includes an application for a Water Conservation Order. Water Conservation Orders 
were an outcome of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Amendment to the Water and Soil Conservation Act 
in 1981. As discussed in the second chapter, the aim of the amendment was to “recognise and 
sustain” the amenity provide by freshwater bodies in their natural state” (WSCA, 1981). WCOs were 
the legislative tool to recognise and sustain outstanding water bodies in New Zealand. Seven water 
bodies were protected by WCOs under the Water and Soil Conservation Act including the Rakaia 
River and Te Waihora / Lake Ellesmere in Canterbury (Hughey et al., 2014, p. 25). Water Conservation 
Orders were subsequently included in the 1991 Resource Management Act. Under the RMA, a WCO 
can be applied to a water body to protect its outstanding qualities: such as its (1) fishery; (2) wild, 
scenic, or other natural characteristics; (3) outstanding habitat for terrestrial or aquatic organisms; 
(4) scientific and ecological values; (5) recreational, historical, spiritual or cultural significance, or; (6) 
characteristics which are considered to be of outstanding significance in accordance with tikanga 
Māori (RMA, 1991, p. 448 [sec. 199 (2)]).  
The RMA asks regional councils to manage the abstraction, use, damming, and diversion of water, as 
well as to control the quantity, level, and flow of water bodies in its region (RMA, 1991, p. 103 [sec 
30 (e)]). If deemed appropriate, regional councils are also given the ability to establish rules for 
freshwater allocation through a regional plan (RMA, 1991, p. 103 [sec 30. (fa) (i)]). However, a 
successful WCO will replace these regional council rules (RMA, 1991, p. 448 [sec 200 (a) (b) (c) (d)]). A 
successful WCO strips authority for management of a water body from the regional council and gives 
it to the Minister for the Environment. The Minister for the Environment is ultimately responsible for 
implementing the WCO and accepting the draft WCO rules for flow rates, abstraction volumes, and 
                                                          
32 One-for-one flow sharing is a principle of freshwater management. It requires that for every cumec of water 
abstracted from the river one should remain in-stream. This allows the river to mimic natural variability (such 
as in times of flood) despite abstraction.  
33 An allocation cap limits how much can be taken out of the river for out-of-stream use. The failure to place an 
allocation cap framed conflict in the late 1990s and early 2000s as Ruapuna Irrigation and Rangitata South 
desired further abstraction from the river for irrigation use.  
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the acceptable contamination levels of a water body. In sum, applicants for a WCO must justify the 
conservation of the water body based on its “outstanding amenity or intrinsic values” to the Minister 
for the Environment, and if successful, these WCO rules will replace existing regional council rules.  
5.4. The Rangitata River debate 
Environment Canterbury councillor Angus McKay stated in June 1998 that the Rangitata River “has 
vital social, economic, and environmental values” that should not be compromised (NZPA 1998, p.7). 
Under McKay’s guidance, ECan researched the Rangitata’s flows, the frequency of low-flow 
conditions, the relationship between local groundwater and the river, as well as how much could be 
abstracted for out-of-stream use (Aitchison-Earl, 2001; Ingles, 2000; Miskell, 2001; Mosley, 2001). 
ECan hoped this research would provide greater understanding of the social, economic, and 
environmental values of the Rangitata River.  
In December 1999 it was revealed that up to 1,000 spawning salmon were lost down the RDR each 
year (NZPA, 1999, p.1). This concerned the local Fish and Game Council. The Fish and Game Council 
represent anglers and hunters in New Zealand. The 1987 Conservation Act grants the Council the 
mandate to “advocate generally and in any statutory planning process the interests of the New 
Zealand Fish and Game Council” in regard to management of fish, game, and habitats (Conservation 
Act, 1987, p. 118 [sec 26C (g)]).  
In late 1999, two new irrigation companies - Rangitata South Irrigation and Rupanua Irrigation - 
applied for consent from ECan to dam, abstract, and divert freshwater from the Rangitata River 
(Pickering, 1999, p.2). Rangitata South applied for consent to irrigate 18,000 hectares of land south 
of the Rangitata River into the Timaru District. Ruapuna Irrigation sought consent to divert 
freshwater over 16,500 hectares of Mid-Canterbury land. In response, the Fish and Game council 
applied for a WCO to be established on the Rangitata River in order to protect the habitat of sport 
fishing species (Worrall, 1999, p.1).The WCO, if successfully established, would set minimum flow 
rates and rules for future abstraction from the river. A successful WCO would strip ECan of its 
responsibility for managing the river’s flows. In justifying the WCO application, Fish and Game’s Jay 
Graybill argued that the Rangitata River has a high quality fishery of native and introduced species 
(ibid). Graybill argued that the abstractions proposed by Rangitata South and Ruapuna Irrigation 
threatened this outstanding fishery, furthermore, amenity values for recreational activities such as 
rafting would be lost (ibid).  
Fish and Game applied for a WCO on the Rangitata River to ensure the river’s fisheries were not 
compromised by future damming. Fish and Game officers Frank Scarf, Jay Graybill, and Mark Webb – 
all from Central South Island Fish and Game – wrote the conservation order application that was 
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submitted to the Ministry for the Environment (MfE) in December 1999 (F. Scarf, personal 
communication, April 13, 2012). The conservation order application presented Fish and Game’s 
rationale for protecting the river. Fish and Game argued the river had outstanding values: including 
(1) a nationally important and outstanding sports fish resource; (2) a habitat for native fish; (3) 
extensive recreational opportunities, such as rafting, canoeing, kayaking, jetboating, whitebaiting, 
floundering, picknicking, and sightseeing; (4) a native bird habitat; and (5) a high level of accessibility 
(Rangitata River Water Conservation Order tribunal, 2002, p.1). Fish and Game then noted the 
attributes of the river that enabled these outstanding values: these attributes included (1) water 
temperature coupled with the incidence of fresh flows, (2) frequency and duration of fresh flows, (3) 
sufficient flow to ensure the river mouth remains open, (4) sufficient flow to provide adequate fish 
passage, (5) the absence of damming, and (6) pristine water quality (ibid). Fish and Game then 
presented draft rules that would allow these natural features to flourish: such as (1) a restriction on 
damming the Rangitata River; (2) a restriction on altering the river flow in order to maintain its 
braided characteristics; (3) limiting total abstraction to a maximum of 33 cumecs; (4) a minimum flow 
regime of 15 cumecs between April and July (winter), and 20 cumecs from August to March 
(summer); (5) a restriction on ECan granting consent for resource use that would have a negative 
effect on water quality; and (6) the maintenance of fish passages (New Zealand Fish and Game 
Council, 1999, pp. 7-8 [sec. 17; 18; 19; 21; 22]). 
MfE accepted the WCO application on 22nd March 2000 and established a Tribunal to receive 
submissions for and against the river’s protection. Territorial authorities were initially disappointed 
that a WCO process, rather than an ECan-led RMA process, had been endorsed (Keast, 2000, p.4). 
The Mayoral Forum34 was concerned at the high cost a WCO process could impose on the community 
(ibid). Local Māori supported the WCO application. The Rangitata River Water Conservation Order 
tribunal report (2002, p.1) stated that the Rangitata River is significant to Ngāi Tahu. Research 
interviewee and Fish and Game’s national director, Bryce Johnson, noted that Fish and Game 
received a brief letter from Ngāi Tahu outlining their support (B. Johnson, personal communication, 
March 27, 2012). According to Johnson, this “had the effect of signalling to government that it’s a 
joint application” (ibid).  
Interest group alliances formed before the first Tribunal hearing. Those who supported the WCO 
included the Fish and Game Council, local Māori tribe Ngāi Tahu, the Ashburton and Rangitata 
Instream Users Group, the Canterbury-Aoraki Conservation Board, and the New Zealand Recreational 
Canoeing Association Inc. Groups opposed to the WCO included Rangitata South Irrigation, Ruapuna 
Irrigation, the Mid-Canterbury Irrigation Enhancement Society, and Federated Farmers. The RDR 
                                                          
34 The Mayoral Forum is an umbrella group with membership from all the mayors and chief executives of 
Canterbury’s Territorial Authorities. ECan’s chairperson and chief executive are also members.  
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remained neutral. The RDR wanted assurance their current abstraction rate would not be threatened 
by either the proposed WCO or an ECan-led RMA plan. John Waugh argued that the status quo rules 
for the river suited the RDR as it preserved their rate of abstraction (J. Waugh, personal 
communication, March 9, 2012). RDR’s abstraction rate had been approved by the South Canterbury 
Catchment Board’s 1986 Rangitata River Plan. This plan was designed to operate until 1996. There 
was no operative plan for the Rangitata River between 1996 and the WCO application in late 1999.  
ECan released a draft plan for the management of the Rangitata River on the 9th September 2001 
(Worrall, 2001, p.2; McKinlay, 2001a, p.3). The draft plan was released after Fish and Game 
submitted their WCO application, but before the WCO Tribunal hearing had commenced. ECan’s 
draft plan proposed rules for the river’s use that it hoped would substitute the WCO. ECan’s plan 
could replace the WCO if the WCO applicants were not able to justify the conservation of the river at 
the WCO Tribunal, or if the WCO applicants decided to withdraw their application in favour of ECan’s 
draft plan. ECan’s draft rules were similar to the draft WCO rules. It recognised the outstanding 
qualities of the river, forbid future damming, and established higher minimum flows for the river 
during winter and summer. It differed from the WCO by not placing a cap on abstraction (Worrall, 
2001, p.2; McKinlay, 2001a, p.3). Under ECan’s draft rules, Rangitata South and Ruapuna irrigation 
would not be able to gain irrigable water through a dam, but they would still be able to apply for 
rights to abstract water because ECan’s plan did not include a cap on allocation.  ECan’s plan also 
proposed a higher minimum flow rate to protect the river’s ecosystem from over abstraction 
(Worrall, 2001, p.2). 
5.4.1. ECan’s justification for a management plan rather than a WCO 
Why did ECan oppose the WCO given the similarities between the draft WCO and ECan’s draft plan? 
One explanation given was the “adversarial” WCO process. ECan’s water portfolio chairman Mark 
Oldfield argued the WCO process was “adversarial” and “combative” in contrast to ECan’s 
“consultive” RMA planning process (ibid). Another explanation is that a WCO would remove ECan’s 
authority to set rules and limits for the Rangitata River in the future. ECan opposed the WCO because 
a successful WCO application would weaken its authority in the region.  
Why did ECan propose a higher minimum flow rate than the WCO? ECan argued for a higher 
minimum flow rate because they did not plan to cap abstraction from the river, thereby providing 
opportunities for new irrigators (such as Rangitata South and Ruapuna Irrigation) to abstract water 
when the river was at high flow. ECan Chairman Richard Johnson argued the higher minimum flow 
rate would protect “the river’s ecological values” as well as the “existing water users” (NZPA, 2001a, 
p.8). Despite ECan’s argument, existing water users – such as the RDR – were the losers from ECan’s 
plan. ECan’s plan contained higher minimum flow rates, which meant less would be available for 
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abstraction, and thus less water would be available to the RDR during the dry summer months. 
Furthermore, ECan’s plan - by not placing a cap on abstraction - would enable southern Rangitata 
irrigators to apply for consent to ECan for irrigable water to travel south. This would mean greater 
competition for water on the Rangitata, in combination with less water being available for 
abstraction due to higher minimum flow rates.  This threatened the reliability of RDR’s irrigation 
scheme. As Table 5 illustrates, the RDR took most of the abstracted water north prior to the WCO 
hearing. As Table 6 illustrates, the proposed abstractions south of the river amounted to an extra 14 
cumecs of freshwater for out-of-stream use. 
Table 5 Surface water abstraction from the Rangitata River (circa May 2001) (Rangitata River 
Water Conservation Order tribunal, 2002, p.79). 
Rangitata Diversion Race 30.70 cumecs 
Non RDR stockwater 1.007 cumecs 
Non RDR irrigation 0.263 cumecs 
Table 6 Proposed surface water abstraction from the Rangitata River into the Timaru District 
(Jenkins, 2013; NZRCA, 2000).  
Rangitata South Irrigation Proposal 5.94 cumecs 
Ruapuna Irrigation Proposal 8.00 Cumecs 
ECan’s draft plan angered the Ashburton District Council who own 40 per cent of the RDR. Ashburton 
Mayor Murray Anderson argued that if ECan’s plan for the Rangitata River proceeded it “would have 
a disastrous effect on this district” (McKinlay, 2001b, p.6) due to the likely reduction in RDR 
abstraction volume. Mayor Anderson also criticised ECan’s inability to draft a plan for the river 
between 1996 and 2001. In sum, ECan’s plan sought to help new irrigators establish themselves 
while simultaneously protecting the river from damming. This required existing users, such as the 
RDR, to limit their abstraction to extend use of the resource. By contrast, the proposed WCO would 
lock in the status quo flows and abstraction rates established by the South Canterbury Catchment 
Board’s 1986 plan. 
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5.5. The Water Conservation Order Tribunal hearing and Environment 
Court appeal 
The WCO was debated in two legal forums. The first forum was the WCO Tribunal hearing35. The 
Minister for the Environment, Marian Hobbes, was given advice by the Tribunal commissioners to 
implement the draft WCO. A month after this decision, ECan councillors voted to appeal the draft 
WCO at the Environment Court. The second forum of debate was the Environment Court appeal36. 
5.5.1. WCO tribunal hearing 
The Tribunal hearing began with Fish and Game’s argument for a WCO. Fish and Game’s Bryce 
Johnson argued that the Rangitata River was in a superior condition to the neighbouring Orari and 
Pareora Rivers. Johnson used these rivers to highlight the effects of abstraction and the need to 
protect the Rangitata River from similar deterioration (Pickering, 2001a, p.1). Ngāi Tahu’s local 
rūnanga,37 Arowhenua, argued the WCO would protect the cultural and spiritual significance of the 
waterway (Pickering, 2001b, p.2). The Department of Conservation (DOC) argued the Rangitata River 
was a significant habitat for rare birdlife and bat species. DOC’s expert witness, Professor Kenneth 
Hughey, supported a high minimum flow level that would protect the habitats of these rare species 
(NZPA, 2001b, p.12). Fish and Game hired a variety of expert witnesses during the WCO Tribunal 
hearing38. In 2010 it was reported that Fish and Game had spent $500,000 trying to establish the 
WCO (Littlewood, 2010, p.2).  
Those opposed to the WCO argued it would restrict economic growth in the region. Rangitata South 
Irrigation argued their 16,000 hectare development south of the river, when applying the economic 
“benefit multiplier for intensive farming”, would result in $120 to $240 million dollars of economic 
activity in the region (Pickering, 2001f, p.2). Economist Geoff Butcher argued a WCO would restrict 
agricultural earnings by a potential $438 million a year (Pickering, 2001g, p.5). Stan Scorringe, 
Mackenzie District Mayor, argued the economic success of the Opuha Dam (Worrall, 2007) – a 
recently built irrigation dam in his district – could be replicated through damming the Rangitata 
River. Tony Howey, an irrigator from the Opuha scheme, cited a $3 million onion and potato pack-
house in the Mackenzie District as an example of the economic benefits of irrigation (NZPA, 2001d, 
p.15). A social argument was put forward by Grant McFadden. McFadden, on behalf of the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Forestry, argued that irrigation development was shown to lower the age of rural 
                                                          
35 The WCO Tribunal began on the 3rd October 2001, with the applicant Fish and Game closing the hearings on 
the 20th December 2001. The Tribunal was chaired by Dr Jonet Ward, a senior Lecturer in resource 
management at Lincoln University. She was joined by Claire Mulcock and Dr Murray Parsons.  
36 The Environment Court hearing began on the 13th October 2003 and concluded in December 2003.   
37 Tribal council.  
38 Fish and Game’s expert witnesses included Keith Hovell, Frank Scarf, Mark Webb, Martin Unwin, Ian Jowett, 
Bruce Digby (hydrologist), Basil Sharp (economist), Geoff Kerr (economist), Bryan Strange, Gordon Glova, and 
John Stark. 
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populations, rejuvenate schools, and place greater demand on rural facilities (Pickering, 2001d, p.12). 
According to research interviewee John Young (pers.comm), the RDR company “spent upwards of a 
million dollars trying to get the status quo”. Trustpower, who presented alongside the RDR company, 
spent upwards of $2 million during the Tribunal and Environment Court hearings (Keast, 2004, p.4).  
5.5.1.1. Off-river storage 
The Timaru Herald reported on the 22nd October 2001 that “behind the scenes manoeuvring” during 
the WCO Tribunal hearing had resulted in an off-river storage compromise (Pickering, 2001c, p. 3). 
The compromise permitted abstraction from the river at high flows (above 110 cumecs). These flows 
would then be diverted into irrigation storage ponds (ibid). Angus McKay (ECan councillor), John 
Young (RDR manager), and Frank Scarf (Fish and Game) all agreed that the river does not provide 
good fishing conditions when flowing above 110 cumecs (A. McKay, personal communication, May 3, 
2012). During a research interview, Frank Scarf argued that “over 110 cumecs the water is getting too 
milky for anglers to go fishing. Not only that, fish tend to hole up and not move, and so above 110 
cumecs the turbidity of the water is such that it is no longer a recreational resource” (F. Scarf, 
personal communication, April 13, 2012). The off-river storage plan would enable farmers south of 
the Rangitata to gain access to irrigable water without a dam or a reduction in RDR’s abstraction rate. 
This compromise, created through bargaining between Frank Scarf, Angus McKay and John Young, 
became a means by which the environmental goals of a WCO and further development of irrigation 
through use of the Rangitata River could both be achieved.  
5.5.1.2. Regional council and territorial authority evidence.  
ECan, the Timaru District Council, and the Ashburton District Council all presented evidence at the 
WCO Tribunal. ECan wanted to enact its draft plan for the river. This draft plan concurred with the 
WCO that the river was outstanding and deserved protection. ECan promoted the planning process 
over the WCO because, in its opinion, the planning process would provide for better “community 
consultation” (Pickering, 2001e, p.15). The Timaru District council opposed the WCO and desired a 
more equitable allocation of water from the Rangitata so that farmers in its district could develop 
irrigation. Thus, the Timaru District Council argued the river was not outstanding and that Fish and 
Game had been emotive rather than scientific during the Tribunal hearing (Pickering, 2001h, p.7). 
The Ashburton District Council, as 40 per cent owner of the RDR, presented evidence that supported 
the maintenance of the RDR’s abstraction levels.  
On the 30th October 2002, the WCO Tribunal recommended to the Minister for the Environment that 
a Water Conservation Order be placed on the Rangitata River. The draft order maintained Fish and 
Game’s proposed 20 cumec minimum flow in summer and 15 cumec minimum flow in winter. 
Abstraction was capped at 33 cumecs, 28 of which would be available for the RDR (MfE, 2002, p.138 
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[sec.7]). The Tribunal also recommended one-for-one flow sharing and the abstraction of flows 
above 110 cumecs for off-river irrigation storage. This would allow farmers south of the river to 
abstract freshwater for irrigation.  
5.5.2. Environment Court appeal 
Farmers south of the river were unhappy with the recommended WCO despite the off-river storage 
compromise (Pickering, 2002, p.1). Regardless, it was ECan that initially appealed the Tribunal’s ruling 
at the Environment Court39. ECan Chairman Richard Johnson justified the appeal by arguing that the 
Rangitata River is of great importance to the Canterbury region (Keast, 2002, p.4). For this reason, 
ECan supported the WCO but maintained that a higher minimum flow regime and the removal of 
one-to-one flow sharing (both features of ECan’s draft plan) would improve the river’s management 
(ibid).  
The Environment Court appeal began in Christchurch on 13th October 200340. The debate and expert 
testimonies followed a similar pattern to the WCO Tribunal. The ecological benefits of conservation 
were presented by those in favour of the WCO, and the economic benefits of irrigation were 
presented by those opposed. ECan presented evidence in the middle. During the appeal, ECan’s 
director of policy and planning, John Talbot (2003, p.4), noted that ECan supported the WCO but 
“wishes to ensure the terms of any Order made do not unnecessarily compromise the ability of 
Environment Canterbury to maximise the well-being obtained from Canterbury’s water resources”. A 
successful WCO would strip ECan of its authority over the river’s management and its autonomy to 
utilise the resource as it saw fit. As a result, ECan would be unable to alter minimum flow levels or 
abstraction rates to help “maximise the well-being obtained” from the river in the future. This 
explains why ECan intervened with its own draft plan, and appealed the WCO at the Environment 
Court while simultaneously supporting the principles of the WCO.  
5.5.3. Decision and reaction 
Nearly five years after the initial application was lodged, on 9th August 2004, the Environment Court 
recommended the establishment of the Water Conservation Order for the Rangitata River. The Court 
maintained Fish and Game’s proposed WCO rules. According to Fish and Game’s Jay Graybill, the 
WCO stopped the deterioration of a major river, highlighted the value of the Resource Management 
Act, and gave the Rangitata River a “virtual national park status” (NZPA, 2004, p.1). Ian Morten of 
Rangitata South Irrigation supported the WCO’s endorsement for an extra irrigation abstraction point 
                                                          
39 ECan was joined by Rangitata South Irrigation, the Timaru District Council, Trustpower Limited, the Rangitata 
Diversion Race, and Federated Farmers in this appeal. See Rangitata South Irrigation Limited v New Zealand 
and Central South Island Fish and Game Council – Decision No. C109/2004. 
40 Judge Jon Jackson was appointed alongside commissioners Robyn Grigg and Charles Manning.  
 59 
on the southern bank of the river. However, Morten argued that irrigators presented a good case to 
take an extra five or six cumecs from the river. The Environment Court Judge, according to Morten, 
went into the hearing with the opinion that the river was already degraded, and thus, the Judge 
denied irrigators new abstractions unless the river’s flow was above 110 cumecs (ibid).  
The Environment Court expressed concern at the inequitable flow of water between the north and 
south sides of the river. They placed blame on ECan’s allocation of water permits on a first-come-
first-served basis. According to the Environment Court, this system leads “to possible unfairness and 
to political inefficiency”, and although this could be resolved through a regional water plan, the Court 
noted the ongoing “potential for highly politicized decision[s] and across-the-river animosities” (ibid). 
ECan welcomed the Environment Court’s decision despite the fact that WCO rules now replaced 
ECan’s draft plan rules. ECan Chairman Richard Johnson stated that the WCO aligned with ECan’s 
proposed Natural Resources Regional Plan (Keast, 2004, p.4). The Minister for the Environment 
enacted the Water Conservation Order on the 13th July 2006.  
5.6. Conclusion 
In this case study, farmers applied for consent to dam the Rangitata River to provide irrigable water 
to South-Canterbury farmers who had suffered through consecutive droughts. In response, the Fish 
and Game council applied for a Water Conservation Order to halt the dam. ECan pursued the 
authority to set rules for freshwater use through a draft plan. ECan also pursued the autonomy to 
allocate freshwater resources through an appeal to the Environment Court over the proposed WCO.  
ECan failed to set rules for the Rangitata River’s use between 1996 and 2001. ECan’s failure to plan, 
in conjunction with the first-come-first-served consents process, encouraged farmers to apply to 
ECan for consent to dam the river for irrigation use. In response, Fish and Game applied for a WCO 
that became a de facto plan in the absence of an ECan led RMA plan.  
The MC-NPM hybrid theory predicted: 1), that ECan would establish patronage with interest groups 
but would maintain decision making autonomy, 2) that ECan would focus on outputs over outcomes 
and 3), that ECan would adopt a hands-off approach to freshwater management unless the 
cumulative environmental effects of resource use became clear. In this case, ECan’s draft plan 
attempted to mediate the interests of environmentalists, northern Rangitata irrigators, and southern 
Rangitata irrigators. However, interviews, archival evidence, and documents all highlight ECan’s 
inability to create a plan that set rules acceptable to all interest groups. Because ECan was not able 
to establish a close relationship of patronage with any interest group, its draft plan was not 
supported. ECan focused on an output, a draft plan, to establish authority over the Rangitata River. 
However, as the MC-NPM hybrid theory predicted ECan wavered in planning for the river between 
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1996 and 2001. This hands-off approach was reversed only after ECan’s decision making autonomy 
was threatened by a WCO.  
The MC-NPM hybrid theory suggested that ECan would struggle to establish authority over 
freshwater but that it would maintain some decision making autonomy. In this case study, ECan was 
unable to establish authority or autonomy over freshwater use, resulting in policy stagnation. Policy 
stagnation was only resolved by the Ministry for the Environment’s decision to implement a WCO on 
the river. In sum, ECan was unable to establish authority through a draft plan. ECan was also unable 
to maintain decision making autonomy because of the Fish and Game council’s successful WCO 
application.  
The next case study will investigate ECan’s attempt to establish rules for groundwater abstraction. 
Groundwater abstraction became a popular means of accessing irrigable water following the 
conservation of the Rangitata River. The popularity of groundwater abstraction forced ECan into a 
planning process for groundwater use.  
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6. Chapter Six 
Case Study 2 – Groundwater zoning in Canterbury  
6.1. Introduction  
By the mid-2000s, the Rakaia, Rangitata, and Ahuriri Rivers in Canterbury were protected by Water 
Conservation Orders. The Waitaki River was used exclusively for hydro-electricity generation. 
Farmers were unable to abstract freshwater from these rivers for irrigation use. In response, farmers 
pursued groundwater abstraction as an alternative to surface water abstraction to irrigate their land.  
ECan noted a growth in groundwater abstraction as early as 2003. In 2003, ECan received up to 30 
new applications a week for groundwater consents (Hayman, 2003, p.4). This was double the number 
of consents received in the previous year. ECan’s consent manager Leo Fietje surmised that 
applications for groundwater consents were being made to secure future irrigation supplies as 
farmers were concerned that some areas were reaching abstraction limits (ibid). In this same year, 
ECan granted 84 per cent of water consents for the maximum allowable period of 35 years. This was 
the largest percentage of water consent approvals out of any regional council in New Zealand (NZPA, 
2003b, p.5). ECan’s first-come-first-served consenting process encouraged farmers to apply for 
consent as quickly as possible, and ECan’s willingness to grant long-term consents locked-in these 
allocations for up to 35 years. Farmers and environmentalists were both concerned that this 
consents process would result in over-allocation of the resource. 
Given these circumstances, this case study examines ECan’s attempt to manage groundwater 
abstraction in Canterbury. The chapter begins with a brief history of groundwater use in Canterbury. 
It then continues by examining the pressures that led to groundwater zoning in Canterbury. The high 
profile Lynton Dairy Environment Court appeal is then described. ECan’s response through the 
Restorative Programme for Lowland Streams is then recounted.  
6.2. Groundwater use in Canterbury – a history 
Māori use of groundwater predated the arrival of European settlers (Weeber, Brown, White, Russell, 
& Thorpe, 2001, p.5). Upon arrival, European settlers believed Canterbury’s groundwater had the 
potential for irrigation use. For example, the Lyttelton Times enthusiastically proclaimed in 1867 that 
artesian wells should be used to irrigate the Canterbury Plains (as cited in Weeber et al., 2001, pp.14-
5). Monitoring of Canterbury’s aquifers began in 1945 and focused on areas with high demand for 
irrigation (Weeber et al., 2001, p.26).  
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Local farmer and irrigator Brian Cameron argued “from the earliest days of settlement, there was the 
realisation that lack of water was the limiting factor in agricultural production” (Cameron, 2009, 
p.17). Government funded irrigation schemes such as the Rangitata Diversion Race ensured that 
many parts of rural Canterbury had an adequate water supply by the mid-20th century. Farmers in 
coastal areas began to sink wells for irrigation purposes by the 1970s. According to Cameron, farmers 
argued “there should be distinct groundwater and river supply areas” and “there was considerable 
debate as to exactly where the boundar[ies] should be” (Cameron, 2009, pp.48-49).  
Hydrologists Hugh Thorpe and David Scott investigated the depth and flow rates of aquifers in 
Canterbury during the late 1970s (Thorpe & Scott, 1979). They examined recharge from rainfall and 
river leakage. Their research illustrated that with full irrigation development some bores would drop 
by as much as 20 metres (Thorpe & Scott, 1979; Cameron, 2009, p.71). Farmers believed abstraction 
from coastal aquifers was threatened by new wells in the upper-plains (Cameron, 2009, p.75). A 
solution proposed by farmers was for upper-plains irrigators to abstract from surface water sources 
exclusively (ibid). However, Water Conservation Orders – such as those on the Ahuriri, Rakaia and 
Rangitata Rivers – and the exclusive use of other water bodies for hydro-electricity generation meant 
that surface water sources were unavailable for many upper-plains farmers. In response, upper-
plains farmers were forced to pursue groundwater abstraction if they desired irrigation.  
ECan’s resource management manager John Talbot outlined the negative effects of groundwater 
abstraction in 1991. Talbot presented a paper to the Irrigation in the New Environment conference in 
which he argued that groundwater abstraction would become more contested in Canterbury over 
the coming decades (Talbot, 1991). Issues included some wells being unusable at times of low water 
levels, conflict between water users, deterioration of groundwater quality due to land use 
intensification, an increase in the risk of sea water contamination, and a decrease in river flow due to 
groundwater abstraction (Talbot, 1991, p.2). These trends prompted ECan to investigate 
groundwater management in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  
6.3. The Environment Court, resource consents, and regional plans 
In New Zealand, resource consent decisions authorised by regional councils can be appealed to the 
Environment Court. New Zealand’s Environment Court replaced the Appeal Board that was created 
under the 1953 Town and Country Planning Act (Palmer, 2010, p.70). Two features of the Appeal 
Board remain in the modern day Environment Court. The first is the membership of the Court, with 
one legally qualified chairperson (the Environment Court Judge) alongside two commissioners. The 
Environment Court is perceived as a Court of expertise because commissioners are appointed for 
their knowledge (e.g. the employment of hydrologists as commissioners for freshwater hearings) 
(Palmer, 2010, p.78). Secondly, the Environment Court asks for a full rehearing of evidence (a de 
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novo hearing). A de novo hearing means that no legal authority is given to the previous decision. The 
Environment Court therefore has the power to change decisions made by local authorities (Palmer, 
2010).  
The Environment Court is guided by the Resource Management Act when making decisions on 
freshwater consent appeals. As noted in the introduction chapter, the “purpose of this Act [the RMA] 
is to promote the sustainable management of natural and physical resources” such as freshwater 
(RMA, 1991, p.68 [sec5. (1)]). The Act defines sustainable management as: 
[t]he use, development, and protection of natural and physical resources in 
a way, or at a rate, which enables people and communities to provide for 
their social, economic, and cultural well-being and for their health and 
safety while- (a) sustaining the potential of natural and physical resources 
(excluding minerals) to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future 
generations; and (b) safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, 
soil, and ecosystems; and (c) avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse 
effects of activities on the environment (RMA, 1991, p.68 [sec5. (2) (a) (b) 
(c)]).  
Therefore, consent for an activity – such as abstracting groundwater for irrigation – can be granted if 
its use does not effect the needs of future generations; if its use does not threaten the life-
supporting capacity of ecosystems; and if the effects of its use can be avoided, remedied, or 
mitigated (Jay, 1999, p.468).  
The RMA asks regional councils to establish, implement, and review “objectives, policies, and 
methods to achieve integrated management of the natural and physical resources of their region” 
(RMA, 1991, p.101 [sec 30 (1) (a)]). The previous chapter noted that regional councils are also asked 
to control the abstraction, damming, and diversion of freshwater in its jurisdiction while controlling 
the levels of flow in water bodies (RMA, 1991, p.103 [sec 30 (e)]). Furthermore, regional councils are 
able to establish rules for freshwater allocation through a regional plan (RMA, 1991, p.103 [sec 30. 
(fa) (i)]). A regional plan will be prepared to help a regional council exercise the functions above 
(RMA, 1991, p.173 [sec 66 (1)]). Regional plans must state the objectives for the region, the policies 
to meet these objectives, and the rules to implement the policies (RMA, 1991, p.175 [sec 67 (1) (a) 
(b) (c)]). Regional plans must give effect to national policy statements issued by central government 
and ought to be consistent with Water Conservation Orders (RMA, 1991, p.175 [sec 67 (3) (4)]). 
Importantly, every rule for resource use in a regional plan “shall have the force and effect of a 
regulation” (RMA, 1991, p.176 [sec 68 (2)]). In sum, resource consent decisions made by regional 
councils can be appealed to the Environment Court. Regional councils can create a regional plan with 
rules for freshwater use that guide, constrain, and facilitate resource consent decisions.  
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Therefore a regional plan, such as ECan’s proposed Natural Resources Regional Plan (NRRP), can 
establish rules that limit the cumulative effects of individual abstractions. If a request for consent 
does not comply with the objectives, policies, and rules of a plan, it potentially requires public 
notification and a public hearing process (Jay, 1999, p.470). ECan began the NRRP process in the late 
1990s, however, ECan was still completing the document by the end of the thesis analysis period in 
2010 (Williams, 2011, p.4). In the absence of planning rules, the allocation of a resource is 
determined by individual consents and whether or not the individual consent affects the needs of 
future generations, threatens the life-supporting capacity of ecosystems, or if consent applicants can 
demonstrate the effect of resource use can be avoided, remedied, or mitigated.  
6.4. Groundwater Zoning Case Study – creation of groundwater zones 
Farmers and environmentalists were both concerned about the effect of changing land use on 
Canterbury’s groundwater by the early 2000s (Cameron, 2009, p.120). For example, 6,319 hectares 
of new land was irrigated in the Te Pirita district west of Ashburton between 1993 and 2002 (NZPA, 
2003a, p.8). To irrigate this land, farmers abstracted from an aquifer 90 to 120 metres below the 
surface. However, a deeper aquifer between 140 and 200 metres underground was increasingly 
being used (ibid). In response, the Dunsandel Groundwater Users Association applied for a grant to 
study groundwater in Mid-Canterbury with the desire to know how much water could be allocated 
for farming (ibid). This research - funded by the Dunsandel Groundwater Users Association in 
partnership with Sustainable Farming Fund, MAF Policy, and ECan - was the first phase of the 
Aqualinc Canterbury groundwater model (Aqualinc, 2005). 
Aqualinc aimed to develop a groundwater model that would “predict the response of the 
groundwater system to changes in land use and groundwater abstraction” (Weir 2007: 1). Aqualinc 
hoped the model would aid the development of a long-term strategy for use of groundwater in 
Canterbury. Aqualinc’s Canterbury groundwater model was the result of an extra $200,000 of 
research funded by the Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry ($62,000), ECan ($60,000), the 
Mackenzie Charitable Foundation ($20,000), and the Ashburton Community Water Trust ($58,000) 
(NZPA, 2002, p.4; Aqualinc 2007).  
Findings from the Canterbury Strategic Water Study (CSWS) (Morgan, Bidwell, Bright, McIndoe, & 
Robb, 2002) were fed into Aqualinc’s Canterbury groundwater model. The CSWS was a quantitative 
survey of Canterbury’s freshwater resources and it confirmed that “approximately one million 
hectares of land could potentially be irrigated in Canterbury” (Morgan et al., 2002, p.2). 
Aqualinc’s Canterbury groundwater model differed from ECan’s bathtub model in its conception of 
Canterbury’s groundwater (Weber, Memon, & Painter, 2011). Aqualinc’s Canterbury groundwater 
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model conceived of Canterbury’s aquifers as semi-permeable layers, and thus supported the 
continued abstraction of water from deep aquifers. By contrast, ECan’s bathtub model conceived of a 
relatively continuous flow of water between deep and shallow aquifers (Weber et al., 2011). ECan 
concluded through use of its bathtub model that abstracting water from deep aquifers would have 
an impact on shallow aquifers that are directly connected to lowland streams. ECan’s bathtub model 
was preferred by environmentalists who believed that abstraction from deep aquifers explained 
reductions in lowland stream flows, whereas Aqualinc’s Canterbury groundwater model was 
preferred by farmers who desired abstraction from deep aquifers (Weber et al., 2011, p.50).  
ECan published a report on Canterbury’s groundwater resources on the 18th February 2004 (Aitchison 
Earl, Scott, & Sanders, 2004; Hayman, 2004a, p.1). This report promoted the management of 
groundwater resources through calculating sustainable abstraction limits and restricting abstraction 
if these limits were exceeded. The report split Canterbury into 29 groundwater zones (see Figure 4) 
and the sustainable abstraction limits of these zones were calculated against estimated use 
(Aitchison Earl et al., 2004, p.14). The report calculated that groundwater was being abstracted faster 
than the estimated recharge rate in seven zones41. ECan’s regional planning committee 
recommended that no new groundwater consents be granted in these zones unless it was proven by 
the consent applicant that the effect of the abstraction would be minor (Hayman, 2004a, p.1).  
The zones were included in ECan’s draft NRRP water chapter (ECan, 2004; Veltman, Miller, Glennie, & 
Talbot, 2004). The NRRP reached first schedule status in 2004. However, as already noted, the NRRP 
was not completed until 2011. Thus, the draft groundwater limits in the NRRP did not have the force 
of fully authorised planning rules. Despite this, the new limits would have an effect on resource 
consent applications for groundwater bores in Canterbury. ECan’s groundwater report was published 
five days before a resource consent hearing for groundwater abstraction by two large dairying 
operations – Lynton and Pine Grove farms – was due to begin (Holden, 2004, p.8). The new draft 
limits and zones effected how ECan assessed Lynton and Pine Grove farms application.  
                                                          
41 These zones were Ashburton-Lyndhurst, Ashley, Levels Plain, Rangitata-Orton, Valetta, Waimakariri, and the 
Rakaia-Selwyn. 
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Figure 4 Groundwater allocation zones in Canterbury (Source Environment Canterbury).  
ECan’s allocation limits were tallied by calculating 50 per cent of annual land-surface recharge and 15 
per cent of average annual rainfall. The report acknowledged this was a “conservative approach to 
highlight areas of high allocation” (Aitchison Earl et al., 2004, p.1). Groundwater had traditionally 
been allocated on the basis of how much water is annually recharged to aquifers. However, this 
calculation did not take into account the extra groundwater required to sustain “groundwater 
dependent ecosystems such as streams, springs and wetlands” (Aitchison-Earl et al., 2004, p.7). 
ECan’s calculations were designed to protect these groundwater dependent ecosystems.  
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ECan justified its 50 per cent annual land-surface recharge calculation due to concern over the health 
of lowland streams, springs, and wetlands in the Rakaia-Selwyn zone (Aitchison Earl et al., 2004, 
p.11). Figure 5 highlights the growth of groundwater abstraction in this zone since 1990, and the 
CSWS (published in 2002) calculated that the Rakaia-Selwyn zone had allocated up to 46 per cent of 
annual land-surface recharge (ibid). Thus, because the “Selwyn Zone is highly allocated, with streams 
already under stress…an alternative limit of 50 per cent of land-surface recharge” was proposed 
(ibid). ECan justified the allocation of 15 per cent of average annual rainfall to groundwater 
abstraction through the research of White, Hong, Murray, Scott, and Thorpe (2003). White et al. 
argued “that approximately 30% of mean annual rainfall becomes recharged to groundwater” (as 
quoted in Aitchison-Earl et al., 2004, p.12). ECan halved this figure to 15 per cent because in “zones 
where soil and other relevant data are not available it is appropriate to adopt a conservative 
approach to setting allocation limits and to consider only the rainfall recharge component of land-
surface recharge” (Aitchison Earl et al., 2004, p.12).  
 
Figure 5 Development in the Rakaia-Selwyn groundwater allocation zone since 1990 (Jenkins, 
2007, p.5).  
ECan argued that all limits “should be considered as interim, [and] open to refinement depending on 
the hydrogeological understanding, and the completeness of use data” (Aitchison-Earl et al., 2004, 
p.26). The 50 per cent annual land-surface recharge calculation would be strengthened in the short-
term by introducing variables specific to each zone, such as land use, soil types, and rainfall 
(Aitchison-Earl et al., 2004, p.24). In the long-term, abstraction capacity would be clarified by 
calculating non-rainfall recharge such as irrigation leakage (ibid). This sequential method of setting 
limits was called the “zonal order regime”. ECan envisioned that knowledge of groundwater would 
improve through three zonal orders (Veltman et al., 2004). Leo Fietje (personal communication, 
 68 
March 1, 2012) explained in a research interview that the first order was based on land-surface 
recharge. The second order calculated rainfall, soil types, and crops. The third order approached each 
zone uniquely.  
Research interviewees differed when asked who was responsible for the creation of the groundwater 
zones, who decided where to draw the boundaries, and how the allocation rates and zonal order 
regimes were devised. ECan hydrologist Dr Howard Williams said that ECan’s groundwater section 
made the technical decisions regarding the most appropriate boundaries for the groundwater 
allocation zones (H. Williams, personal communication, October 4, 2012). ECan’s Christina Robb 
maintained that ECan’s Chief Executive Bryan Jenkins, in partnership with the Water Rights Trust 
environmental interest group, influenced the zonal management system (C. Robb, personal 
communication, May 24, 2012). ECan’s Leo Fietje credited hydrologist Philippa Aitchison-Earl for the 
development of the zonal boundary concept (L. Fietje, personal communication, March 1, 2012). 
Aqualinc consultant Ian McIndoe believed the need for limits was first established by the Canterbury 
Strategic Water Study (I. McIndoe, personal communication, April 17, 2012).  
ECan denied Lynton and Pine Grove farms application for a 35 year groundwater consent on 29th 
June 2004. ECan noted that the applications were in the over-allocated Selwyn-Rakaia red zone. ECan 
denied the consents due to the effects abstraction would have on existing consent holders (Scott, 
2004b, p.1).According to Federated Farmers, the decision highlighted the seriousness of ECan’s zonal 
management system (ibid). Water Rights Trust chairman Murray Rodgers welcomed the news. 
Rodgers stated “[w]e were opposed to the consent on the grounds that the volume of water 
intended for abstraction was not a sustainable use of the resource” (ibid). Lynton and Pine Grove 
appealed the decision to the Environment Court.  
6.5. Challenges to the groundwater zones 
Lynton and Pine Grove Environment Court appeal illustrated the different assumptions made by ECan 
and the applicants regarding Canterbury’s groundwater resources. The Environment Court examined 
four issues in its judgment: (1) possible draw-down effects on nearby wells, (2) possible nitrification 
effects, (3) cumulative effects relating to groundwater levels generally, and (4) the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the proposed abstraction. ECan rejected the original consent application due to the 
possible draw-down effects on nearby wells. However, during the Environment Court appeal Lynton 
and Pine Grove came to an agreement with their neighbour, Synlait’s Robindale Dairies, which 
established special conditions on Lynton and Pine Grove’s abstraction (C. Glass, personal 
communication, February 24, 2012). The agreement established a monitoring well. Lynton and Pine 
Grove would have to cease abstraction if water levels fell below 147.7 metres in the monitoring well 
(Lynton Dairy Env. Court, 2005, pp. 3-4 [sec. 10]).  
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The second issue was groundwater nitrification. The Environment Court noted “there is a concern 
that the nitrates introduced to the soil by fertiliser, cow urine and dairy shed wash-down could lead 
to increased nitrification beneath the site and thus in the aquifer system generally” (Lynton Dairy Env 
Court, 2005, p.5 [sec 15]). The Court argued that ECan had originally assessed nitrification effects 
incorrectly by comparing dry-land sheep farming to irrigated dairying (Lynton Dairy Env Court, 2005, 
p.34 [sec 121]). Lynton and Pine Grove were already farming dairy cattle and would continue dry-
land dairying if unsuccessful in gaining groundwater consent. In response, the Court assessed the 
effects of increased nitrification between irrigated and dry-land dairying. The Court calculated that 
stocking rates could increase by a maximum of 20 per cent with irrigation (Lynton Dairy Env Court, 
2005, p.33 [sec 118]). Given this, the Court concluded that there would be a “no more than minimal” 
increase in nitrification as a result of the groundwater abstraction (Lynton Dairy Env Court, 2005, 
p.34 [sec 121]). To limit nitrification, the Court asked Lynton and Pine Grove dairies to reduce their 
nitrogen fertiliser use and to apply best practice fertiliser use (Lynton Dairy Env Court, 2005, p.34 [sec 
122]). 
The third issue was cumulative effects. The Court recognised that growth in groundwater abstraction 
was explained by the lack of controls, such as planning rules, making it more attractive to farmers 
(Lynton Dairy Env Court, 2005, p.9 [sec 29]). Lynton and Pine Grove’s proposed abstraction was from 
aquifer four. Table 7 and Figure 6 indicate that aquifer four was considered, at the time, to be one of 
the deeper local aquifers. 
Table 7 Aquifer depths in the Rakaia-Selwyn groundwater zone (Lynton Dairy Env Court, 2005, 
p.12 [sec 39.]) 
  Inland   Coastal 
Aquifer 1    <10m 
  <20m 
Aquifer 2    30-40m 
Aquifer 3 80-120m  Unknown 
Aquifer 4    Unknown 
  >160m 
Aquifer 5    Unknown  
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The Court criticised ECan’s management of groundwater abstraction because it had failed “to control 
allocations on a seasonal or annual basis … [t]his lack of precision in the consents is at the heart of 
the issue. There is no real allocation given in the consent” (Lynton Dairy Env Court, 2005, pp. 7-8 [sec. 
24]). The Court instructed ECan to review its groundwater consents to ensure the total allocation of 
the resource is known on an annual basis so that each consent holder knows their portion of the 
total allocation (Lynton Dairy Env Court, 2005, p.8 [sec. 27]).  
 
Figure 6 Cross-section of aquifers underneath Christchurch (Stewart, 2012).  
Two cumulative effects were considered by the Court. The first effect was the “lowering of 
groundwater levels on a regional scale that may occur as a result of the proposed extraction” (Lynton 
Dairy Env Court, 2005, p.34 [sec 123]). It was concluded that historical fluctuations in well levels 
could be attributed to rainfall (Lynton Dairy Env Court, 2005, p.35 [sec 127]). The Court then used 
Aqualinc’s Canterbury groundwater model to assess the effects of Lynton and Pine Grove’s proposed 
abstraction on local groundwater levels. The results indicated a lowering of water levels in aquifer 4 
but a rise in the level of the shallowest aquifer due to recharge from the extra irrigation (Lynton Dairy 
Env Court, 2005, p.36 [sec 132]). Using this evidence, the Court concluded that the effects of Lynton’s 
proposal “would be minimal everywhere except possibly in the immediate vicinity of the wells where 
local draw-down effects may be evident” (Lynton Dairy Env Court, 2005, p.37 [sec 134]). These 
effects had been resolved through the well monitoring agreement between the applicants and 
Robindale dairies.  
The second cumulative effect to be assessed was lowland stream flow. The Court was concerned 
with lowland stream flow in the Rakaia-Selwyn groundwater zone (Lynton Dairy Env Court, 2005, 
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p.37 [sec 135]). The Court argued “that the major contributor to lower lowland flows is increased 
abstraction” (Lynton Dairy Env Court, 2005, p.38 [sec 138]). However, the Court accepted that 
“aquifer buffering” between the proposed wells and lowland streams would lessen the effect of the 
abstraction on lowland streams (Lynton Dairy Env Court, 2005, p.38 [sec 139]). The Court accepted 
that “there would be a time delay before the effects of any increase in abstractions would be realised 
and that the time delay would increase while the magnitude of the effect would decrease with the 
distance from the lowland streams” (Lynton Dairy Env Court, 2005, p.38 [sec 141]). The Court 
concluded, using Aqualinc’s Canterbury groundwater model, that “the addition of the proposed 
Lynton take would not have any significant or observable effect on flow in the lowland streams42” 
(Lynton Dairy Env Court, 2005, p.39 [sec. 144]).  
The Court concluded that the location of an abstraction, rather than the total amount abstracted, 
was the most critical factor in determining the effects on lowland stream flows. The Court used the 
lowland Irwell River to illustrate this point. Local groundwater users, in an attempt to increase 
irrigation reliability during summer, had started sinking deeper wells close to the Irwell River. 
Between 1997 and 2005 there were only four applications for new shallow wells near the Irwell River 
(up to 22m), whereas there were 40 applications for deeper wells (below 22m) (Lynton Dairy Env 
Court, 2005, pp. 49-50 [sec 180]). The Court argued these new abstractions below 22m in the vicinity 
of the Irwell, rather than the upper-plains abstractions proposed by Lynton and Pine Grove farms, 
were to blame for declining lowland stream flows.  
The Court subsequently criticised ECan for assessing consents in the upper-plains Te Pirita area 
differently from those in the lowland areas near the coast. The Court disapproved of consents being 
granted for groundwater abstraction in lowland areas while simultaneously being refused in Te Pirita, 
and subsequently concluded: 
…there is no probative evidence to support the alleged link between 
abstractions in the Te Pirita area and the effect on lowland streams. We 
have concluded that there is a direct correlation between abstractions from 
bores surrounding the Irwell, particularly within two kilometres of the Irwell 
River [takes from Aquifer 1], and the other tributaries and drains leading to 
Lake Ellesmere (Lynton Dairy Env Court, 2005, p.53 [sec. 194]).  
The Court argued that abstractions from the shallowest aquifer had led to an ecological crisis at Te 
Waihora / Lake Ellesmere (Lynton Dairy Env Court, 2005, p.53 [sec. 195]). In conclusion, the Court 
                                                          
42 The Court was presented with reports which indicated that Birdlings Brooks, Harts Creek, and Boggy Creek 
flows would decrease by an average of 2.3 per cent to 18 per cent, including one or two sites at Birdlings Brook 
that would decrease by up to 50 per cent (p. 39, [sec 143]). 
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disagreed with ECan’s initial decision to reject Lynton Dairy and Pine Grove’s application, permitting 
them consent to abstract groundwater for ten years43.  
6.5.1. Explaining the success of Lynton and Pine Grove dairies at the Environment 
Court 
The Environment Court case exposed issues with ECan’s groundwater management. First, the Court’s 
use of Aqualinc’s Canterbury groundwater model suggested that the effects of abstraction from deep 
upper-plains aquifers would be negligible in comparison to abstractions from aquifers geographically 
closer to the lowland streams. Second, the Court’s decision illustrated that consents for abstraction 
did not contain an actual volume that a consent holder could abstract. This meant that ECan could 
not calculate how much water was currently being abstracted through tallying existing consents. 
Furthermore, ECan was setting limits to groundwater abstraction without knowing how much was 
actually being used. Third, ECan’s tiered system of calculating groundwater availability was open to 
scientific challenge. New models, such as Aqualinc’s Canterbury groundwater model, could calculate 
the effects of variables – such as soil type, land use, and irrigation recharge – to challenge ECan’s first 
zonal order calculations. ECan’s persistence in granting consents for groundwater abstraction in 
lowland areas despite not knowing how much groundwater was annually abstracted was also 
criticised by the Court.  
According to ECan’s Christina Robb, this outcome had a significant effect on how the council would 
operate in the future: 
[Lynton and Pine Grove] brought into question the whole ability of regional 
councils to manage to limits. The view at the time was that ECan did not 
know what it was doing. And that has led to a whole lot of stuff at central 
government level, including ultimately the dismissal of Environment 
Canterbury councillors44 (C.Robb, personal communication, May 24, 2012).  
6.5.2. The Restorative Programme for Lowland Streams 
In response to the Lynton and Pine Grove decision, ECan created an adaptive management45 
programme to address uncertainties with groundwater management in the Rakaia-Selwyn zone. The 
Restorative Programme for Lowland Streams first aimed to establish “clear annual limits on the 
amount of water every consent holder in red zones can abstract…[and] to vary those limits year-by-
year depending on how much water is in the groundwater system”. It would also require every 
“consent holder to measure how much water they are taking by metering their wells”. The 
                                                          
43 The original consent application was for 5.1Mm³ of abstraction. The Court reduced the amount Lynton and 
Pine Grove dairy could abstract to 3.64Mm³ (pp. 54-55 [sec 200-203]).  
44 This will be discussed in the next case study.  
45 Adaptive management was defined by Sara Singleton (2002, p.58) as a strategy “that allows for continual 
adjustment and fine-tuning as more is learned about the environmental effects of particular policies”.  
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Programme also aimed to “control the rate of abstraction from wells that directly affect lowland 
stream flows to ensure abstraction does not cause streams to go below minimum environmental 
flows” (ECan, 2006, p.1). 
Shortly after the announcement of The Restorative Programme for Lowland Streams, a bulk 
application for 71 groundwater consents in the Rakaia-Selwyn zone was assessed by ECan 
commissioners (Claridge, 2006, p.4)46.The appointed commissioners decided to grant 69 of the 71 
consents for a ten year period against the wishes of ECan (Eleven, 2007a, p.3).The commissioners 
decided to reject applications for groundwater consent from the shallowest aquifer47 because they 
believed these abstractions would affect lowland stream flows greater than abstractions from deeper 
aquifers (ECan, 2007). This decision was influenced by Aqualinc’s Canterbury groundwater model, 
which assumed that deeper aquifers are separated from lowland streams by several semi-permeable 
layers. ECan’s Chief Executive Bryan Jenkins was disappointed with the decision. Commissioners 
advocated The Restorative Programme for Lowland Streams by describing it as a “suck it and see 
approach” (Eleven, 2007b, p.2).The “suck it and see approach” refers to the adaptive management 
rules set on the consents, which meant that abstraction could continue while the effects of this 
abstraction were being monitored. By contrast, Bryan Jenkins argued the commissioners should have 
employed an “anticipate and avoid” strategy by restricting further abstraction until all the cumulative 
effects of existing consents were known.  
6.5.2.1. Explaining the success of the Rakaia-Selwyn 69.  
ECan officers attempted to justify zonal limits during the Rakaia-Selwyn hearing which ultimately led 
to the granting of 69 of 71 consents. Matthew Bubb (personal communication, February 29, 2012) 
and Ian McIndoe (personal communication, April 17, 2012) both reported in research interviews that 
ECan officers refused to accept the possibility that ECan’s figures for sustainable allocation of 
groundwater could be challenged. The resource consent commissioners concurred with Bubb and 
McIndoe. The commissioners argued that ECan adopted an advocacy role by attempting to decline all 
of the consent applications (Milne, Russell, & Ryder, 2007, p.6 [para 24]). In the commissioners’ view, 
there was insufficient monitoring data to support ECan’s conclusion that deeper aquifers were 
already fully allocated and that further allocation would affect lowland streams (Milne et al., 2007, 
p.56 [para 263]). 
The decision to grant 69 extra consents in the Rakaia-Selwyn red zone confirmed the weakness of 
ECan’s groundwater management system. ECan responded by hiring hydrologist Paul White to 
review the case (White, 2009). White argued that ECan’s approach was “suitably conservative” but 
                                                          
46 ECan appointed commissioners Philip Milne (environmental lawyer), Wayne Russell (hydrogeologists), and Dr 
Greg Ryder (aquatic ecologist) to hear the case 
47 There were two exceptions in which groundwater consents were granted in the shallowest aquifer.   
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ultimately unsuccessful (White, 2009, pp. i-ii). Why was ECan unable to justify its groundwater limits 
to the commissioners? White noted the debate between consent applicants and ECan over the effect 
of abstracting from deep aquifers on lowland streams. Consent applicants, using Aqualinc’s 
Canterbury groundwater model, argued the effect of abstracting from deeper aquifers would be 
negligible on lowland streams. By contrast, White argued that groundwater abstraction in deeper 
aquifers could cause decline in shallow aquifer flows (that feed lowland streams), but that the 
pathway of flows between shallow and deeper aquifers was still unknown (White, 2009, p. i). Given 
this, why did the commissioners allow the abstraction?  
White offered several explanations. First, aquifer identification is relatively easy near the coast, but 
in the upper-plains aquifer identification is more difficult and the “hydraulic boundaries between 
aquifers are not well defined” (White, 2009, p.60). Hydrologists therefore experienced difficulty in 
identifying the flow of water between deep and shallow aquifers, whereas identifying the flow 
between shallow coastal aquifers and lowland streams was easier. Despite this, research by Bruce 
Hunt and David Scott (2007) confirmed in layered aquifer systems abstraction from deeper aquifers 
will lead to flow changes in shallower aquifers. Second, White (2009, p.61) argued that ECan’s 
bathtub model, which assumed that aquifers were connected, was “not suitable for assessing local 
effects of groundwater use, for example the effects of pumping on neighbouring wells”. White noted 
that bathtub models are commonly used in hydrogeology when the geological structures of aquifers 
are unknown. However, bathtub models are only suitable at assessing the effects of groundwater use 
at certain scales. The sub-regional scale of the Rakaia-Selwyn hearing suited Aqualinc’s Canterbury 
groundwater model over ECan’s regional bathtub model. In the words of the commissioners, ECan’s 
use of the bathtub model did not differentiate “between the [consent] applications on the basis that 
some would have less impact than others depending upon their location and the size of take 
involved” (Milne et al., 2007, p.11 [para 52]).  
ECan expected the commissioners to conclude that abstractions from all aquifers will affect levels of 
the shallowest aquifer and thus levels in lowland streams. The commissioners decided there was a 
degree of uncertainty with this claim. As a result, commissioners were happy that the effects of new 
abstractions could be assessed and mitigated through ten year consents, metering the abstractions, 
and placing adaptive management rules on the consents. In sum, Aqualinc’s Canterbury groundwater 
model, by conceiving of Canterbury’s upper-plains aquifers as semi-permeable, was able to justify 
some abstractions (such as those in deeper aquifers) over others. Furthermore, unlike ECan’s 
bathtub model, the Canterbury groundwater model was able to assess the effects of singular 
abstractions.  
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Aqualinc’s Canterbury groundwater model also identified greater recharge into the Rakaia-Selwyn 
groundwater zone from the Selwyn River. Thus, the applicants argued there was more groundwater 
available for abstraction than ECan was aware of (see Table 8).  
Table 8 Water inputs to the Rakaia – Selwyn Groundwater Zone (White, 2009, p.67, as 
reported by Anthony Davoren during the Rakaia-Selwyn hearings). 
 
Component    ECan    Applicant’s assessment 
     (million m³/yr)  (million m³/yr) 
Dryland rainfall recharge  370   370 
Irrigation recharge   55   55 
Rakaia surface water irrigation 
recharge    5   24 
Selwyn River    0   100 
Total      430   549 
 
50 per cent of land-based recharge 
for allocation    215   274 
It would appear that Aqualinc’s Canterbury groundwater model was more compatible with the 
requirements of the RMA than ECan’s bathtub model. First, the RMA requires regional councils to 
measure the effects of activities on the environment. When resource consents are granted with 
certain conditions – such as a limited time period, water metering, adaptive management (limiting 
abstractions during low flow years), and pumping tests to monitor levels between aquifers – the 
effect of upper-plains abstractions on lowland streams can be identified, calculated, and mitigated. 
By contrast, ECan’s bathtub model argued that because aquifers were interconnected the effect of 
abstractions were all similar. Due to the scientific uncertainty of this claim, commissioners chose to 
monitor the effects of abstraction rather than to restrict abstraction. Second, ECan can establish 
limits to cumulative abstraction under the RMA through regional planning documents (such as the 
proposed NRRP). However, ECan acknowledged that its groundwater rules were interim (despite 
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being included in the draft NRRP water chapter), and this allowed applicants to use the Aqualinc 
groundwater model to investigate variables (for example, Selwyn river recharge) to stretch ECan’s 
interim limits. Applicants had gone beyond the variables of ECan’s first zonal order and concluded 
that the effects of extra abstraction from deep upper-plains aquifers would be negligible on lowland 
streams. In conclusion, Aqualinc’s Canterbury groundwater model provided commissioners with a 
means to make decisions on individual consents in accordance with the RMA’s effects-based 
mandate. The result was that commissioners granted consent for groundwater abstraction despite 
ECan’s zonal limits regime.  
6.6. RMA processes without a plan – management of cumulative effects 
This case study highlighted the difficulty ECan experienced in managing the cumulative effects of 
resource use without a completed regional plan. ECan’s Chief Executive Bryan Jenkins noted these 
difficulties in 2007: 
[a]s sustainability limits are approached, there is the potential for 
cumulative effects. Management of cumulative effects requires a catchment 
wide approach. However, with [the] RMA designed for managing the 
adverse effects of individual applications there are shortcomings in the 
legislative framework for the management of cumulative effects… (as 
quoted in Milne, 2008, p.2). 
Philip Milne disagreed with Jenkins. Milne argued that cumulative effects of individual consents can 
be managed through the RMA without a regional plan (Milne, 2008). Milne cited Peter Salmon, who 
argued that calculating cumulative effects required “identifying the resource, determining its 
capacity and then limiting its use” (as quoted in Milne, 2008, p.9). If ECan had been able to identify 
the groundwater resource and determine its capacity for use then hypothetically its limits for 
groundwater abstraction should have had the strength to withstand Environment Court appeals. 
Milne used his experience as an ECan commissioner to highlight how difficult it was to identify the 
resource and determine its capacity for use. Milne argued that Canterbury’s groundwater zones are 
complicated:  
…[because they] comprise multiple layered aquifers (up to 6 deep in places). 
The effect of a particular proposal will depend upon its location in two 
dimensions (lateral and vertical). Then one must add a third dimension; 
time. The deeper aquifers respond more slowly to recharge and abstraction 
than the shallower aquifers, and surface effects (on lowland streams) take 
longer to emerge. Even the “over allocated” shallower aquifer has sufficient 
capacity in some locations most years (because of river recharge) and in 
most locations in some years (when there has been sufficient winter 
recharge and moderated irrigation demand) (Milne, 2008, p.9). 
Thus, determining the abstraction capacity of an aquifer is very difficult. It requires knowledge of the 
cumulative effect of existing abstractions and the point at which these cumulative effects become 
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unacceptable. It requires reliable evidence on the effect of current and potential abstractions, and 
whether there will be times, locations, or depths in which additional abstractions can be 
accommodated. For these reasons, Milne argued that “only in clear cases will there be a case for a 
total prohibition on further activity” (Milne, 2008, p.12 italics added).  
Restricting groundwater use on the basis of cumulative effects without a notified regional plan is very 
difficult but not impossible. Milne argued that the failure to manage cumulative effects is not 
because of regional council incompetence, but due to “insufficient information upon which to base 
limits; uncertainty about the cause of particular effects; reluctance by some politics to severely 
constrain resource use and thereby curtail economic development” and “the lesser weight which can 
be given to ‘untested’ limits in proposed plans” (Milne, 2008, p.19). In conclusion, Aqualinc’s 
Canterbury groundwater model highlighted deficiencies in ECan’s identification of the resource. This 
provided enough uncertainty for consent applicants to successfully challenge ECan’s interim 
groundwater limits. Commissioners rejected ECan’s limits because there was uncertainty regarding 
the resource (in terms of aquifer identification and the flow of water between aquifers) and its 
capacity for further use (in terms of to what extent river runoff, soil type, and irrigation leakage 
affect aquifer flow), as well as uncertainty over how much groundwater was being abstracted 
through existing consents.   
6.7. Conclusion  
ECan pursued interim limits to groundwater abstraction in an attempt to establish authority over 
groundwater use in this case study. Consent applicants challenged these limits in resource consent 
hearings and through appeals to the Environment Court. Consent applicants, when using Aqualinc’s 
Canterbury groundwater model, were able to highlight uncertainties with ECan’s identification of the 
resource while illustrating the capacity of aquifers for more abstraction.  
The MC-NPM hybrid theory predicted: 1), that ECan would establish patronage with interest groups 
but would maintain decision making autonomy, 2) that ECan would focus on outputs over outcomes 
and 3), that ECan would adopt a hands-off approach to freshwater management unless the 
cumulative environmental effects of resource use became clear. In this case study, ECan established 
a close relationship of patronage with environmental interest groups, such as the Water Rights Trust, 
who supported ECan’s (self-proclaimed) “conservative” approach to groundwater limits (Aitchison 
Earl et al., 2004, p.12). ECan also chose to pursue authority through an interim plan output, as in the 
first case study. ECan also adopted a hands-off approach to groundwater planning until the 
environmental effects of groundwater abstraction (for example, lowland stream flow in the Rakaia-
Selwyn groundwater zone) became clear. 
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Thus, this case study provides evidence that concurs with the predictions of the MC-NPM hybrid 
theory. However, ECan was not able to maintain autonomy over decision making as the MC-NPM 
hybrid theory suggested. Consent applicants, through use of the Aqualinc Canterbury groundwater 
model, successfully challenged ECan’s groundwater limits through Environment Court appeals and 
resource consent hearings. The Aqualinc Canterbury groundwater model highlighted scientific 
uncertainties with ECan’s identification of the groundwater resource, and as a result, the 
Environment Court and resource consent commissioners chose to allow abstraction with adaptive 
management techniques, rather than restricting all abstractions as ECan desired.   
ECan’s inability to establish authority or autonomy over freshwater use led to policy stagnation. 
ECan’s policy stagnation concerned New Zealand’s central Government. The Minister for the 
Environment, Trevor Mallard, met with ECan chairman Kerry Burke and Chief Executive Bryan Jenkins 
after 69 applicants were given resource consent in the Rakaia-Selwyn red zone. The Ministry for the 
Environment believed ECan was experiencing difficulties in managing freshwater (Gorman, 2010c, 
p.5). Mr Mallard was concerned with ECan’s shortage of appropriately skilled staff as well as backlogs 
of resource consents.  
ECan’s failure to produce a notified regional plan, as well as the policy stagnation seen in the first two 
case studies, led the organisation to examine alternative methods of establishing authority and 
autonomy over freshwater management. In response, ECan helped create the non-statutory 
collaborative Canterbury Water Management Strategy. The next chapter examines the creation of 
the Canterbury Water Management Strategy. The CWMS established new principles, priorities, and 
targets for Canterbury’s freshwater management. The chapter examines ECan’s role in the creation 
of the CWMS, the CSWS’ early research into Canterbury’s freshwater resources, as well as the later 
expansion of the strategy to include environmental interest groups.  
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7. Chapter Seven 
Case Study 3 – the Canterbury Water Management Strategy 
7.1. Introduction 
ECan’s inability to establish authority over freshwater management in the first two case studies 
exacerbated tensions between farming and environmental interest groups in Canterbury. Both 
groups successfully challenged ECan’s autonomy as freshwater decision makers in the first two case 
studies. In the first case study, environmental interest groups usurped ECan’s autonomy through a 
successful Water Conservation Order application. In the second case study, farmers successfully 
challenged ECan’s groundwater limits at the Environment Court and at resource consent hearings. 
The Canterbury Mayoral Forum blamed the “adversarial” and “lawyer-heavy” consents and planning 
process for the tension between the two groups (Gorman, 2009a, p.8). The Canterbury Water 
Management Strategy (CWMS) was an attempt to mediate these tensions, whereby the adversarial 
and litigious RMA processes were replaced by “collaborative” engagement between consent 
applicants, the community, and government (ibid).  
To achieve this transformation, the CWMS promoted new governance arrangements for 
Canterbury’s freshwater. The CWMS endorsed rescaling freshwater management from the regional 
council, splitting planning responsibility between zonal, regional, and national scales. Catchment 
sized zonal committees would be guided by the targets and principles of the CWMS which were 
devised through public consultation processes. The CWMS’ targets promoted new water storage 
facilities for irrigation while simultaneously establishing tougher environmental standards to ensure 
the health of freshwater ecosystems was maintained.  
This case study examines the creation of the CWMS. The CWMS was an extension of the Canterbury 
Strategic Water Study (CSWS). The chapter will recall ECan’s role in the creation of the CSWS and the 
CWMS, as well as ECan’s simultaneous development of the NRRP regional plan. The chapter will 
conclude by describing events after the publication of the CWMS which included Parliamentary 
intervention in Canterbury’s freshwater management.  
7.2. Problems with ECan’s management and governance 
ECan’s ability to plan for long-term freshwater outcomes, as well as its ability to process resource 
consents, was questioned given the organisation’s struggle to establish authority during the 2000s 
(NZPA, 2000a, p.3; Hughey, 2001, p.5; Warren, 2002, p.4; Creech et al., 2010). For example, Professor 
Kenneth Hughey argued in 2001 that “the biggest drought over the last 10 years has been the lack of 
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planning and action for the sustainable use of Canterbury’s precious water resources”, and as a result 
there is “a backlash from instream users (led by frustrated and angry trout anglers) which will 
ultimately threaten the irrigation proposals that farmers and local government are promoting to 
offset the impacts of future water shortage” (Hughey, 2001, p.5). By contrast, farmers were 
concerned with ECan’s ability to process resource consents. ECan achieved only 29 per cent 
compliance with statutory timeframes for processing resource consents between 2007 and 2008 
(Creech et al., 2010, p.25). ECan was the worst performing council in New Zealand in terms of 
resource consent processing during this period (ibid).   
ECan needed a regional plan to establish authority and autonomy over Canterbury’s freshwater 
management. Fish and Game’s WCO application for the Rangitata River demonstrated that rules for 
freshwater use and allocation could be applied without using the authority of a regional council 
(Hughey, 2001, p.5). It was in this context that policy analyst Grant McFadden was asked by the then 
Minister of Agriculture and Forestry to assist in the creation of a plan for Canterbury’s freshwater use 
in 2000. McFadden sourced funding for the plan from ECan, MAF, MfE, the Ashburton Community 
Water Trust, and the Dunsandel Water User Group (Morgan et al., 2002, p. i). The plan needed to 
mediate the tension between farmers and environmentalists in Canterbury. This required 
quantitative information of Canterbury’s freshwater resources to determine how much irrigation 
could be developed in the region. The plan also required a social mechanism in which farmers and 
environmentalists could negotiate targets, principles, and governance structures for future 
freshwater management. The Canterbury Strategic Water Study provided the quantitative data and 
the Canterbury Water Management Strategy provided the social mechanism.  
7.3. The Canterbury Strategic Water Study 
The Canterbury Strategic Water Study was written in four stages to guide Canterbury’s freshwater 
management. The first stage published quantitative data on long-term demand for freshwater in 
Canterbury. The second stage examined the consequences of proposed irrigation storage. The third 
stage discussed the implications of irrigation storage with a number of interest group 
representatives, and the fourth stage split Canterbury into hypothetical groundwater and surface 
water supplied irrigation zones. The CSWS was written for the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 
ECan, and the Ministry for the Environment. The CSWS provided crucial knowledge of Canterbury’s 
freshwater resources and suggested ways to boost irrigation in the region.  
The first stage of the CSWS was published in August 2002 (Morgan et al., 2002)48. The CSWS was 
prompted by concerns from central, regional, and local government in Canterbury regarding the 
                                                          
48 The report was written by Lincoln Environmental researchers Matthew Morgan, Vince Bidwell, John Bright, 
Ian McIndoe, and Christina Robb. 
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absence of a regional plan for management of land and freshwater resources49 (Morgan et al., 2002, 
p.1). These authorities “were concerned that ad hoc actions by one group might foreclose on 
protection or development options that provided greater benefits over the long-term to the 
environment and to the community” (ibid). However, it was difficult for ECan to judge the benefits or 
disadvantages of conserving or developing certain freshwater bodies due to a lack of information on 
the amount of freshwater resources in Canterbury as well as future demand. Thus, the first stage of 
the CSWS focused on providing quantitative information on Canterbury’s freshwater resources, the 
ability of these resources to meet demand for irrigation, the resources that would come under the 
most stress, as well as the reliability of natural systems to meet increasing demand for freshwater 
(ibid). Stage 1 proclaimed that “approximately one million hectares of land could potentially be 
irrigated in Canterbury” (Morgan et al., 2002, p.2). 
Bryan Jenkins was employed as ECan’s chief executive between 2003 and 2011. Jenkins recalled in a 
research interview that some stakeholders50 had “major reservations [about] the strategy’s scope 
being confined to quantity” (B. Jenkins, personal communication, April 11, 2012). Subsequently, 
there was a shift from the supply-and-demand calculations of the first stage to the second stage 
examining the consequences of recommended irrigation storage projects (Dark, Bright, & Sigle 2008). 
The Canterbury Mayoral Forum replaced ECan, MAF, and MfE as the lead agency for the CSWS 
between the first and second stages (A. McKay, personal communication, May 3, 2012). The 
Canterbury Mayoral Forum is an informal group of mayors and chief executives from Canterbury’s 
territorial authorities and ECan. Even though ECan was involved, the Canterbury Mayoral Forum’s 
leadership over the strategy reinforced the perception that ECan was unable to plan for freshwater in 
Canterbury (K. Burke, personal communication, March 16, 2012). Former ECan councillor Angus 
McKay (personal communication, May 3, 2012) argued that it was a pragmatic move because funding 
was easier to source from central government when the Mayoral Forum was the lead agency.  
The Mayoral Forum established a steering committee to incorporate the views of environmental 
stakeholders into the CSWS. Grant McFadden (personal communication, April 17, 2013) revealed that 
he “selected most of the people” who were involved in the Stage 3 steering committee. This steering 
committee debated the merits of irrigation storage. McFadden (communication, April 17, 2013) 
argued that he “went to great lengths to get the people who could speak authoritatively for each of 
the interest groups, whether it be farming, or Fish and Game, or kayaking, or iwi”. 
                                                          
49 ECan was preparing the draft water chapter for the NRRP during this period.  
50 ECan councillor Eugenie Sage indicated scepticism at the scope and frame of the CSWS. In a research 
interview she stated “the Mayoral Forum had been so pro development and pro irrigation with the Strategic 
Water Study … all of the research it commissioned was about whether storage schemes were technically 
feasible. There was no research about irrigation’s environmental impact on water quality … all of the 
externalities were ignored” (Eugenie Sage, pers.comm). 
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Preliminary results of Stage 251 (Dark et al., 2008) were given to the Stage 3 steering committee (see 
appendix 4 for steering committee membership)52 (Whitehouse, Pearce, & McFadden, 2008). The 
steering committee discussed irrigation development and concluded that public and scientific 
considerations of land use intensification were required before major water storage infrastructure 
could be built (Whitehouse et al., 2008, p.2). The steering committee noted the inequitable flow of 
water north and south of the Rangitata River. The steering committee also agreed that protection of 
lowland stream flows and major alpine river flows was important (Whitehouse et al., 2008, p.4). 
Stage 453 expanded on the work of Stage 3 by dividing Canterbury into hypothetical zones supplied 
by groundwater and surface water (Dark, Bright, & Weir, 2009). The aim was to maximise irrigable 
land space while ensuring that lowland stream health and water quality was maintained. 
7.4. ECan’s Natural Resources Regional Plan 
The Natural Resources Regional Plan (NRRP) was ECan’s regional plan to determine rules for the long-
term use of freshwater resources in Canterbury. The completed NRRP would give ECan greater 
authority over freshwater management because the rules established in the plan would have the 
force and effect of regulation. ECan began writing the NRRP in the late 1990s. Following droughts in 
1997 and 1998 the Minister for the Environment urged ECan to accelerate its work on the NRRP 
(Robson, 1999a, p.9). During this period, ECan councillors were split on how to respond to the 
drought. Rural councillors wanted ECan to be more responsive. For example, councillor Robert 
Johnson argued that rural Cantabrians wanted ECan “to tap into water resources from snow fed 
rivers so that the water was available for irrigation during a drought” (Robson, 1999b, p.8).   
ECan staff worked throughout 2000 and 2001 on preparing the NRRP’s draft water chapter. ECan 
staff were criticised by councillors during this period for delaying the release of the chapter (Watson, 
2001, p.4). ECan sought public submissions on the NRRP’s draft water chapter from November 2001 
(NZPA, 2001c, p.3). Despite ECan’s appeal for public submissions, Federated Farmers provincial 
president, Stuart Wilson, argued the farming community had been ignored during the draft NRRP 
process (NZPA, 2001e, p.4). Federated Farmers were concerned with draft NRRP rules that would 
limit fertiliser application within 10 metres of a stream. The draft NRRP also banned nitrogen 
fertiliser application during May and June unless consent was gained from ECan (Keene, 2002, p.15). 
                                                          
51 Stage 2 of the CSWS was written by Andrew Dark, John Bright, and Shane Sigle. 
52 Stage 3 of the CSWS was written by Ian Whitehouse, Andy Pearse, and Grant McFadden for the Canterbury 
Mayoral Forum. 
53  Stage 4 of the CSWS was written by Andrew Dark, John Bright, and Julian Weir. 
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The NRRP’s draft water chapter was once again delayed in September 2002 (Warren, 2002, p.4). 
ECan staff had taken longer than expected to input the data from 800 public submissions into the 
new draft. The draft water chapter was eventually published in May 2004 (Scott, 2004a, p.4). 
However, it was at this stage that progress on the NRRP stalled. The NRRP had reached first schedule 
status after the publication of the draft plan in 2004. First schedule status requires ECan to receive a 
second round of public submissions and to consult with iwi authorities. However, by 2010 the NRRP 
had still not passed through first schedule status, a situation which was “unprecedented in New 
Zealand” (Creech et al., 2010, p.6). Between 2004 and 2010, when the NRRP was struggling to pass 
through this second phase of public submissions, the Canterbury Water Management Strategy was 
devised as a non-statutory planning document informed by the quantitative data of the CSWS.  
7.5. The Canterbury Water Management Strategy 
The Canterbury Water Management Strategy is a collaborative planning document that promoted 
new priorities, principles, and targets for Canterbury’s freshwater governance (Mayoral Forum, 2009; 
Lomax et al., 2010). According to Bryan Jenkins (2011, p.54), the collaborative approach of the CWMS 
was adopted in response to amendments made to the Local Government Act (LGA) in 2002, which 
promoted closer partnerships between regional councils, the community, and industry. The LGA asks 
local government authorities to engage with the community when preparing ten year plans. 
According to Jenkins this encourages “a shift from representative democracy towards participative 
democracy” (ibid). In effect, this process provided ECan with an alternative way to address the 
cumulative effects of freshwater use.  
Research interviewees cited a number of people when asked who was responsible for the creation of 
the CWMS. As noted earlier, the Canterbury Mayoral Forum assumed responsibility for the CWMS 
and supervised the steering group who prepared the final document (Mayoral Forum, 2009, p.5). 
Despite this, research interviewees did not cite Mayoral Forum members as key actors despite their 
leadership role. ECan councillors (E. Sage, personal communication, March 12, 2012; K. Burke, 
personal communication, March 16, 2012.) and employees (K. Taylor, personal communication, April 
12, 2012) argued that Chief Executive Bryan Jenkins was the “architect of the strategy”. Jenkins, 
influenced by the scholarship of political economist Elinor Ostrom (Jenkins, 2011a, p.56), promoted 
the adoption of the collaborative approach for the CWMS. Communications consultant Geoff Henley 
was also cited as an important actor in the development of the CWMS (G. McFadden, personal 
communication, April 17, 2013; E. Sage, personal communication, March 12, 2012; K. Taylor, 
personal communication, April 12, 2012). Henley’s role was to mediate between the CWMS steering 
group – who were responsible for collaboratively establishing the goals and principles of the strategy 
– and the central government agencies that were funding the strategy.  
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7.5.1. Creation of the CWMS 
According to the CWMS, the collaborative approach was adopted in response to requests from 
stakeholders. These stakeholders “whether environment or production-given, repeatedly asked that 
they be given the opportunity to resolve their differences and find solutions together” (Mayoral 
Forum, 2009, p.40). Stakeholders were able to influence the CWMS through a variety of consultation 
processes. Consultation occurred in five systematic stages: (1) an initial stakeholder and community 
engagement to develop strategic options, (2) defining the strategic options, (3) re-consulting with the 
community on the preferred strategic options, (4) investigating the potential outcomes, and (5) 
undertaking a sustainability appraisal of all options (Jenkins & Henley, 2013, p.4). The CWMS Steering 
Group assisted with all five stages of consultation. The Steering Group included members from 
regional and territorial government, tangata whenua, farmers, environmentalists, as well as industry 
and recreational interests (see appendix 5 for steering group membership) (ibid). The Steering Group 
made recommendations directly to the Mayoral Forum.  
Stakeholder meetings were held at eleven locations throughout Canterbury to help identify the uses 
and benefits of freshwater in the region (Jenkins & Henley, 2013, p.6). Stakeholders used the Open 
Strategies computer program to define strategic options for Canterbury’s freshwater and to link 
these strategic options to specific projects (e.g. water storage projects). Bryan Jenkins and Geoff 
Henley argued these stakeholder meetings were pivotal in establishing the CWMS’ vision statement, 
the definition of priorities and principles in the strategy, as well as the strategies and actions the 
CWMS promotes to achieve outcomes (ibid). The CWMS’ goals of expanding irrigated land while 
conserving freshwater ecosystems emerged from this process.  
The next stage of the collaborative process was to re-consult with the community about the 
preferred options. The CWMS Steering Group was provided with four future scenarios to help 
achieve the twin goals of increased irrigation and ecosystem protection.  
A – Business as usual. 
B – Environmental protection before infrastructure development. 
C – Integrate infrastructure development and protection side-by-side. 
D – Development first; protection second (Mayoral Forum, 2009, p.35). 
These future scenarios were then assessed by the Steering Group using a sustainability appraisal. 
Jenkins, Russel, Sadler, & Ward (2014, p.85) define sustainability appraisal as “a means of informing 
specific choices and framing policy and public discourse on issues of sustainable development”. A 
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sustainability appraisal requires an integrated analysis of environmental and social effects, as well as 
an evaluation of these effects against criteria for sustainable development. Jenkins et al. (2014, p.84) 
argued the CWMS’ sustainability appraisal was a method that “bridged the effects-based RMA and 
the objectives focused LGA”. The appraisal rated scenario A poorly in regards to environmental 
sustainability. Scenario B scored well on environmental criteria but poorly on economic criteria. 
Scenario C scored poorly on both environmental and economic criteria. Scenario D scored well on 
economic criteria but poorly on environmental criteria (Jenkins & Henley, 2013, p.9). ECan sent 
150,000 households information on the four future scenarios to gain public feedback. Public 
submissions illustrated strong support for option B (which emphasised environmental protection) 
and D (which emphasised economic development).  
The CWMS consultation process was far more extensive than the earlier CSWS consultation with 
farmers and environmentalists. The CWMS asked the public to offer feedback on the priorities and 
principles that ought to inform Canterbury’s freshwater management. This resulted in public 
submissions that supported opposing strategies. Despite the consultation process, trade-offs 
between environmental and economic goals were still required because support for economic 
development and environmental protection appeared even.  
7.5.2. Publication of the CWMS 
The CWMS was published on the 3rd September 2009. The CWMS announced a “new paradigm in the 
way water is allocated and managed” in Canterbury: which included (1) “a shift from effects-based 
management of individual consents to integrated management based on water management zones; 
(2) management of the cumulative effects of water abstraction and land use intensification; (3) water 
allocation decisions that address sustainable environmental limits and climate variability; and (4) 
actions to protect and restore freshwater biodiversity, amenity values, and natural character” 
(Mayoral Forum, 2009, p.7).The desired outcome of the CWMS was to “enable present and future 
generations to gain the greatest social, economic, recreational and cultural benefits from our water 
resources within an environmentally sustainable framework” (Mayoral Forum, 2009, p.6). To achieve 
this outcome, the CWMS set priorities and principles to guide freshwater management.  
The CWMS’ first-order priorities include the environment, customary use, community supply, and 
stock water. Second-order priorities include irrigation, hydro-electricity, recreation, and amenity. The 
principles of the CWMS were then ranked, with primary principles including sustainable 
management, regionalism, and tangata whenua values. Supporting principles included the natural 
character of the Canterbury landscape, indigenous biodiversity, access, drinking water standards, 
recreational opportunities, alongside community and commercial use (Mayoral Forum, 2009, p.8). 
Measurable and quantifiable targets were then set for drinking water, irrigated land area, energy 
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security and efficiency, ecosystem health and biodiversity, water use efficiency, kaitiakitanga; 
regional and national economic growth, the natural character of braided rivers, as well as 
recreational and amenity opportunities (Mayoral Forum, 2009, p.8). Water storage was cited as a 
“key incentive mechanism” in achieving the CWMS’ goals (ibid.).  
7.5.2.1. Devolved governance 
The CWMS proposed a new governance arrangement for Canterbury’s freshwater. Ten local zonal 
committees were promoted by the strategy. Each zonal committee would be comprised of seven to 
ten members from ECan, territorial authorities, local tangata whenua, consent holders, stakeholders, 
and informed citizens (Mayoral Forum, 2009, p.11). Zonal committees would be responsible for the 
creation of zone implementation programmes (ZIPs). The CWMS also proposed a regional scale of 
governance, which would be responsible for the creation of a regional implementation programme, 
and a national scale which would address national freshwater issues (Mayoral Forum, 2009, p.12). 
The CWMS stated that “planning activities will be carried out in “nested” zone/regional/national 
levels where issues can be allocated to the most appropriate level for consideration while ensuring 
coherence between the levels” (Mayoral Forum, 2009, p.15). ECan’s planning authority would be 
split between local, regional, and national scales. The CWMS authors hoped this system would result 
in a reduction of legal appeals and hearings (ibid).  
ZIPs would address issues of land use intensification, wastewater discharge, infrastructure, water 
quality and quantity, recreational issues as well as commercial freshwater use (Mayoral Forum, 2009, 
p.43). Regional plans would address environmental limits, biodiversity issues that cross zones, as well 
as water allocation and consents issues (Mayoral Forum, 2009, p.44). ZIPs would be competing with 
RMA plans such as the NRRP, and thus, the CWMS argued that new legislation is needed that gives 
status to the ZIPs. Bryan Jenkins defined the geographical boundaries of the zonal committees as well 
as the composition of the zonal committee membership (B. Jenkins, personal communication, April 
11, 2012). Jenkins wanted zonal committee members to be able to work together for community 
outcomes, as opposed to representatives of interest groups promoting a particular agenda (B. 
Jenkins, personal communication, April 11, 2012).  
The research interviews revealed that ECan employees (B. Jenkins, personal communication, April 11, 
2012; K. Taylor, personal communication, April 12, 2012) and territorial authority mayors (J. Coles, 
personal communication, April 13, 2012; A. Familton, personal communication, March 5, 2012; K. 
Coe, personal communication, March 6, 2012) supported the new zonal governance system. Former 
ECan councillors (E. Sage, personal communication, March 12, 2012; K. Burke, personal 
communication, March 16, 2012), were more sceptical. Eugenie Sage was concerned that 
environmental, public health, and scientific interests might be underrepresented on zonal 
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committees. Furthermore, the views of local landholders could potentially prevail over wider 
community interests. Kerry Burke argued that farmers could dominate zonal committees, and that he 
would only support zones if their authority was subordinate to regional plans and regional 
councillors. Sylvia Nissen’s (2014, p.42) research quoted a regional councillor who told her “it was 
never intended that they [zonal committees] develop[ed] regional plans and policies … that was the 
role of the council”. Thus, ECan councillors perceived the CWMS plan to split planning authority 
between zonal, regional, and national scales as a threat to their authority and autonomy in the 
region.  
7.5.2.2. Opinion of interest groups on devolved governance  
Farming and environmental interest groups submitted a variety of opinions on the proposed CWMS 
zonal governance system. These opinions are sourced from the public submissions process for the 
draft CWMS. This archival evidence illustrates that farming interest groups were sceptical of zonal 
governance. For example, the South Canterbury Irrigation Trust argued that the area between the 
Rangitata and Waitaki Rivers should contain one zonal committee rather than the three that were 
proposed. The Trust believed that zonal committees needed to be strong in order to effectively 
negotiate with regional councillors. Dairy exporter Synlait agreed with the Trust and argued that the 
area between the Rangitata and Waitaki Rivers should be governed by one zone. However, Synlait 
had “serious concerns with the governance structure proposed by the Strategy” because it was too 
complex “to implement the vision”. Synlait believed splitting authority between zonal, regional, and 
national scales would involve too many people, and coming to a consensus on planning decisions 
would be difficult. The Rangitata Diversion Race and Trust Power also argued that three scales of 
governance could result in tension and inconsistencies.  
Environmental interest groups were also concerned with the zonal governance system. The 
Canterbury-Aoraki Conservation Board argued that the relative authority of zonal, regional, and 
national scales needed to be clear. The Conservation Board believed that significant decisions, such 
as the minimum flow level of a river, should be made at regional rather than zonal scale. South 
Canterbury Forest and Bird agreed with farmers that one zone would be sufficient between the 
Rangitata and Waitaki Rivers. Forest and Bird argued there was a lack of human resources to 
administer three zonal committees in South-Canterbury. Chris Todd of Forest and Bird argued that 
“the governance and management processes outlined in the Draft Canterbury Water Management 
Strategy may not result in effective and lasting decision making”. Todd argued that the knowledge, 
commitment, and contribution of zonal committee members should be more important than where 
they live. Furthermore, any concept of self-governance “must include representatives of the regional 
and national interest”.  
 88 
7.5.3. The CWMS and targets for Canterbury’s freshwater use 
The CWMS established targets to guide zonal committees when creating ZIPs. The targets were 
devised through stakeholder meetings and public submissions54. Targets are established for the years 
2010, 2015, 2020, and 2040. These are aspirational targets rather than enforceable rules (Mayoral 
Forum, 2009, p.106). The CWMS argued these targets should be “viewed as a whole” and that 
“targets inform each other and are designed to build a whole picture” (ibid).  
7.5.4. Water storage, land use, water quality and environmental protection 
The CWMS promoted the construction of new water storage infrastructure in North-, Mid-, and 
South-Canterbury55 (Mayoral Forum, 2009, p.13). Water storage would result in increased irrigated 
land use that would lead to greater pollution in waterways. For example, nitrate levels in 
groundwater near Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere were predicted to rise by as much as 37 per cent as a 
result of the CWMS’ proposed water storage schemes (Harris Consulting, Aqualinc., Agribusiness 
Group., & Butcher Partners, 2009). Nitrification of groundwater is a threat to human health. ECan 
discovered in 2009 that 10 per cent of wells monitored in the region had nitrate levels that exceeded 
drinking water standards (Mayoral Forum, 2009, p.25). The CWMS responded with a number of 
initiatives to protect freshwater ecosystems in Canterbury. Tactics included pest and weed control, 
fencing streams and wetland areas, riparian planting, removing or modifying some in-stream 
structures, as well as the protection of freshwater fauna (Mayoral Forum, 2009, p.48). 
Supplementary projects included restoring the character of braided river system, maintaining the 
character of high country lakes, and returning flows to lowland streams (Mayoral Forum, 2009, 
pp.137-9).  
In sum, the CWMS evolved from the quantitative research of the CSWS. The CSWS began with a 
focus on developing irrigation to mitigate the effects of drought. After environmental stakeholders 
were consulted, the CSWS noted that the environmental effects of land use intensification needed to 
be investigated before water infrastructure could be built. In response, the CWMS attempted to 
balance the goals of irrigation expansion and environmental protection by creating new priorities, 
principles, and targets for Canterbury’s freshwater governance. A new zonal governance system was 
devised – despite scepticism from farming and environmental interest groups – to achieve these new 
                                                          
54 Eugenie Sage (personal communication, March 12, 2012) believed public consultation through the 
submissions process and consultation with stakeholder organisations were important in developing the 
environmental principles of the CWMS. She argued the themes that came through on submissions were 
directly responsible for the first-order and second-order hierarchy of principles, the commitment to immediate 
ecosystem restoration, and the way in which sustainable management appears in the document.  
55 The document suggests the use of Lake Coleridge for irrigation and efficiency improvements in the way 
water is used. Groundwater storage, options for the Hurunui River, Lees Valley storage, utilising the water of 
Lake Tekapo in South Canterbury, as well as extending South Canterbury’s Hunter Downs irrigation scheme 
north, were also suggested (Mayoral Forum 2009: 13).   
 89 
targets. The CWMS suggested that ECan’s regional councillors cede some of its planning authority to 
zonal committees. The CWMS had no statutory authority upon its publication. Despite this, zonal 
committees would be established a year after its publication. The next section examines the 
developments in Canterbury’s freshwater politics after the publication of the CWMS.  
7.6. The Creech Report and the ECan Act 
2009 was a tumultuous year for freshwater management in Canterbury. The CWMS was published in 
2009 while several ECan councillors were also investigated for conflicts of interest when setting 
water charges (Provost, 2009). ECan Chairman Kerry Burke lost the confidence of the council and was 
replaced as Chairman by Alec Neill (Peter, 2009a, p.14). Given these controversies, territorial mayors 
were concerned with the future of Canterbury’s freshwater management under ECan. Mike Jebson 
of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry argued in a research interview that territorial authorities 
and ECan worked relatively well together during this period (M. Jebson, personal communication, 
March 28, 2012). However, Jebson speculated that tensions between Canterbury’s territorial 
authorities and ECan could have influenced the Creech Report (M. Jebson, personal communication, 
March 28, 2012).  
The Creech Report was a critical review of ECan’s resource management functions, governance, and 
policy (Creech et al., 2010; Gorman, 2010a, p.8). The review was prompted after Canterbury’s 
territorial mayors and chief executives sent a letter to the Minister of Local Government 
encapsulating their concerns that freshwater management issues were impacting on the future 
prosperity of Canterbury (Gorman, 2009b, p.1) 56. Territorial mayors highlighted ECan’s poor 
performance in meeting deadlines for resource consent applications between 2007 and 2008 (Peter, 
2009b, p.9). In response, the Minister of Local Government and the Minister for the Environment 
established a review team to investigate Environment Canterbury’s performance (Creech et al., 
2010). Canterbury’s territorial mayors met with the review team in November 2009. During this 
meeting, Timaru Mayor Janie Annear claimed “there is not one area they [ECan] are doing well in” 
(Gorman, 2010b, p.3). Selwyn Mayor Kelvin Coe argued that “operationally it [ECan] is a rudderless 
ship” (ibid). Kaikoura District Chief Executive Stuart Grant summed up by stating “[w]hat do we 
want? ECan gone by lunchtime” (ibid).  
The investigation undertaken by Wyatt Creech, Martin Jenkins, Greg Hill, and Morrison Low, which 
has become known as the Creech Report, was published on the 19th February 2010. It advocated the 
restructure of ECan’s freshwater management and governance functions. The report proclaimed that 
                                                          
56 The Mayoral Forum included the Chairman and Chief Executive of Environment Canterbury. A ‘no surprises’ 
clause was agreed to by Mayoral Forum members, which ECan chairman Kerry Burke believed was broken by 
the decision to write a letter of concern to Rodney Hide without first telling ECan (Gorman, 2009b, p.1). 
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freshwater management was the most significant political and economic issue in Canterbury (Creech 
et al., 2010, p. i). The Report argued that the scale of freshwater issues was greater in Canterbury 
than in any other region of New Zealand because Canterbury allocates 58 per cent of New Zealand’s 
consumptive water (ibid; c.f. Mayoral Forum, 2009, p.23). Correspondingly, Canterbury’s freshwater 
management is of much greater significance to national well-being. The Report argued that central 
government should act in Canterbury to “protect and enhance both regional and national well-being” 
(ibid). 
The Creech report argued that ECan’s failure to adequately manage freshwater in the region justified 
restructuring the organisation. The report cited ECan’s failure to manage competing demands and 
interests effectively which led to costly delays when writing policy and issuing consents (Creech et al., 
2010, p. ii). The report cited ECan’s failure to pass the NRRP through the full first schedule public 
submission phase (Creech et al., 2010, p.6). The report authors interviewed stakeholders around 
Canterbury who argued that ECan focused too much on environmental values to the detriment of 
economic, social, and cultural values (Creech et al., 2010, pp. 8-9). The report supported the CWMS. 
The Report argued that legislative changes are required to make the CWMS “workable”, but that the 
vision and objectives of the CWMS should be a “core component of any future institutional change” 
(Creech et al., 2010, pp. ii-iii). The report argued that elected regional councillors should be replaced 
by temporary commissioners under special legislation before any institutional changes.  
Central government followed the advice of the Creech Report and intervened in Canterbury’s 
freshwater management. The Environment Canterbury (Temporary Commissioners and Improved 
Water Management) Act 2010 initiated significant structural changes to Canterbury’s freshwater 
management. The Act was passed under urgency, without the normal period of Parliamentary 
debate, on the 12th April 2010 (ECan Act, 2010). The Act substituted ECan’s elected councillors with 
appointed commissioners. The Act gave the appointed commissioners new powers: such as the 
ability to (1) enforce moratoria over freshwater consents, (2) amend or remove Water Conservation 
Orders in Canterbury, and (3) restrict access to the Environment Court (ECan Act, 2010; Smith, 2010, 
p.11). The Act also instructed ECan and the Minister for the Environment to acknowledge the values 
and principles of the CWMS. ECan and the Minister are instructed to acknowledge the CWMS when 
amending a WCO or when considering new regional policy statements or plans (ECan Act, 2010, pp. 
16, 23, 28). Nevertheless, the Act states that the “inclusion of the vision and principles of the CWMS 
…does not accord to the CWMS or its vision and principles any status in law other than as provided in 
this Act” (ECan Act, 2010, p.7). 
The ECan Act was controversial. For example, concern was raised about the new powers given to 
commissioners to amend WCOs (NZPA, 2010, p.4; Holden, 2010, p.22). Neil Deans of Fish and Game 
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argued that amendment of WCOs would permit “water currently meeting an outstanding test for 
protection” to be made available for irrigation use (Deans, 2010, p.13). Some argued that the 
removal of elected councillors was undemocratic (Dalziel, 2010, p.15; Matthews, 2010, p.3). The Act 
was also criticised for removing Cantabrians right to appeal decisions to the Environment Court 
(Deans, 2010). Farming interest groups – such as Irrigation New Zealand and Federated Farmers – 
supported the legislation (NZPA, 2010, p.4). Environmental interest groups – such as Forest and Bird 
and Fish and Game – were opposed (ibid). Ngāi Tahu “reluctantly” supported the Act by arguing that 
something needed to happen (ibid). Ngāi Tahu proclaimed seven months later that it was a “good 
move” (Gates, 2010, p.11). 
Academics also criticised the ECan Act. Philip Joseph of the University of Canterbury argued it was ad 
hominen, applied retrospectively, denied individuals the right of access to the Environment Court, 
and suspended certain sections of the RMA (Joseph, 2010, p.193). Ann Brower of Lincoln University 
argued the ECan Act gave the Minister for the Environment “the power to disapply the empowering 
legislation (RMA) selectively and at will without recourse to Parliament” (Brower, 2010, p.312). 
Hamish Rennie, also of Lincoln University, noted that WCOs are modified under the ECan Act by 
requiring WCOs to have regard to the vision and principles of the CWMS (Rennie, 2010, p.20).  
Appointed commissioners quickly implemented the zonal governance system promoted by the 
CWMS. The Canterbury Mayoral Forum was given $242,000 from central government’s Community 
Irrigation Fund to help establish zonal committees (Williams, 2010b, p.5). The first zonal committee 
was established in North Canterbury a month after the ECan Act was passed (ibid). 
In sum, the vision and principles of the CWMS are embedded in the ECan Act. Within a year, the 
CWMS had developed from a collaborative non-statutory planning document to a document that 
guides Canterbury’s freshwater governance within a new institutional setting. The CWMS’ legacy –
through its adoption in the ECan Act - is that it has changed ECan’s statutory mandate, and as a 
result, altered how ECan now pursue authority over freshwater use.  
7.7. Conclusion 
ECan pursued statutory and non-statutory planning processes to establish authority over freshwater 
management in this case study. The statutory RMA-led NRRP and the non-statutory CWMS are the 
two key planning documents relating to ECan’s freshwater management produced in the late-2000s. 
ECan had full autonomy over the NRRP, however, the plan was stuck in first schedule status from 
2004 onwards. The CWMS was viewed as an alternative planning document to the rules based NRRP. 
ECan helped create the CWMS – through funding, technical support, and expertise (especially in the 
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work of Bryan Jenkins) – however, it did not have the same autonomy over the CWMS as it did over 
the NRRP.  
The MC-NPM hybrid theory predicted: 1), that ECan would establish patronage with interest groups 
but would maintain decision making autonomy, 2) that ECan would focus on outputs over outcomes 
and 3), that ECan would adopt a hands-off approach to freshwater management unless the 
cumulative environmental effects of resource use became clear. In this case study, ECan willingly 
ceded some autonomy as freshwater managers in the region by supporting the CWMS (led by the 
Canterbury Mayoral Forum), a document which envisioned devolution of some planning authority to 
zonal committees. Capitalising on a legislative shift with the introduction of the LGA, ECan adopted 
the collaborative CWMS as an alternative planning document to the NRRP. The CWMS, contrary to 
the MC-NPM hybrid theory’s predictions, also focused on long-term goals and targets for 
Canterbury’s freshwater management. However, the CWMS was a direct response to the policy 
stagnation and hands-off approach to planning which dominated ECan’s freshwater management 
between 1989 and 2010.  
The MC-NPM hybrid theory predicted that ECan would struggle to exercise authority but would 
maintain some decision making autonomy. By contrast, this case study illustrated ECan’s willingness 
to forgo autonomy over freshwater management in Canterbury in an attempt to regain some 
authority. ECan’s authority was strengthened through the power given to appointed commissioners, 
such as moratoria on consents, amendments to WCOs, and restricting access to the Environment 
Court.  
The situation of high authority with low autonomy is reminiscent of multiple clientelism. However, 
multiple clientelism argued that a local government agency would gain authority through the 
selective and sequential patronage of multiple interest groups. By contrast, in this case study ECan 
gained authority through the intervention of central government. The irony is that ECan required 
central government intervention in the form of controversial legal amendments to establish 
authority over freshwater management in the region. Furthermore, central government intervention 
was opposed by environmental interest groups but supported by farming interest groups.  
In conclusion, the predictions of the MC-NPM hybrid theory were not confirmed by this case study. 
ECan was willing to forgo autonomy over freshwater management, and as a result, freshwater 
management in Canterbury was restructured through the authority of New Zealand’s Parliament.  
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8. Chapter Eight 
A meta-analysis of the three case studies 
8.1. Introduction 
Multiple clientelism proposes that a local government agency will establish selective and sequential 
patronage with competing interest groups over natural resource management decisions. The aim of 
this research was to examine multiple clientelism’s proposition with a local government agency 
(ECan) created during New Zealand’s New Public Management reform era. Did ECan pursue selective 
and sequential patronage with interest groups as multiple clientelism predicted? Or did ECan pursue 
other methods to establish authority and autonomy over freshwater management? Furthermore, did 
NPM reform affect the strategies pursued by ECan to establish authority and autonomy over 
freshwater management? 
Three case studies investigated ECan’s pursuit of authority and autonomy between 1989 and 2010. 
The case studies illustrated that ECan was active in the pursuit of authority and autonomy. ECan 
attempted to develop a plan in the Rangitata River case study, set interim abstraction limits in the 
groundwater case study, and assisted in the development of statutory and non-statutory planning 
documents in the CWMS case study.  
Farming and environmental interest groups attempted to influence ECan in all three case studies. 
Farmers lobbied for an irrigation dam in the Rangitata River case study, helped fund a groundwater 
model in the groundwater case study, and were involved in the Steering Group and public 
submission phase of the CWMS. Environmentalists applied for a Water Conservation Order in the 
Rangitata River case study, supported ECan’s precautionary groundwater limits in the groundwater 
case study, and were also involved in the Steering Group and public submission phase of the CWMS.  
This chapter discusses the results of this research. First, the chapter recalls how ECan pursued 
authority and autonomy in the three case studies and asks how successful ECan was in achieving its 
goals. The chapter then examines the MC-NPM hybrid theory. Following this is a discussion of 
collaborative governance and the potential problems faced by collaborative governance regimes. The 
chapter is concluded by proposing a cycle between policy capture and policy stagnation in 
Canterbury’s freshwater politics.  
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8.2. How did ECan pursue authority and autonomy in the three case 
studies? 
8.2.1.  Rangitata River case study 
Between 1996 and 1999 there was no operative plan for use of the Rangitata River’s water. In 
response, the New Zealand Fish and Game Council applied for a Water Conservation Order in late 
1999. ECan’s authority over the Rangitata River was threatened by Fish and Game’s WCO application. 
In response, ECan pursued a draft plan and appealed Fish and Game’s proposed WCO at the 
Environment Court in an attempt to establish authority over the Rangitata River.  
Why did ECan not plan for the river prior to the WCO application? ECan councillors Diana Shand 
(Robson, 2001, p.7) and Kerry Burke (Burke, 2010, p.13) both argued that ECan had not devoted 
enough time and resources to planning in the early 1990s. ECan’s first Chief Executive, Malcolm 
Douglass, argued that in the early 1990s ECan adopted an inadequate market-led first-come-first-
served approach to planning (Douglass, 2006, p.28). Farmers noted it would be tactically prudent to 
apply for water consents as soon as possible because consents were granted to those who applied 
first. When farmers realised they were applying for water consents from catchments nearing 
sustainable allocation limits a rush for the remaining water consents occurred. The Environment 
Court criticised the first-come-first-served approach to freshwater management (NZPA, 2004, p.1). 
Consent applications were often challenged at the Environment Court which led to extra costs for 
applicants and objectors (K. Burke, personal communication, March 16, 2012.).  
Malcolm Douglass agreed that first-come-first-served planning resulted in an “increased reliance on 
litigation” (Douglass, 2006, p.28). Writing in 2006, Douglass noted that over $100 million had been 
spent in Canterbury appealing resource consent decisions to the Courts (ibid). Douglass argued that 
the Environment Court is “not the right place for high level strategies to be forged”, and that if the 
money spent on litigation had gone into regional planning, freshwater management in Canterbury 
would be improved (ibid). In sum, ECan pursued a plan for the Rangitata River. This plan would 
resolve the first-come-first-served issuing of consents by placing conditions on future consents.  
8.2.1.1. How well did it work? 
ECan’s Environment Court appeal failed to halt the implementation of a WCO for the Rangitata River. 
The WCO’s rules for minimum flow, an allocation cap, one-for-one flow sharing, and the prevention 
of damming the Rangitata River’s main stem, replaced ECan’s proposed planning rules. ECan failed to 
gain authority over the river’s management. ECan’s autonomy as freshwater managers in Canterbury 
was weakened as the Fish and Game Council successfully used an external power (the Ministry for 
the Environment) to authorise the WCO.  
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ECan’s pursuit of authority and autonomy through a draft plan was unsuccessful because it was 
unable to gain interest group support. ECan potentially could have established its draft plan as an 
alternative to the WCO if it had received support from farmers and environmentalists. The WCO 
process led to a compromise between the applicant (Fish and Game), northern Rangitata irrigators 
(the RDR), and southern Rangitata irrigators (Rangitata South/Ruapuna Irrigation). The off-river 
water storage compromise permitted southern Rangitata irrigators access to irrigation water without 
damming the main stem of the river, while northern Rangitata irrigators maintained their current 
rate of abstraction.  
ECan’s plan attempted to establish patronage with these interest groups. ECan addressed the 
environmental concerns of Fish and Game by setting higher minimum flows for the river. ECan’s plan 
also permitted abstraction by southern Rangitata irrigators. Despite these attempts at patronage, 
ECan’s plan received no support from interest groups. Higher minimum flows threatened the current 
abstraction rate of northern Rangitata irrigators. Fish and Game believed an allocation cap was the 
only way to prevent over abstraction occurring in the future. Southern Rangitata irrigators were 
disappointed that ECan’s plan restricted damming of the river. 
In conclusion, ECan’s pursuit of policy authority and autonomy did not work well in this case study. 
ECan attempted to establish patronage with a variety of interest groups through compromises in its 
planning document. However, the compromises established by the WCO received greater interest 
group support. Thus, ECan was unable to establish authority and autonomy in this case study despite 
attempting to establish patronage with a variety of interest groups. ECan’s inability to establish 
authority or autonomy led to policy stagnation which was only resolved through the application of 
WCO rules in 2006.  
8.2.2. Groundwater case study 
ECan pursued authority and autonomy in the groundwater case study through the creation of 
groundwater zones. ECan separated Canterbury into different groundwater zones using hydro-
geological information obtained from stage one of the Canterbury Strategic Water Study (Morgan et 
al., 2002). ECan calculated how much would be available for abstraction in each zone by tallying 15 
per cent of average annual rainfall and 50 per cent of annual land surface recharge. These were 
ECan’s interim groundwater limits (ECan, 2004). ECan calculated that several zones’ groundwater use 
exceeded sustainable allocation limits. In response, ECan did not issue new groundwater consents in 
these zones unless the applicants were able to prove their abstraction would only have a minor 
effect. Applicants subsequently tested ECan’s limits during Environment Court appeals and resource 
consent hearings.  
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8.2.2.1. How well did it work? 
ECan’s interim limits were not able to halt groundwater abstraction. In the Lynton and Pine Grove 
farms Environment Court case, the Court concluded that the farms should be able to abstract 
groundwater under certain conditions despite ECan’s zonal limits. The Environment Court ruling 
asked ECan to establish how much a groundwater consent holder is allowed to abstract annually, to 
measure how much the consent holders were abstracting, and to control the rate of abstraction to 
ensure lowland stream flows were maintained. In response, ECan established an adaptive 
management scheme for groundwater consents in the Rakaia-Selwyn zone. This adaptive 
management programme was tested by a bulk application of 71 groundwater consents. ECan officers 
attempted to justify the groundwater limits by requesting the denial of all consents, despite this, the 
hearing commissioners decided that abstractions from certain aquifers could be justified.  
Why were ECan unable to establish authority in this case study? The first explanation is that two 
competing scientific models yielded different hydrological responses to groundwater abstraction. 
ECan’s bathtub model – preferred by environmental interest groups – argued that Canterbury’s 
aquifers were interconnected. According to the bathtub model, abstraction from deep aquifers 
would affect flow in the shallow aquifers that fed lowland streams. By contrast, Aqualinc’s 
Canterbury groundwater model – preferred by farmers – argued that Canterbury’s aquifers were 
separated by semi-permeable layers. Aqualinc’s model justified the abstraction of freshwater from 
deeper aquifers because it predicted a negligible effect on shallow aquifers that feed lowland 
streams. Aqualinc’s model could also be used to assess the effects of individual abstractions. ECan’s 
bathtub model was a regional model and was unhelpful in calculating the effects of individual 
abstractions. By contrast, Aqualinc’s model was able to assess the effects of individual abstractions 
through pumping tests and well monitoring to gauge if the abstraction would have an effect on local 
groundwater levels.  
Second, ECan’s groundwater limits were unsuccessful because ECan adopted a precautionary 
approach to groundwater management. Philip Milne argued that ECan needed to identify the 
resource and then determine its capacity for abstraction before limiting its use. ECan, with the 
support of environmental interest groups, had taken a precautionary approach by setting limits first 
which in Milne’s opinion was not supported by the RMA.  
Third, interim planning rules – such as those proposed by ECan for groundwater use – do not have 
the same authority as planning rules that have passed through two public submissions processes. 
ECan’s regional plan was stuck in the first stage of public submissions. Thus, the applicants for 
groundwater consent were able to challenge the assumptions and science underpinning ECan’s limits 
because they did not have the strength of regional planning rules.  
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In conclusion, ECan pursued authority in this case study through interim planning limits. ECan 
established patronage with environmental interest groups who supported these limits. However, 
ECan’s authority was weakened by farming interest groups who challenged ECan’s interim limits in 
Environment Court appeals and resource consent hearings. During these appeals, ECan’s inadequate 
knowledge of the groundwater system and the effects of existing consents was criticised by the 
Environment Court. Furthermore, ECan’s groundwater model was not designed to assess the effects 
of individual abstractions. As a result, the Aqualinc model was used by the Environment Court and 
resource hearing commissioners to justify individual abstractions from deep aquifers. ECan was 
unable to establish authority or autonomy over groundwater policy and as a result policy stagnated.  
8.2.3. Canterbury Water Management Strategy case study 
ECan pursued policy authority and autonomy in this case study through conventional RMA planning 
as well as non-statutory planning. The NRRP was a statutory regional plan written by ECan 
throughout the 2000s to help achieve integrated regional management of natural resources. 
However, the NRRP struggled to pass through the second phase of public submissions, and as such, 
its legal status remained that of a draft planning document until 2011 (Williams, 2011, p.4). 
ECan also pursued authority and autonomy through the non-statutory CWMS. ECan was pivotal in 
the design and funding of the CWMS. Despite this, the Canterbury Mayoral Forum assumed 
responsibility for the CWMS, established the Steering Group for the CWMS, and arranged public 
meetings and a public submissions process to discuss draft versions of the document. Thus, ECan was 
an important actor in the CMWS, however, ECan was just one of many important actors involved. For 
example, farming interest groups helped fund the original quantitative data collection of the CSWS 
along with ECan, MAF, and MfE. Territorial authorities were also involved through the Mayoral 
Forum. Furthermore, the public submissions process allowed environmental and farming interest 
groups to influence the principles, priorities, and targets of the CWMS.  
8.2.3.1. How well did it work? 
ECan has re-established its authority following the publication of the CWMS but has lost some 
autonomy. How did this occur? Following the release of the CWMS, the ECan Act reshaped the 
institutional framework for freshwater management in Canterbury. This Act of Parliament removed 
ECan’s elected councillors and installed commissioners who were given new powers. The new 
powers given to commissioners – such as the ability to amend WCOs and restrict Environment Court 
appeals – gave ECan greater authority over freshwater management in Canterbury. However, the 
devolution of some planning authority to zonal committees – whose members would include farming 
and environmental interest groups, local Māori, and territorial authorities - has dispersed ECan’s 
autonomy for freshwater management and policy.  
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The concord established between farming and environmental interest groups during the 
collaborative CWMS process eroded after the enactment of the ECan Act. Environmental interest 
groups were opposed to the extra powers given to commissioners, especially the ability to amend 
WCOs. By contrast, farming interest groups supported the changes.  
The CWMS had several advantages over ECan’s NRRP as a planning document. First, the non-
statutory CWMS could not be appealed to the Environment Court like the statutory NRRP. Second, 
the CWMS involved farming and environmental interest groups early in the process (from stage 3 of 
the CSWS). By contrast, farmers felt excluded from the NRRP process and perceived Environment 
Court appeals as the best way to express their opinion on the NRRP (NZPA, 2001e, p.4). In sum, ECan 
pursued authority and autonomy through statutory and non-statutory planning documents. ECan’s 
governance structure was reshaped during this process whereupon ECan’s autonomy was weakened 
but its authority was strengthened.  
8.3. MC-NPM hybrid theory 
A hybrid theory of multiple clientelism and New Public Management predicted that ECan would 
maintain autonomy over freshwater management between 1989 and 2010 but that it would struggle 
to exercise authority. The MC-NPM hybrid theory predicted that ECan would attempt to establish 
patronage but not to the detriment of its autonomous decision making. However, the hybrid theory 
also predicted that ECan would only intervene in freshwater management to ensure quantifiable 
outputs (such as resource consents and plans) were met and the environmental effects of freshwater 
use was minimised.  
The case studies highlighted ECan’s attempt to establish patronage as well as the difficulty it 
experienced in establishing authority over freshwater use. As the MC-NPM hybrid theory suggested, 
ECan attempted to establish patronage throughout the three case studies but not to the detriment of 
its decision making autonomy. In the Rangitata River case study, ECan attempted to establish 
patronage by mediating the interests of environmentalists and farmers through a draft plan. In the 
groundwater case study, ECan established a close relationship with environmental interest groups 
who supported ECan’s precautionary approach to groundwater management. In the CWMS case 
study, ECan encouraged environmental and farming interest groups to collaborate through the 
Steering Group phases of the CSWS and CWMS. Despite these attempts at patronage, ECan’s 
autonomy was challenged several times, for example, through WCO applications and Environment 
Court appeals. The success of these appeals highlighted the inability of ECan to set autonomous 
policy throughout the three case studies.  
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As the MC-NPM hybrid theory suggested, ECan intervened in freshwater management when it 
perceived the negative environmental effects of freshwater use. This was illustrated in the 
groundwater case study. ECan set interim limits to groundwater use on the basis of declining lowland 
stream flows in the Rakaia-Selwyn zone. However, these limits were successfully challenged at the 
Environment Court and during resource consent hearings. These challenges illustrated that ECan was 
unable to manage the cumulative environmental effects of freshwater use despite its desire to do so.  
ECan struggled to meet long-term outputs, like regional plans, however they were able to issue 
outputs like resource consents with ease. The issuing of consents without knowledge of how much 
would be abstracted per consent, and the cumulative effect of these consents, made long-term 
planning more difficult and exacerbated the cumulative effects of freshwater use.  
The MC-NPM hybrid predicted that ECan would establish high autonomy but low authority over 
freshwater use in Canterbury between 1989 and 2010. The three case studies illustrated that ECan 
was unable to establish a high level of authority or autonomy over freshwater use. This resulted in 
policy stagnation, in which environmental interest groups sought WCOs on Canterbury’s rivers to halt 
abstraction, and farmers sought resource consents before cumulative limits were put in place 
through fully notified plans.  
Several factors contributed to ECan’s inability to establish authority and autonomy over freshwater 
management. First, the relationships of patronage it established with interest groups were weak. For 
example, in the Rangitata River case study interest groups supported the competing WCO process 
over ECan’s regional plan process. In the groundwater case study, the support of environmental 
interest groups did not help ECan justify its groundwater limits. Thus, despite establishing 
relationships of patronage ECan was unable to maintain autonomy over freshwater management in 
Canterbury due to the alternative policy mechanisms available to environmental and farming interest 
groups. 
Secondly, the techniques available to ECan to manage freshwater through the RMA – such as 
regional plans and resource consents – were ineffective at constraining freshwater use. ECan’s 
authority and autonomy was threatened by its inability to constrain water use. This finding concurs 
with the research of Neil Gunningham (Gunnigham, 2008, p.5), who argued that neither regional 
plans nor consents could constrain water abstraction or ensure allocation of water use to its highest 
value in Canterbury.  
NPM reform had three distinct effects on ECan’s freshwater management between 1989 and 2010. 
First, ECan’s failure to plan for freshwater use in the early 1990s exhibited the hands-off approach to 
natural resource management that typified NPM reform in New Zealand (Upton, 1991). ECan’s 
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failure to plan in the early 1990s affected the organisation’s ability to plan in the late 1990s and early 
2000s when conflicts over freshwater management had already begun. Second, NPM reforms split 
regulatory and policy delivery responsibilities. ECan was responsible for regulating freshwater in 
Canterbury while the Ministry for the Environment was responsible for national freshwater policy. 
However, between 1989 and 2010 New Zealand’s central government failed to create a national 
policy statement for freshwater use (Logan, 2013, pp. 139-164). ECan was thus forced to produce 
regional plans without the explicit guidance of a national policy statement. Third, the privatization of 
irrigation schemes and the removal of farming subsidies in the 1980s typified the retreat of central 
government during the NPM era. Farmers responded by searching for sources of freshwater (often 
groundwater) to help irrigate and intensify their land use. This led to conflict between farmers, who 
cited the economic benefits of irrigation development, and environmentalists, who perceived 
irrigation as the cause of declining freshwater quality and quantity in Canterbury. ECan struggled to 
manage the conflict between these interest groups due to the complexity of producing regional plans 
under the RMA, the difficulty of managing cumulative effects under the RMA, and the difficulty of 
constraining water use through interim plans and resource consents.  
In sum, ECan pursued authority and autonomy in a way that was reminiscent of the MC-NPM hybrid 
theory. However, the MC-NPM hybrid predicted that ECan would be able to retain autonomy over 
freshwater management. The results of WCO applications, Environment Court appeals, and resource 
consent hearings illustrated that ECan was unable to set policy without first bargaining with interest 
groups. In response, ECan explored non-statutory methods of establishing authority and autonomy. 
ECan thus promoted the collaborative Canterbury Water Management Strategy as a guide for 
Canterbury’s future freshwater management.  
8.4. Issues with collaborative governance 
The adoption of collaborative governance in Canterbury’s freshwater politics was hastened by ECan’s 
policy stagnation between 1989 and 2010. Policy stagnation led to prolonged legal hearings between 
farmers and environmentalists over resource consents. Chris Ansell and Alison Gash (2008, p. 544) 
noted these same trends in their own research:  
Collaborative governance has emerged as a response to the failure of 
downstream implementation and to the high cost and politicization of 
regulation. It has developed as an alternative to the adversarialism of 
interest group pluralism and to the accountability failures of managerialism, 
especially as the authority of experts is challenged.   
Collaborative governance offers a new method of resolving the policy stagnation and interest group 
adversarialism observed during this research. However, some researchers note that collaborative 
governance has a naïve conceptualisation of power (Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987; Gray, 1989; Short 
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& Winter, 1999; McCloskey, 2000; Warner, 2006). As a result, collaborative processes can be 
disrupted by power imbalances resulting in their capture. Furthermore, collaborative processes – by 
involving multiple stakeholders - often produce contradictory policy goals that cannot be met 
simultaneously. Status quo policy is likely to be maintained if contradictory policy goals are set.  
8.4.1. Collaboration and power 
Collaborative governance promotes the inclusion of multiple stakeholders when developing policy. 
According to proponents, collaboration can foster trust between stakeholder groups and 
government actors, can resolve political polarisation, and it can help address complex political 
problems with neither one cause nor solution (Leach et al., 2002; Weber, 2003). Despite the 
potential benefits of collaboration listed above, power imbalances in collaborative governance 
processes can potentially undermine their success (Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987; Gray, 1989; Short & 
Winter, 1999; McCloskey, 2000; Warner, 2006). The concerns of these authors align with the critics 
of pluralism who argued that even if everyone’s voice is heard some voices will be heard louder than 
others (Lindblom, 1977).  
Ansell and Gash (2008, pp.551-2) expand on this by arguing “if there are significant power/resource 
imbalances between stakeholders….then effective collaborative governance requires a commitment 
to a positive strategy of empowerment and representation of weaker or disadvantaged 
stakeholders”. In response to power imbalances, Schuckman (2001: 361) argued that local 
government agencies ought to provide assistance to local groups who do not have the resources to 
effectively engage in collaborative processes. Merkhofer, Conway & Anderson (1997) promoted the 
use of a multi-attribute utility analysis to help the public participate in collaborative processes which 
contained a high level of technical and scientific complexity.  
Large environmental interest groups have also criticised collaborative governance arrangements by 
arguing that the negotiating power in these arrangements suits pro-development interest groups 
(Schuckman, 2001, p. 355). Furthermore, these environmental groups have feared that collaborative 
processes which promote consensus decision making will support the maintenance of status quo 
policy (ibid). I argue that if no commitment is made to restructure collaborative arrangements in 
recognition of power and resource imbalances these collaborative arrangements could potentially 
become captured by powerful interest groups.  
The research of Sara Singleton (2000) and Thomas, Bradley, & Davis (2010) have noted this trend of 
policy capture in collaborative governance arrangements. Singleton (2000) investigated a Salmon 
fishery co-management regime between indigenous Indian tribes, federal government, and state 
government in the American Pacific Northwest. Singleton (2000, p.8) concluded that “the weakness 
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of accountability mechanisms and the lack of transparency in decision making has led to the 
perception among some nontribal fishing interests and environmental groups that the state agency is 
at least partly captured by the tribes". Thomas et al., (2010) researched the voting behaviour of 
Fishery Management Councils over ten years. The researchers discovered that “at the state level, 
capture appears to have occurred in 10 of the 16 models” (Thomas et al., 2010, p.461).  
8.4.2. Collaborations normative argument 
Collaboration offers a normative argument by proclaiming that policy ought to include the principles 
and rules agreed upon by a number of different stakeholders: 
…[the] essence of collaborative governance is a new level of social/political 
engagement between and among the several sectors of society that 
constitutes a more effective way to address many of modern societies’ 
needs beyond anything that the several sectors have heretofore been able 
to achieve on their own (Weil and Weil, as quoted in Donahue, 2004, p.2)  
Collaborative policy processes are perceived to be more effective and democratic than managerial or 
technocratic processes. For example, New Zealand’s Land and Water Forum (2012, p. x) argued that 
collaborative processes will be faster, more efficient, and more equitable than previous 
arrangements. The Ministry for the Environment’s Freshwater Reform 2013 and Beyond document 
suggested reforming the RMA to include optional collaborative planning processes (MfE, 2013, p.10).  
Will collaboration resolve the problems observed with Canterbury’s freshwater management during 
this research? I note that the collaborative CWMS has resulted in contradictory policy goals, put 
forward by a variety of stakeholders – such as environmentalists lobbying stronger water quality 
standards alongside farmers lobbying for the expansion of irrigated land space – which cannot be 
achieved simultaneously. For example, studies into nitrate pollution of Canterbury’s groundwater 
predict that with further water storage, and thus increased irrigated land use, nitrification of 
Canterbury’s groundwater will increase (Harris et al. 2009). Nitrification affects several CWMS targets 
such as drinking water quality and ecosystem health. If nitrification to groundwater cannot be limited 
these targets cannot be met. The ECan Act enshrined the values of the CWMS, and thus, zonal 
committees will be responsible for both increasing irrigated land and maintaining water quality 
standards in their catchment.  
The implementation of these goals through zonal committees relies heavily on funding from central 
government. For example, the Irrigation Acceleration Fund57 has promised $35 million in irrigation 
funding throughout New Zealand (MPI, 2014), including $1.71 million58 for the Central Plains Water 
                                                          
57 Previously known as the Community Irrigation Fund.   
58 With a further $4.04 million if ‘key milestones’ can be met.  
 103 
Scheme in Mid-Canterbury (MPI, 2014) and $2.4 million for the Hurunui Water Project in North-
Canterbury (MPI, 2013). This fund is a fraction of the $400 million central government indicated it 
was willing to spend on irrigation infrastructure in January 2013 (Crown Irrigation, 2014). Cabinet 
agreed to spend $80 million through the 2013 budget (Treasury, 2013). By contrast, a joint Ngāi Tahu 
and ECan ecological protection programme – Whakaora Te Waihora (Ngāi Tahu, 2014) – has been 
given $6 million59 in funding for two-to-five years from the Ministry for the Environment. The 
Wainono Lagoon restoration in South Canterbury has also received $2.1 million in funding (MfE, 
2014a).  
Another challenge in meeting the collaborative CWMS targets is enforcing water quality standards on 
individual farmers. Ronlyn Duncan (2014) has highlighted the difficulties of using the Overseer 
nutrient budgeting model as a tool for farm scale management of nutrient pollution. Overseer’s 
inaccuracy and the continued release of new versions that predict varying degrees of nutrient loss 
from the same data are just some of the problems with the model (Duncan 2014, pp.382-3). Duncan 
(2014, p.385) concluded that New Zealand’s land use policy has “been built around the assumption 
that ‘rule by numbers’ would remove ambiguity and provide clarity and certainty for both 
governments and resource users”, however, “it has been shown that the opposite is unfolding, and is 
likely to continue”.  
The targets of the CWMS, agreed upon by farming and environmental interest groups, give 
Canterbury’s new zonal governance regime legitimacy in the absence of democratic elections. 
Central government spending to meet the targets of environmental protection and irrigation 
development appears even. However, the amount of money central government plans to spend on 
irrigation in the coming years will dwarf these environmental remediation projects. Regulating land 
use to achieve water quality targets will be difficult due to the difficulties of measuring nutrient 
pollution from single sources. The cumulative effect of farm pollution will result in greater 
nitrification of Canterbury’s groundwater. The ability of collaborative governance arrangements to 
achieve multiple policy goals needs further investigation.   
I can now offer some answers as to whether collaboration will resolve Canterbury’s vexed freshwater 
management. First, collaboration offers a normative argument which states that public policy should 
be agreed upon by multiple stakeholders. However, this will potentially result in contradictory policy 
goals and targets. Contradictory policy targets might lead some interest groups to leave the 
collaborative process, and this could result in the capture of collaborative processes by the groups 
who choose to remain. Second, collaboration – as seen in the Canterbury case study - does not 
                                                          
59 Another $5.6 million of combined funding from MfE, Ngai Tahu, Environment Canterbury and industry will 
support additional initiatives in tandem with Whakaora Te Waihora.  
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resolve the power imbalances held by members of a collaborative policy process. Unless effort is 
made to resolve these power imbalances, collaborative arrangements could become captured by the 
more powerful interest groups involved.  
These issues highlight the complexity of managing freshwater when interest groups demand 
contrasting policy. For example, central government’s recent decision to promote a mixed appointed 
and elected governance model for ECan from 2016 is justified by citing the “multi-dimensional nature 
of water issues in Canterbury”, and the work still needed to achieve the goals and targets of the 
CWMS (MfE, 2015, p.20). I argue that the collaborative governance processes initiated in 
Canterbury’s freshwater management have struggled, by themselves, to resolve the complex issues 
surrounding the management of Canterbury’s freshwater. This struggle has justified central 
government’s decision to not replace the appointed commissioners with a fully elected council in 
2016. 
In sum, I argue that contradictory policy goals and power imbalances threaten the viability of 
collaborative arrangements in Canterbury’s freshwater management. I propose that these factors 
could result in the capture of collaborative governance processes. Collaborative governance will not 
resolve Canterbury’s vexed freshwater management, but rather, will create new problems for ECan 
to resolve in the future.  
8.5. Authority, Autonomy, and Interest Group influence 
Collaborative governance was promoted as a solution to ECan’s failure to establish authority and 
autonomy between 1989 and 2010. However, I contend that collaborative governance processes 
could potentially become captured by powerful interest groups. Policy capture will have an effect on 
local government authority and autonomy. This next section analyses the relationships between local 
government authority, autonomy and interest groups during New Zealand’s three interest groups 
eras.  
8.5.1. Authority, Autonomy, and Interest Groups in the Corporatist era 
In the corporatist era, policy was written by bureaucrats and specific interest groups side-by-side. As 
a result, bureaucracies held a lot of authority over freshwater management in Canterbury because 
rules, prescriptions, and instructions were followed without recourse to persuasion or force. 
However, autonomy was low because authorities could not establish policy without first bargaining 
with interest groups.  
During this era, interest groups like Federated Farmers were seen as legitimate representatives of 
farmers across New Zealand. Relationships of clientelism were established between government 
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departments such as the Ministry of Agriculture and interest groups like Federated Farmers. 
Government irrigation schemes were “entirely captured” by a small group of users during this period 
(Treasury, 1984, p.47). Capture was sustained because no countervailing interest group contested 
the accommodations given to farmers over freshwater policy. New Public Management reforms 
sought to end policy capture by separating the funding of goods and services from providers, and 
through creating distinct bureaucracies to draft and implement policy.  
8.5.2. Authority, Autonomy, and Interest Groups in the New Public Management 
era 
In the NPM era, local government agencies were given a high level of autonomy over freshwater 
management but authority receded. NPM reforms noted the capture of irrigation schemes by 
farmers, and in response, central government sold irrigation schemes to users. Devolution of 
freshwater management to regional councils, and the its sale of irrigation schemes, illustrated central 
government’s ceding of authority as the dominant user and regulator of natural resources during this 
period. During the NPM era, entrepreneurs were encouraged to develop natural resources for 
economic gain and regional councils were asked to manage the effects of resource use. Local 
government authority was ensured because both environmentalists and farmers initially supported 
the NPM era’s hands-off approach to natural resource management (Bührs & Bartlett, 1993, p.90; 
Liepins & Bradshaw, 1999, p.576). 
The NPM era resulted in policy stagnation. The first two case studies highlighted the difficulty ECan 
experienced in establishing authority through conventional RMA processes during the NPM era. As a 
result, freshwater consents were granted while rules and regulations for freshwater use were still 
being formulated. In response, farming and environmental interest groups challenged ECan’s 
autonomy by pursuing freshwater consents and WCOs against the wishes of ECan. The third 
emergent era of interest group politics, collaboration, was promoted as a solution to the policy 
stagnation of the NPM era.  
8.5.3. Authority, Autonomy and Interest Groups in the Collaboration era 
In the collaboration era, I predict that authority will be strengthened while autonomy will be 
weakened. In Canterbury’s freshwater management, collaboration was promoted as a solution to the 
policy stagnation that emerged during the NPM era. ECan and other actors created the Canterbury 
Water Management Strategy as a collaborative planning document with mutually agreed upon 
principles, targets, and governance arrangements for Canterbury’s freshwater management. The 
ECan Act that followed gave new commissioners greater authority over freshwater management in 
Canterbury to enact the goals of the CWMS. The ability to amend WCOs, set moratoria for consents, 
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and to halt Environment Court appeals, permits ECan to exercise greater authority over Canterbury’s 
freshwater management. 
The collaborative approach continues in Canterbury through the establishment of catchment sized 
zonal committees. I propose that ECan’s autonomy will weaken during the collaborative era due to 
the dispersal of its planning authority across zonal, regional, and national scales. Farming and 
environmental interest groups will potentially become members of these new authorities. If these 
authorities continue the collaborative approach, this will give interest groups greater freedom to 
lobby and bargain over policy at zonal, regional, and national scales. The increased influence of 
environmental and farming interest groups in collaborative governance processes will weaken ECan’s 
autonomy over freshwater management.  
In sum, during the corporatist era of interest group politics government autonomy was weakened as 
interest groups entered into the political process. The corporatist era resulted in the capture of 
freshwater policy by interest groups. In response to capture, during the second NPM era, central 
government ceded authority and local governments adopted a hands-off approach to natural 
resource management. The NPM era resulted in policy stagnation. In response to policy stagnation, 
during the third collaborative era ECan relinquished some autonomy to new zonal and national 
authorities while its authority was strengthened by the ECan Act.  
8.6. Cycle of interest group politics in Canterbury  
I propose that collaborative governance arrangements for Canterbury’s freshwater politics will 
become captured by interest groups. I propose a counterintuitive conclusion that a cycle between 
policy capture and policy stagnation exists in Canterbury’s freshwater politics. Table 9 details the 
cycle between policy capture and policy stagnation.  
 107 
 
Table 9 Proposed cycle of policy capture and policy stagnation in Canterbury’s freshwater 
politics.  
 Colonial era 
(1840 – 1950) 
Corporatist era 
(1950 – 1984) 
New Public 
Management 
era (1984 – 
2010) 
Collaborative 
era (2010 - ) 
Local 
Government 
Authority 
High High Low High 
Local 
Government 
Autonomy 
High Low Low Low 
Outcome Full Autonomy Policy Capture Policy 
Stagnation 
Predicted 
Policy Capture 
 
The interest group cycle highlights the trends between the corporatist and collaborative eras. Local 
government autonomy is weakened through the growing influence of interest groups while authority 
over policy is strengthened. The corporatist era illustrated the same trends, and during this era policy 
became captured by interest groups. In the collaborative era, powerful interest groups – such as 
resource users or nationally organized environmental groups – could use their organisational 
capacity, money, experience, and legal knowledge, to dominant collaborative arrangements (such as 
zonal committees) or to demand maintenance of status quo policy. International research has 
discovered that resource-development interest groups have exercised greater influence than 
environmental interest groups in some collaborative governance arrangements (Echeverria, 2001; 
Schuckman, 2001).  
The interest group cycle provides insight into why ECan struggled to establish authority and 
autonomy over freshwater management between 1989 and 2010. ECan was given authority under 
the RMA to regulate freshwater during the NPM era. During the NPM era, central government 
retreated from active regulation of natural resources and gave this responsibility to regional councils. 
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ECan exhibited this same hands-off approach to freshwater management by failing to plan for 
freshwater throughout the 1990s. By the early 2000s, ECan’s failure to plan led interest groups to 
challenge its autonomy (see first two case studies). ECan’s inability to establish authority after these 
challenges to its autonomy led to policy stagnation and eventually to ECan being restructured by 
central government.  
The solution to policy stagnation was collaboration. My conclusion is that collaboration could result 
in the policy capture last seen during the corporatist era. Policy capture is likely to occur when 
regulators and the regulated industry share common policy goals (McFarland, 2004, p.33), for 
example, farmers capturing collaborative processes to ensure the expansion of irrigated land space in 
Canterbury or environmentalists capturing the process to ensure conservation of freshwater bodies 
in Canterbury. The targets of the CWMS were designed so that the regulator, ECan, had to meet both 
farming and ecological targets. However, ECan will experience difficulty in meeting incompatible 
policy goals, especially when freshwater resources continue to be allocated and water quality is 
projected to get worse in the decades to come (PCE, 2004; PCE, 2013).  
Scholars, bureaucrats, and interest groups are likely to agree that policy capture and policy 
stagnation are both undesirable outcomes for freshwater management. The question remains 
whether the proposed interest group cycle can be broken. To break this cycle, a local government 
agency requires the authority and autonomy to set policy that has been influenced by multiple 
interest groups. Multiple clientelism offers a method – selective and sequential patronage – of 
achieving this. However, ECan’s attempts at selective and sequential patronage during the three case 
studies were unsuccessful.  
As argued earlier, ECan was able to establish relationships of patronage but the overarching RMA 
made it difficult for ECan to constrain water use. The RMA’s cumbersome planning process, the 
ambiguity of its definition of sustainable management, the failure of central government to produce 
a national policy statement, and the effects-based consenting system also restricted ECan’s ability to 
manage freshwater use in Canterbury. Furthermore, interest groups were able to appeal to national 
policy processes, such as WCOs, or to challenge planning and consent decisions at the Environment 
Court. The ECan Act – by restricting Environment Court appeals, permitting moratoria on consents, 
and by allowing commissioners to amend WCOs – has granted ECan’s commissioners far greater 
authority than that held by the previously elected councillors. 
8.7. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the three case studies confirmed that ECan pursued authority and autonomy over 
freshwater management through regional plans, non-statutory plans, interim plans, consents, and 
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Environment Court appeals. ECan’s pursuit of authority and autonomy only came after a period of 
inactivity in the early 1990s in which ECan adopted a hands-off approach to freshwater management 
influenced by NPM reforms. This approach led to conflict between farming and environmental 
interest groups in Canterbury. ECan responded to the conflict by establishing relationships of 
patronage with these interest groups as the theory of multiple clientelism suggested, however, 
patronage alone was not enough to grant ECan authority over freshwater management. As a result, 
policy stagnated and ECan was forced into pursuing non-statutory collaborative methods to resolve 
the conflict and to gain authority over freshwater management. This research, and the scholarly 
literature, suggests that collaborative governance – as a solution to ECan’s policy stagnation between 
1989 and 2010 – risks becoming captured by powerful interest groups.  
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9. Chapter Nine 
Conclusion 
9.1. Introduction 
This research investigated ECan’s pursuit of authority and autonomy over freshwater management in 
Canterbury between 1989 and 2010. The research discovered that ECan was active in pursuing 
authority and autonomy through a variety of statutory and non-statutory techniques. ECan 
established relationships of selective and sequential patronage as multiple clientelism predicted. 
However, ECan was unable to establish authority and autonomy. ECan’s failure to establish authority 
and autonomy led to policy stagnation which justified the adoption of collaborative governance. 
This chapter concludes the thesis. It begins by noting the research’s contribution to knowledge. The 
chapter then raises questions for future researchers before noting the implications of the research 
findings for public policy.  
9.2. Contribution to knowledge 
This thesis provides a unique analysis of Canterbury’s freshwater politics. The proposed interest 
group cycle offers an alternative to conspiratorial explanations of Canterbury’s freshwater politics. 
For example, Sam Mahon, a Cantabrian artist and freshwater activist, argued that ECan’s failure to 
plan for freshwater was part of a broad conspiracy for control of the resource by farming interest 
groups and the ECan council60. Mahon’s argument was that ECan did not plan for freshwater use to 
allow for its continued abstraction by commercial farming interest groups. By contrast, this research 
noted that ECan’s failure to plan was not due to a lack of effort. ECan did fail to plan for freshwater in 
the early 1990s, preferring a hands-off approach to planning, which was supported by government 
ministers who argued that intervention in land use should only occur if there are significant 
environmental effects (Upton, 1991, p.3018). However, once the cumulative environmental effects 
of land and freshwater use became apparent in the early 2000s, ECan attempted to plan, manage 
and regulate freshwater use through a variety of techniques.  
Others argued that ECan’s failure to plan for freshwater can be explained by the organisation’s 
competing planning priorities and its lack of infrastructure ownership. For example, research 
interviewees61 observed that urban air pollution planning had taken precedent over freshwater 
                                                          
60 He makes these arguments over the course of two books entitled Water Thieves (2006) and Franzi & The 
Great Terrain Robbery (2011). 
61 Grant McFadden (personal communication, April 17, 2013) argued there was a lack of central Government 
guidance following the introduction of the RMA. This is supported by the first ECan chairman, Richard Johnson, 
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planning in the 1990s. It was also argued that ECan had not been granted trading enterprises, 
infrastructure, or ports that were bestowed to other regional councils in New Zealand during local 
government reform (Douglass, 2004b, p.6). According to the argument, this restricted ECan’s income 
and its ability to fund freshwater planning. However, this research illustrated that ECan put a lot of 
effort into freshwater planning and scientific analysis of Canterbury’s freshwater resources. I argue 
that ECan’s failure to plan is better explained by the difficulty of producing a fully notified plan under 
the RMA. The RMA framework, which allows for Environment Court appeals on two phases of public 
submissions, significantly slowed regional planning.  
9.3. Contribution to theory 
Some of the predictions of the MC-NPM hybrid theory were confirmed in this research. As the MC-
NPM hybrid theory predicted, ECan attempted to establish patronage but not to the detriment of its 
decision making autonomy. Furthermore, as the MC-NPM hybrid theory predicted, ECan intervened 
in freshwater management when it perceived the negative environmental effects of freshwater use. 
The MC-NPM hybrid predicted that ECan would choose to deliver quantifiable outputs over long-
term planning outcomes. The case studies discovered that ECan delivered some outputs with ease, 
such as consents, but struggled on more difficult outputs like regional plans. The MC-NPM hybrid 
predicted that ECan would establish autonomy but would struggle to exercise authority. However, as 
the case studies illustrated, ECan was unable to establish autonomy and its freshwater management 
decisions were successfully challenged by non-governmental interest groups. ECan’s struggle to 
establish authority and autonomy led to policy stagnation and the subsequent adoption of 
collaborative governance.  
The MC-NPM hybrid theory contributes to the theory of multiple clientelism by examining it in a 
modern context. This research highlighted that the context of Canterbury’s freshwater management 
in the 1990s and 2000s differed from Culhane’s research in the 1970s. Furthermore, the recent trend 
towards collaborative governance threatens the ongoing relevance of multiple clientelism. A local 
government agency needs to mediate between interest groups to establish selective and sequential 
patronage. In a collaborative governance arrangement, the agency loses this unique bargaining 
position as interest groups are actively engaged at all stages of policy making.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
who argued that “successive government had failed to provide regional councils with a clear direction on 
natural resources policy and standards since the Resource Management Act was created in 1991” (Williams, 
2010a, p.4) . By contrast, Kerry Burke (personal communication, March 16, 2012) argues a focus on air 
pollution in the 1990s led the council to delay production of water plans.  
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9.4. Questions for further research 
The question remains whether ECan can avoid the sequence of policy stagnation and capture 
observed in this thesis. Both policy stagnation and capture are undesirable results for Canterbury’s 
freshwater management. Thus, continued investigation of appropriate freshwater governance 
arrangements is needed. This raises a further question of whether there are methods other than 
multiple clientelism or collaboration that will grant a local government agency authority while 
remaining influenced by interest groups. Research is needed on governance arrangements that 
enable local government agencies to exercise appropriate authority and autonomy while remaining 
open to interest groups and other stakeholders.  
Further research into the legacy of New Public Management reforms in New Zealand will help clarify 
the extent to which it still influences New Zealand’s public management. Is NPM still the dominant 
paradigm in New Zealand’s public management or has New Zealand entered a phase of post-NPM 
reform (e.g. Duncan and Chapman 2010)? If New Zealand has entered a phase of post-NPM reform, 
what are the implications for freshwater and natural resource management? Are there other public 
management philosophies beyond NPM or post-NPM that contemporarily influence New Zealand’s 
bureaucracy?  
Further research is needed on the recent institutional changes in ECan. Are the collaborative zonal 
committees becoming captured as the interest group cycle proposes? Are zonal committees 
achieving the aspirational targets of the CWMS? What relative authority will the regional council and 
zonal committees exercise once democratically elected councillors return to ECan (MfE, 2015)? How 
will the transition to democracy occur, and will this transition reignite tensions between farming and 
environmental interest groups? How will commissioners, zonal committee members, or regional 
councillors address emergent social and biophysical freshwater values? How will ECan manage land 
use for water quality given the problems with tools, such as Overseer, that are currently available? 
Canterbury’s freshwater managers will have to address these issues in the coming years.  
9.5. Implications for policy 
Collaborative governance has been enthusiastically embraced as a solution to the problems of 
freshwater management in New Zealand (Land and Water Forum 2012; MfE 2013). A significant 
implication for policy highlighted by this research is the potential capture of collaborative 
arrangements by powerful interest groups. Researchers and policy makers must critically engage 
with the benefits and drawbacks of collaborative governance. For example, Ansell and Gash (2008: 
549) have noted a trend in measuring the social and procedural outcomes of collaborative 
governance rather than ecological outcomes. In a Canterbury context, the research of Lomax et al., 
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(2010) focused on the social and procedural benefits of the collaborative approach during the writing 
of the CWMS. Auditing of the ecological outcomes of collaborative governance is also required in 
Canterbury.  
This research also highlighted flaws with the RMA’s consenting and planning processes. The RMA has 
been in a constant state of reform since its enactment in 1991. However, unlike critics who have 
argued that the RMA has been too restrictive of natural resource use (McShane et al., 1999), I argue 
that it has permitted the deterioration of New Zealand’s natural resources through the cumulative 
effects of individual resource uses. New Zealand’s natural resource management needs to progress 
from a narrow focus on the effects of activities – whether singular or cumulative – towards a more 
holistic focus on the urban, rural, wild and scenic environments New Zealanders collectively desire. 
9.6. Conclusion 
The introduction chapter noted that New Zealand’s local government agencies struggled to exercise 
autonomy during the 1960s and 1970s. The third chapter noted that the 1980s was a period of 
significant local government restructuring. I conclude that the Canterbury Regional Council still 
struggled to exercise autonomy as well as authority following the 1980s reforms. In response, 
Canterbury’s local government was once again reformed through the Environment Canterbury 
(Temporary Commissioners and Improved Water Management Act) in 2010.  
In the future, policy capture will be the biggest threat to an efficient and equitable freshwater 
management regime in Canterbury. New collaborative governance arrangements have the positive 
effect of engaging a wide range of stakeholders in the management of Canterbury’s freshwater 
resources. However, new collaborative governance arrangements will struggle to avoid capture due 
to the disproportionate power held by stakeholders and the difficulty of addressing the plurality of 
social, ecological, and economic values in society. Given this, local government agencies in 
Canterbury with responsibility for freshwater management will continue to struggle in the pursuit of 
authority and autonomy. 
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Appendix One 
The pre-colonial management of freshwater in Canterbury 
According to Canterbury’s Ngāi Tahu tribe “water is central to all Māori life” (Te Rūnanga o Ngāi 
Tahu, 1999, p.5). Freshwater is a taonga (gift) left by ancestors to provide and sustain life for the next 
generation. Thus, Māori give freshwater prominence in their creation stories. Ngāi Tahu asserts 
freshwater is “the promoter of all life” and that the condition of freshwater is “a reflection on the 
health of Papatūānuku”62 (Garven et al., 1997, p. 36).  
Māori creation stories recited the relationship between gods – representative of natural resources 
such as the forest (tāne-mahuta), the sea (tangaroa), and cultivated food (rongo-hīrea) - as a family 
structure. According to Hong-Key Yoon the environment is modified by the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of the resource family structure (Yoon, 1994). Creation is therefore not a single event 
but “an evolutionary process in which people played a part” (Yoon, 1994, p.163). Protocols on how to 
use natural resources, such as freshwater, come from the stories told about these personified 
deities.  
Fish were an important food for Māori communities. Freshwaters life-giving force (mauri) was 
recognised. Freshwater was managed through a variety of practices to ensure its life giving force was 
maintained, for example, restrictions (rāhui) were placed on stretches of water to maintain food 
stocks.  
Mana is the energy and consciousness of all things, and tapu reflects the sacred nature of a vessel 
(say a person, or natural object) which contains mana (Young, 2004, p.49). As David Young (2004, 
p.50) explains, rāhui were proclaimed by someone with mana, usually through the erection of a pole. 
This was “a substitute for civil law” over freshwater areas of significance (ibid). Thus, Māori managed 
freshwater through practices which protected food stocks and the sacred qualities of freshwater.  
European settlers were of the opinion that no legal mechanism for management of freshwater 
existed prior to their colonisation. This can be explained, in part, by Māori management of 
freshwater overlying physical and metaphysical realms. In the case of Wi Parata v Bishop of 
Wellington (1877) it was recorded that “[o]n the foundation of this colony, the Aborigines were 
found without…any settled system of law” (as quoted in Wheen, 2002, p.261). This misjudgement 
permitted transition from existing Māori law to English common law.  
                                                          
62 Papatūānuku is the female Māori deity of ‘the land’.  
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Appendix Two 
The drainage of Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere 
English common law in colonial New Zealand focused on defining rights to resources based on land 
ownership (Wheen, 2002, p.261). English common law supplanted Māori law and introduced riparian 
rights for landowners. Riparian rights accorded landowners the right to use water for domestic and 
stock watering purposes as long as the flow of water through their property was not diminished in 
quality or quantity (Roche, 1994, p.16). The drainage of Te Waihora / Lake Ellesmere revealed a 
conflict between colonial property law and Māori customary law. Of importance to this thesis, the 
draining demonstrated that the settlers’ freshwater management was designed to encourage the 
growth of commercial farming in Canterbury. New government agencies gained authority by 
enforcing colonial management over freshwater bodies not sold by Māori, and thus, were able to 
establish productive farming around the lake’s margin.  
Te Waihora is located along Canterbury’s eastern shoreline south of Banks Peninsula. It is a broad 
and shallow lagoon with an artificial outlet on the southern shore of the lake which affects its size at 
different times of the year (Varona, 2012). The outlet was established by local Māori to ensure the 
maintenance of food supply (mahinga kai) by regulating the amount of freshwater in the lake.  
The Kemp Purchase (1848) was an agreement between Ngāi Tahu and the Crown to sell South Island 
land. According to Waitangi Tribunal reports (1991, p.459), Māori made it clear the sale was to omit 
Te Waihora (ibid). However, in 1868, a European farmer, Charles Chapman, opened Te Waihora’s 
outlet himself in order to maximise the amount of productive land around the lakes shoreline 
(Singleton, 2007). Crown Representative Walter Mantell was informed by Ngāi Tahu that erosion of 
the purchase’s eastern border by European settlers was unacceptable. Mantell deliberately 
disregarded the rights of Ngāi Tahu by failing to comply with terms of Kemp Purchase which 
preserved their access to Te Waihora (Waitangi Tribunal, 1991, p.466). 
The Ellesmere Lands Drainage Board held authority for controlling lake levels from 1906 to 1947 
(Douglass, 2004b, p.31). This ensured the priority of commercial land users to lower the lake levels 
despite the Kemp Purchase agreement. Failure to comply with the terms of the Kemp Purchase 
guaranteed the New Zealand government decision making authority over all freshwater bodies in 
Canterbury.  
Freshwater management, through the drainage of lakes and the construction of stop-banks along 
rivers to prevent flooding (Ward & Scarf, 1993, p.64), encouraged the expansion of commercial land 
use. Riparian rights granted landowners use of freshwater which passed through their property. 
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These two developments helped establish farming in Canterbury, and farmers would go on to hold 
prevailing influence over freshwater management in the region for the next 140 years.  
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Appendix Three 
The political power of farmers in Canterbury between 1850 – 1960 
Farmer prominence in Canterbury was evident in freshwater management as well as the land sale 
and distribution debates. Land regulation was considered the biggest political issue of the early 
colonial period (Hawke, 1985, p.22; Brooking, 1996, p.79). Stevan Eldred-Grigg (1977; 1980) 
examined Canterbury’s unequal distribution of land, wealth, and political power during the colonial 
period. He described Canterbury’s dominant landowners as the Southern Gentry. Eldred-Grigg argued 
these landowners were able to play a “heavily disproportionate role in the social, political and 
economic life of New Zealand” (Eldred-Grigg, 1977, p.3).  
Canterbury was described as being more “aristocratic” than other regions in New Zealand (Jourdain, 
1925, p.15), with land owners “a favoured race who (sic)...had been elevated into a position of 
boundless wealth and disgraceful monopoly” (Scotter, 1965, p.25). Canterbury’s land and animal 
stocks were owned by a few powerful individuals during the global economic crisis which lasted from 
the late 1870s to the 1890s (Eldred-Grigg, 1977, p.4; Sutch, 1966). In response, the John Balance led 
Liberal government passed a series of important land reforms designed to address this inequality 
(Gardner, 1992; Brooking, 1996). 
The 1894 Land for Settlements Act gave government the authority to purchase private land in order 
to subdivide it into small farming plots. W.J. Gardner (1992) examined the sale of “Ready Money” 
Robinson’s Canterbury estate through the Land for Settlements Act, and argued it was a political 
success for the Liberal government. The reforms increased land ownership. Increased land 
ownership, in combination with the introduction of refrigeration technology which expanded the 
range of produce New Zealand could export, laid the foundation for New Zealand’s primary produce 
industries in the 20th century. Jim McAloon argued “the primacy of agricultural cultivation was 
something which few dared to challenge” during this period (McAloon, 2002, p.101). 
Farmers were political supporters of the Liberal government. The Liberals were described as being 
“literally, government of farmers, by farmers, for farmers” (Bremer & Brooking, 1993, p.110). William 
Scotter (1965a, p.352) argued that examination of the colonial period leaves no doubt that the state 
heavily assisted the farming community. During the early 20th century the Liberal introduced 
freshwater policy which addressed public utilities63 and flood control64. (Ward & Scarf, 1993, p.64) 
                                                          
63 The 1920 Counties Act; the 1920 Municipal Corporations Act; the 1928 Public Works Act. 
64 The 1908 Land Drainage Act.  
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Farming interest groups formed in New Zealand during the early 20th century. A pamphlet written by 
James Glenny Wilson in April 1903 promoted national farmer organisation in the face of 
countervailing trade union organisation. There were already a variety of organised interest groups in 
New Zealand – formed by employers, manufacturers, teachers, and doctors – but farming 
organisation was more difficult due to the distance between members and ideological differences 
over land tenure (Cleveland, 1972, p.69). Organisation was initially pushed by North Island dairy 
farmers (Cleveland, 1972, p.72).  
By October 1906 Wilson’s Farmers’ Union had introduced eight bills of recommendation to 
Parliament and had been recognised by the Prime Minister as representative of farmers’ throughout 
the nation. The Union produced the influential Farmers’ Union Advocate newspaper. The newspaper 
engaged in an early “public relations” campaign (Cleveland, 1972, p.74). The newspaper and the 
Farmers Union were able to relay information to politicians about farmers’ opinions through 
telegraph communication.  
The Union were internally divided between small and large landowners. Small landowners, often 
supporters of the Liberals due to their land reforms in the 1890s, feared that large landowners could 
gain monopolies if allowed to purchase an unlimited amount of freehold land. The Farmers Union 
were divided over the 1906 Land Amendment Act which established a limit on how much 
unimproved land one person could own, addressing the monopoly fears of small landowners 
(Cleveland, 1972, p.79). 
The Union unified against the common threat of trade unions. Port strikes threatened agricultural 
exports which were crucial to farmer’s income. In 1913, the Farmers’ Union members were recruited 
as a port strike breakers – Massey’s Cossacks65 - which Les Cleveland argued “was to dispose finally 
of the myth of its political neutrality” (Cleveland, 1972, p.82). Left wing commentator Chris Trotter 
(2007, pp.122-3) believed the strike breaking secured the economic future of New Zealand’s 
agricultural exports.  
William Massey – Prime Minister during the port strike – had “become the symbol of the farmer 
militant” (Graham, 1963, p.178). “Farmer Bill” represented the man on the land and illustrated the 
power of farming interests during the early 20th century. This popularity was not maintained as 
farmers became increasingly disillusioned with Massey. This led to the creation of the Country Party, 
which although short lived, succeeded in getting several Members of Parliament elected (Graham, 
1963). 
                                                          
65 Named after the contemporary Prime Minister William Massey (Trotter, 2007).  
 119 
An observer in 1938 noted the rural bias in New Zealand politics (Graham, 1963, pp.197-198). 
Farmers were the “backbone of the country”, a fact accepted by rural and urban citizens alike. Urban 
industry was “parasitical in that they depend for their very existence” on the output of the farmer 
(ibid). Urban New Zealanders accepted that the prosperity of New Zealand relied on grasslands 
production.  
Federated Farmers – New Zealand’s influential farming interest group – was formed in 1946. 
Federated Farmers evolved from the Farmers Union and was “an amalgamation of a number of 
primary producer organisations” (Cleveland, 1972, p.83; cf. Perry, 1992, p.43). Federated Farmers 
constitution was designed to overcome the problems which had prevented a cohesive farming voice 
in the past. These problems – provincial sentiments, diverse political attitudes, and conflicting 
interests between different types of farming – were resolved by distinguishing between dairying, 
meat, wool, and horticultural production, while allowing these groupings to be represented at sub-
provincial, provincial, and national levels (Bremer & Brooking, 1993, p.112). Federated Farmers, by 
creating a structure which provided autonomy for a variety of different farming types within 
geographically diverse areas with some coordinated central control, held the power and flexibility 
necessary to mobilise a farming voice in New Zealand.  
The Farmers’ Union and Federated Farmers highlighted the emergence of interest group influence 
over land use and freshwater policy. For example, farming interest groups and local booster groups 
such as the Canterbury Progress League lobbied government to construct the Rangitata Diversion 
Race irrigation system in Mid-Canterbury during the 1940s as well as the establishment of irrigation 
test farms (Evans & Cant, 1981, p.59; Hopkinson, 1997; Wood & Brooking, 2001, p.90). The era of 
corporatism in New Zealand interest group politics – between 1950 and 1984 (Cleveland, 1972; 
Perry, 1992; Bremer & Brooking, 1993) - ensured that farmers captured freshwater policy, such as 
irrigation, for their own private needs. However, during the corporatist period, countervailing 
environmental interest groups emerged to challenge the dominant ethos of freshwater policy and 
management. The emergence of multiple interest group influence over freshwater policy in the late 
20th century suggests a weakening of government autonomy over freshwater policy.  
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Appendix Four 
Canterbury Strategic Water Study multi-stakeholder steering 
committee (Whitehouse et al., 2008, p.60). .   
Andy Pearce Chairman 
Graeme Sutton Irrigation New Zealand 
Mike Hodgen Hurunui Community Water Development 
Working Group 
Ross Millichamp Fish and Game 
Norm Williamson Amuri Irrigation Scheme 
Murray Lane Water Rights Trust 
Eddie Glass Ashburton Community Water Trust 
Kelvin Coe Federated Farmers, Selwyn District Council 
David O’ Connell Ngāi Tahu 
Bill Hood Forest and Bird 
Bob Frame Landcare Research 
Ken Hughey Lincoln University 
Bob McDowall NIWA 
Ian Mackenzie Ashburton Community Water Trust, Eiffelton 
Irrigation Scheme 
Ann Jarman Selwyn District Community Development 
Roger Sutton Orion Group 
Tony Howey Opuha Water Company 
Nick Brown Economist 
Don McFarlane South Canterbury Water Trust 
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Appendix Five 
Canterbury Water Management Strategy steering group members 
(Mayoral Forum, 2009, p.66). 
Bede O’Malley Chair and Mayoral Forum representatives 
Mike Jebson Central government agencies 
Brian Lester and Bryan Jenkins Chief Executive representatives 
Peter Townsend Industry representative / regional economic 
David O’Connell Ngāi Tahu 
Murray Rodgers Water Rights Trust 
Grant McFadden Historical knowledge of water management in 
Canterbury 
Angus McKay and Eugenie Sage Environment Canterbury councillors 
Graeme Sutton Irrigation New Zealand 
Peter Scott Opuha Water Supply Partnership and southern 
region representative 
Martin Clements Fish and Game 
Hugh Canard Kayaking, recreation, and tourism 
representative 
Alastair James Canterbury District Health Board 
Edith Smith Forest and Bird 
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Appendix Six 
List of government publications cited in the thesis.  
Central Government 
Publications 
ECan Publications Other Publications  
Crown Irrigation, 2014. 
Land and Water Forum, 2012. 
Ministry for Primary Industries 
(MPI), 2013; 2014.  
Ministry for the Environment 
(MfE), 2002; 2011; 2013; 
2014a; 2014b; 2015. 
New Zealand Government, 
2001.  
Parliamentary Commissioner 
for the Environment (PCE), 
2004; 2013.  
State Services Commission, 
(SSC) 2001.  
Statistics New Zealand, 1995; 
1999; 2002; 2003; 2007; 2009. 
Treasury, 1984; 1987; 2013.  
 
Hydrology 
Ingles, 2000; Aitchison-Earl, 
2001; Miskell, 2001; Mosley, 
2001; Hunt & Scott, 2007; Bell 
& van Voorthuysen, 2008; 
Harris et al., 2009.  
Policy  
Aitchison Earl et al., 2004; 
ECan, 2004; 2006; 2007; 
Veltman et al., 2004; White, 
2009.  
 
Environment Court cases  
Rangitata South Irrigation 
Limited v New Zealand and 
Central South Island Fish and 
Game Council – Decision No. 
C109/2004 
Lynton Dairy Limited v the 
Canterbury Regional Council – 
Decision No.C108/2005 
Resource consent hearings 
and court submissions. 
Talbot, 2003; Milne et al., 
2007.  
Non-statutory plans 
Canterbury Strategic Water 
Study 
Morgan et al., 2002; Dark et 
al., 2008; Whitehouse et al., 
2008; Dark et al,. 2009. 
Canterbury Water 
Management Strategy 
Mayoral Forum, 2009.  
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